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The purpose of this collection is to present Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ thesis, and to appraise its validity and shortcomings 25 years 
after the publication of his landmark article in the journal Foreign Affairs. The 
notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ is examined from a multidisciplinary 
perspective and its validity is appraised in the fields of International Relations, 
European Politics, International Law, Political Theory, and International 
History. First, the volume examines Huntington’s contribution from a 
theoretical perspective, focusing on his ideas about politics and the concept 
of civilization. Second, the articles collected in this volume also consider 
Huntington’s thesis in the light of recent events in international politics, 
including the conflict in Ukraine, the rise of ISIS, China–India relations, the 
electoral success of far-right movements in Europe, the refugee crisis in the 
Mediterranean, and the activity of the International Criminal Court in Africa. 
This volume offers to its readers a vibrant and multifaceted conversation 
among established and emerging scholars on one of the most important 
paradigms for the understanding of international politics and the history of the 
twenty-first century. 
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1 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
Introduction
DAVIDE ORSI
Over the past 25 years, Samuel P. Huntington’s article ‘The Clash of 
Civilizations’ (1993) has shaped public opinion and the ways in which the 
academic world thinks about world politics. Events in the Middle-East and 
Asia, American military interventions, the Ukrainian conflict, the refugee crisis 
in the Mediterranean, Brexit, the rise of far-right movements in America and 
Europe challenge our traditional frameworks and seem to show the persistent 
relevance of the controversial notion of a clash between opposing and 
incommensurable values, religions, cultures and beliefs. That article, written 
in 1993, still seems to provide, in particular to the public opinion, a paradigm 
through which to interpret our times.
The purpose of this collection is to offer a critical analysis of Huntington’s 
contentious ideas and to appraise its relevance to the understanding of 
today’s political context. The book aims to be both a guide for students 
looking for an introduction to the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ and a point 
of reference for scholars interested in the debate provoked by Huntington’s 
work. The collection does not present a single univocal interpretative line, but 
it rather offers different approaches and perspectives. Some contributors 
stress the persistent relevance of the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, others 
praise its importance for the study of international relations, others advance a 
strong and polemical criticism. 
Already in 2013, E-International Relations published a collection on the ‘clash 
of civilizations’ to discuss Huntington’s legacy (Barker 2013). Different from 
that book, this collection contains longer essays and has a stronger 
multidisciplinary character. Contributors have indeed considered the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis from the point of view of different disciplines: International 
Relations, Political Science, International Law and Political Theory. 
The Design of the Book
The structure of the book reflects this multifaceted and eclectic approach. A 
first series of contributions examines the theoretical content and legacy of 
2Introduction
Huntington’s ideas. Chapter one provides a sort of introduction to the thesis 
defended by Huntington in the 1993 article and in the 1996 book. To this end, 
it illustrates the philosophical root of their arguments by placing the theory of 
the ‘clash of civilizations’ in the context of the realist tradition in international 
political thought. In Chapter two, Ian Hall focuses on the concept of 
civilization by comparing Huntington’s theory to Arnold J. Toynbee’s. Hall 
underlines some of the similarities between the two thinkers, especially in 
their aims and assumptions, but also some of their important differences, with 
particular regard to their divergent accounts of the relationships and 
encounters between civilizations. In his essay (Chapter three), Erik Ringmar 
advances a much more polemical interpretation of Huntington’s idea on the 
‘clash of civilizations’, linking it to a quintessentially American way of relating 
to other civilizations. 
In their contribution (Chapter four), Gregorio Bettiza and Fabio Petito consider 
the rise of discourses, institutions and practices built on the premise that 
civilizations and inter-civilizational relations matter in world politics. They 
show that the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm advanced by Huntington is not 
the only possible kind of civilizational analysis of international politics. 
Moreover, they defend the critical potential of civilizational approaches in a 
time of crisis of both national identities and liberal universalizing projects. Jeff 
Haynes (Chapter five) explores the relevance of Huntington’s ideas for the 
understanding of the world after the end of the Cold War, and its importance 
for the ‘return to religion’ in International Relations. At the same time, Haynes 
highlights how in the years after 9/11, and also in response to Huntington’s 
thesis, there has been a rise in attempts of inter-civilizational dialogues, which 
are now facing new challenges. 
Paradigms wish to explain the world and there is no doubt that with his article 
and book Huntington wanted to offer an instrument for the understanding of 
international politics in the twenty-first century. Focusing on an often-
neglected aspect of Huntington’s work, Kim Nossal (Chapter six) examines 
the idea of ‘kin-country rallying’ and argues for its relevance to the 
understanding of international affairs. This notion, much less famous than that 
of clash of civilization, also characterizes Huntington’s paradigm and claims 
that states are part of civilizations and behave like kin. This theory, argues 
Nossal, explains the relations among some countries much better than 
traditional international relations theory. In Chapter seven, Glen M.E. Duerr 
compares the predictions made by Huntington, Fukuyama and Mearsheimer 
on the world after the end of the Cold War, with particular regard to the rise of 
ISIS, the wars in the Middle-East, and the Ukrainian crisis. This latter case is 
of particular interest because Huntington seems to offer contradictory 
statements on the possibility of a conflict between Russia and Ukraine over 
Crimea and the eastern part of the country. The contribution by Anne Khakee 
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(Chapter eight) also examines the Ukrainian case and advances a criticism of 
Huntington’s civilizational analysis. Khakee argues that the current crisis 
between Russia and Western powers can be explained by looking at them as 
clashes between alternative political systems, not civilizations. Chapter nine 
by Anne Tiido is also devoted to the case of Russia and of its foreign policy. 
Tiido instead underlines the role of the idea of civilization in Putin’s 
discourses and actions as well as in Estonian political life after the end of the 
Soviet Union. These contributions examine the relationships between Russia 
and its neighbors, showing both their shortcomings and potential. Chapter 
ten, by Ravi Dutt Bajpai focuses on a non-Western context and on the 
relationships between China and India. Bajpai examines how the self-
perception of being ‘civilization-states’ has shaped the national identities and 
bilateral relations between the two countries. Wouter Werner (Chapter 11) 
writes on an often neglected aspect when appraising the impact and the 
relevance of Huntington’s thesis: that of its influence on the study of 
International Law. Werner considers this in the case of the actions of the 
International Criminal Court in Africa and explores how arguments about 
civilizations are used to counter cosmopolitan claims on human rights and 
international society. Werner shows that the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ is 
important in contemporary normative debate on international law and justice.
As already mentioned, Huntington’s thesis has also had a huge impact on the 
public debate, especially over issues related to multiculturalism and 
relationships with religious minorities. In Chapter 12, Ana Isabel Xavier 
explores the current migrant crisis in the Mediterranean and its perceived link 
with a ‘clash of civilizations’. She also considers the impact of this crisis on 
the policies of the European Union and on the future of the European project. 
In Chapter 13, Jan Lüdert sheds light on the use of the image of the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ by far-right movements in the European political context, by 
examining the electoral success of Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 
German general elections. Lüdert offers a detailed account of the impact of 
Huntington’s ideas on AfD’s political position and rhetoric, with particular 
regard to the refugee crisis and the relationship with Muslim communities. 
As is already clear from this short introduction, the volume offers a rich 
analysis of Huntington’s ideas. It presents the most important arguments and 
ideas grounding the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’, it examines the validity of 
that thesis for the understanding of international affairs and international law 
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1
The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and 
Realism in International 
Political Thought
DAVIDE ORSI
The thought of Samuel Huntington, and in particular his ideas in the 1993 
article and 1996 book Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(2002), have contributed to the conceptual vocabulary through which the 
changing international context has been examined after the end of the Cold 
War and the rise of Islamist terrorism. Huntington’s central thesis that conflicts 
in the post-ideological era are fueled by differences in identity, religion or, 
more generally, culture (Huntington 1993, 22), has had a huge impact on the 
study of international politics. Some praised Huntington for his ability to 
forecast future trends in international affairs. After 9/11, some intellectuals 
even looked up to him as a prophet of the wars of the new century. In the US 
and in Western Europe, the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the 
West and Islam offered arguments to many intellectuals and activists, across 
the political spectrum, who saw in Muslim immigration and the geopolitical 
situations of Muslim countries a danger for a declining and confused West 
(among many others see Fallaci 2002). At the same time, Huntington has 
been loathed as the inspirer of a logic of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ that had some 
resonance in the policies of George W. Bush after 9/11. He has been accused 
of being ignorant of his own and other cultures, and to propose a static and 
caricature-ish description of civilizations, and in particular of Islam (Said 
2001, Adib-Moghaddam 2010). 
This chapter takes a different approach and starts from a different 
methodological presupposition inspired by the British philosopher and 
historian of political thought Michael Oakeshott. While trying to present to 
readers the political and moral thought of Thomas Hobbes, Oakeshott 
claimed that in order to understand a text in political philosophy one should 
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place it in the context of the history of that discipline (1991, 223–228). In so 
doing, it would be possible to highlight those elements that escape from the 
contingencies and the darkness of the time in which philosophers were 
writing. Of course, in the case of a thinker so embedded in his time such as 
Huntington, it may appear as a bold claim to affirm the presence of theoretical 
elements of his thought detached from its time and place. At first glance, it 
seems that Huntington was more interested in offering advice to the American 
political elite, than to contribute to the theoretical understanding of internat-
ional affairs. The questions that a book such as The Clash of Civilizations 
asks are indeed of a practical sort. However, as I hope to demonstrate in this 
short essay, it is possible to find in Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ some elements that are independent from the contingencies of 
his, and our, time and that can be linked to the history of the philosophical 
reflection on international affairs. These, I contend, are the elements that still 
appeal to readers from both the academic world and the general public.
Starting from this methodological presupposition, the aim of this chapter is to 
present and understand some of the main aspects of Huntington’s argument 
as presented in the book and article on the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 
1993, Huntington 2002). I claim that his thought can be seen in continuity with 
the realist tradition in International Relations and as one of the most 
prominent and strong critical critiques of utopianism in international political 
thought. 
The Realist Tradition in International Political Thought
In order to show Huntington’s contribution to realism, it is first necessary to 
offer a brief overview of that tradition. Realism is indeed one of the most 
recognizable voices in international political thought and is still holding center 
stage in the study of contemporary international affairs (see the contributions 
in Orsi, Avgustin, Nurnus 2018). Historians of international political thought 
agree in identifying two sorts of realisms: classical and structural. The former 
starts with Thucydides and continues with thinkers such as Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, E.H. Carr and Morgenthau (Boucher 1998, 47–170); the latter is 
instead influenced by the ‘scientific approach’ and aims to reach a 
quantitative and certain study of politics and is based on the notion of the 
balance of power (Mearsheimer 2013). My contention in this chapter is that 
while Huntington criticized some of the central tenets of structural realism, his 
theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ can be seen in continuity with classical 
realism. To this end it is worth highlighting some of the main ideas that define 
the identity of classical realism in the philosophical reflection on international 
affairs. 
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Notwithstanding their many differences, classical realist thinkers shared a 
tragic vision of life (Lebow 2003; Rösch and Lebow 2017) according to which 
human beings have to take difficult decisions in a condition of uncertainty and 
with incomplete knowledge of reality. According to this view, all humans are 
embedded in changing contexts with no certain guide. This conception is 
linked to a profound critique of all forms of universalism, according to which it 
is possible, by the use of reason, to reach universal moral truths. The tragedy 
of the human condition also lies in its inescapability. Neither human reason 
nor universal moral law can come to the rescue of human beings. 
At the same time, human nature is conceived of as self-interested. Human 
nature shapes the character of any human activity and, most of all, of politics. 
However, this condition is even worse in international politics. It is indeed in 
the international realm that the real nature of politics appears in all its force. 
For example, this fundamental idea is at the center of the political theory of 
one of the most important realist thinkers of the twentieth century: Hans 
Morgenthau. Writing at a time when International Relations as a discipline 
was not established as yet, Morgenthau’s declared purpose was far from that 
of any scholar of our time: to find the eternal truths of politics (Morgenthau 
1955). To this end, he applied to the study of politics the ideas of his teacher, 
the German legal philosopher Carl Schmitt. In Schmitt’s The Concept of the 
Political, politics is conceived in terms of power. That this is the character of 
politics is well represented in the description of the state of nature by Hobbes. 
In the Leviathan, the state saves human beings from the constant threat of 
violent death: for Schmitt’s Hobbes, the authority of the state derives from its 
ability to protect the citizens, who, in return, give their obedience. For Schmitt, 
there is no distinction between politics and war and indeed politics is the 
continuation of war by other means (Foucault 2003). The relations among 
states are characterized not by actual war, but by a constant state of 
belligerence in which the world is divided along the lines of friend/foe (Schmitt 
2008, 37). 
Conflict is a constant feature of human history, and of international history in 
particular. As Martin Wight famously put it, in international politics, no 
progress is possible and if some people from the distant past returned to 
present and looked at international affairs, they ‘would be struck by 
resemblances to what they remembered’ (Wight 1966, 26). As a 
consequence, as shown by Machiavelli (1988) but also by other realist 
thinkers, the only morality in politics is that identified with expediency and 
prudence and with the interest of the political community. Good politicians are 
those who protect their state and increase its power. In the absence of 
universal moral laws, the political woman/man should use her/his prudence to 
face difficult situations and ‘to make a friend of every hostile occasion’ 
(Oakeshott 1991, 60). 
8The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and Realism in International Political Thought
In addition to a tragic conception of human life, and the supremacy of power 
over ethics, realism in modern international political thought is also shaped by 
what Nicholas Rengger has recently defined as an ‘anti-pelagian imagination’ 
(2017). One of the characters defining this tendency is the aversion against 
the hope for universal moral truths (such as that about the existence of 
universal rights) to be a guide for political action. Moreover, anti-pelagianism 
fights against the belief that human history displays progress. Of course anti-
pelagianism is not exclusively a character of realist international thought and 
many liberal theorists, starting with Judith Shklar, share distrust in utopian 
thinking (Rengger 2017, Chapter six). However, it is fair to say that the 
polemical targets of many classical realist thinkers were the utopian projects 
of their own times. If we look again, as an example, at Hans Morgenthau, we 
see that he criticized international liberalism in world politics. Its fault is not to 
acknowledge the centrality of power in politics and the ubiquity of evil in the 
world (1948). 
To recapitulate, classical realist thinkers ground their argument on a tragic 
conception of human nature, and on the idea that international politics is 
essentially characterized by anarchy and war. Their positions often present a 
critique of utopianism and of the idea that international politics may be 
constrained by law or ethical principles, and is animated by a progress 
towards the best. In the following, I will illustrate the ways in which Hunt-
ington’s theory of ‘clash of civilizations’ is related to these ideas.
Huntington’s Critique against Structural Realism
As is well known, the main objective of Huntington’s article and book on the 
‘clash of civilizations’ was to offer a new paradigm to interpret world politics 
after the end of the Cold War. The historical events following the unexpected 
dissolution of the Soviet Union were redesigning world history and putting to 
the test established theories of international relations. Also inspired by Kuhn’s 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Huntington believed that the events 
such as the war in the Balkans and Chechnya showed the inadequate 
explanatory power of previous framework for interpreting and understanding 
world politics (Huntington 2002, 29–30). What was needed was a new 
paradigm and Huntington offered a new way of seeing international affairs 
grounded on the claim that ‘the great divisions among humankind and the 
dominating source of conflict will be cultural’ (1993, 22). 
A first aspect to clarify is that this does not equate to saying that before the 
end of the USSR and during the Cold War culture and ideas were irrelevant 
or did not enter the equation explaining international conflicts. It rather means 
that the origin and reasons of war would not be the underlining competition 
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between superpowers – a competition that during the Cold War was not just 
material, but also ideological – but rather the conflict between 
incommensurable ways of seeing the world and ways of life, those shaped by 
civilizations. In a sense, Huntington claims, civilizations have always been 
there: ‘human history is the history of civilizations’ (Huntington 2002, 40). This 
character of history was, however, hidden under the more apparent and 
manifest conflict between the two superpowers and their allies. My contention 
in this chapter is that this vision of world politics can be better understood 
when seen in the context of the realist and anti-pelagian tradition in 
international political thought. However, if we look at both Huntington’s article 
and book on the ‘clash of civilizations’ we can see that one of their main 
concerns was to show the inadequate explanatory force of realism, and 
especially Mearsheimer’s theory (Huntington 2002, 37). 
According to Huntington, in realist theory ‘states are the primary, indeed, the 
only important actors in world affairs, the relations among states is one of 
anarchy, and hence, to ensure their survival and security, states invariably 
attempt to maximize their power’ (2002, 33). According to Huntington, this 
approach is able to explain the importance of states, it does not take into 
account the fact that states define their interests not just in terms of power: 
‘values, cultures, and institutions pervasively influence how states define their 
interests’ (2002, 34). In the civilizational paradigm, states are still important, 
and power politics is still shaping their actions. However, these should be 
conceived within certain frames of reference: civilizations. These are ‘a 
collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena’, the ‘broadest cultural 
entity’, ‘the highest cultural grouping of people’. There are some common 
objective elements that define civilizations ‘such as language, history, religion, 
customs, institutions, and the subjective self-identification of people’ (2002, 
43). In the post-Cold War era, civilizations, and in particular their religious 
aspects, are the source of identity and meaning for a growing numbers of 
individuals and groups. Therefore, they shape the decisions of states and the 
study of international affairs should take this into account. 
As many critics have noted, Huntington’s definition of civilization is so vague 
and generic that it is useless in the actual analysis of world politics. However, 
the theoretical importance of Huntington’s theory in this regard lies in his 
criticism of the realist paradigm and its focus on material interest and power 
as the driving forces of international politics. In contrast to that, Huntington 
sees a ‘cultural reconfiguration of global politics’ (2002, 126), in which a 
country’s enemies and friends are defined by cultural identity. In a sense, 
power and interest still guide international agents, but these are defined by 
cultural framework. There is a priority of culture over interest and power.
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The fact that agents define their interests through the vocabulary and ideas 
offered by their civilization is not the only aspect of structural realism that is 
criticized by Huntington. The ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm explains the rise 
of non-state actors such as regional organizations. These, as well as 
alliances between states, are more and more shaped by civilizations. In the 
post-Cold War era, states suffer ‘losses in sovereignty, functions, and power’ 
(Huntington 2002, 35) in favor of these larger entities. For example, in the 
case of the European Union, states, which committed to an ‘ever closer 
union’, despite the many problems and setbacks, have progressively given up 
their economic, military and juridical powers to the institution of the Union. In 
the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm, the essence of the European Union is 
cultural homogeneity (Huntington 2002, 28), which is ultimately grounded in 
Christianity. The fact that ‘people rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, 
language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with 
different ones’ (Huntington 2002, 126) also explained the entrance of new 
states into the European Union after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
civilizational paradigm is not recognized in the founding documents of the 
European Union and, in particular, in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (European Union 2004) ratified in 2004. Writers of that legal text 
chose not to cite European religious identity and rather mention other 
principles such as the rule of law. However, much of the discussion in the 
years of the drafting process of the Constitution for Europe revolved around 
the place of Christianity in the European identity (see Eriksen, Fossum and 
Menendez 2004),  and this is how the civilizational perspective was present in 
that political debate.
In sum, Huntington criticized the structural realist paradigm by affirming the 
priority of culture over interest and power as the core of international politics, 
and by arguing that, in the new era, states were losing their centrality in favor 
of alliances and organizations based on shared civilizational values.
The Realist and Anti-Pelagian Character of Huntington’s Thought
Even though the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis is critical of some central tenets 
of structural realism, in this section, I argue that it shares some fundamental 
ideas with the classical realist tradition, which I have presented earlier in this 
chapter. 
One of the objectives of Huntington’s article and book on the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ is to advance arguments against other paradigms interpreting the 
post-Cold War world. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, 
among others, thought that the idea that the end of the Cold War was the 
beginning of an era without conflict. In this view, the world would have been 
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united under one sole way of life and system of values: those inspired by 
liberal-democracy and by Western ideas. This conception is one of the many 
universalist political theories inspired by the idea of progress. Fukuyama was, 
as is well known, inspired by Hegel’s philosophy and by Kojeve’s Hegelian 
notion of ‘universal homogeneous state’, and considered the source of 
conflict to be ideological, or spiritual. Given the failure of all systems of ideas 
alternative to liberalism, history had reached its end (Fukuyama 2006). 
Another version of this view is represented by cosmopolitan theories of 
international politics according to which boundaries and particularist 
allegiances are morally irrelevant. From the increasing economic cooperation 
among states, communities and individuals follows the existence of a 
universal society in which burdens and benefits should be distributed and in 
which there are indeed universal human rights that are valid, beyond, and in 
spite of, all government bodies and legal recognitions of them (Pogge 2007, 
2).
The paradigm advanced by Huntington is opposed to this optimist vision of 
world politics and advances objection to the view that conflict can be 
overcome. In general, the very idea of a world in which there is a plurality of 
civilizations is opposed to the notion that there is one and only one human 
civilization. There are indeed some elements common to all humans: ‘certain 
basic values’ and ‘institutions’ (2002, 6). However, Huntington argues, history 
can rather be explained in the light of the divisions among humanity, such as 
‘tribes, nations, and broader cultural entities normally called civilizations’ 
(Huntington 2002, 56). Not only is a universal civilization based on Western 
values impossible, but the instauration of a global democracy is also doomed 
to failure (Huntington 2002, 193). Liberal universalist projects are, after all, 
imperialist and overlook cultural differences in the world. There is an 
irreducible cultural pluralism in the world, an irresolvable disagreement on 
fundamental values. There is no lingua franca among civilizations, and 
democracy and human rights are meaningful to the West but not to the rest. 
Huntington underlined the elements that separate human beings, and the 
importance of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ logic in our quest for an identity. As he 
writes: ‘people define their identity by what they are not’ (Huntington 2002, 
67). 
What is important is that these differences are also the source of conflict and 
the reason world unity remains impossible. Instead of seeing history as a 
history of progress, with a bright future in which culture merges and peace 
advances, Huntington sees world politics as determined by the omnipresence 
of conflict. As in other realist writers, at the ground of this understanding there 
is a negative vision of human nature. As Huntington writes,
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It is human to hate. For self-definition and motivation people 
need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, 
opponents in politics. They naturally distrust and see as 
threats those who are different and have the capability to harm 
them. The resolution of one conflict and the disappearance of 
one enemy generate personal, social, and political forces that 
give rise to new ones. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ tendency is ... in 
the political arena almost universal. In the contemporary world 
the ‘them’ is more and more likely to be people from a different 
civilization (Huntington 2002, 130).
As many other European and American intellectuals before him, this negative 
view of humanity is paired with a certain reading of world history, in which the 
cultural force of the West is declining. The world of the clash of civilization is a 
world seen from a declining and ageing civilization that has lost control and 
appeal. This decline is in territory and population, economic product, military 
capability, but also cultural dominance (Huntington 2002, 83–96). As is well 
known and as many advocates of Huntington’s ideas have suggested after 
9/11 and after the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and America, the decline 
of the West is not leading the world to greater peace. Even though Huntington 
does not believe that a coalition of states against the West is possible 
(Huntington 2002, 185), civilizational relationships are antagonistic and 
conflict has to be considered the leitmotiv of international politics. 
Conclusion
Huntington developed his paradigm of the ‘clash of civilizations’ in an age of 
turmoil and to answer the practical need of a new theory for the 
understanding of the world. The fall of the Soviet Union was the end of a 
(short) century of ideological and material wars between two systems of 
power. Likewise, the events that followed 9/11 also required a new vocabulary 
and a new way of interpreting the world. From the analysis conducted in this 
chapter it has emerged that Huntington found this vocabulary in the classical 
realist tradition. Even though Huntington was deeply critical of some of the 
assumptions of structural realism on the sources of conflict and on the role of 
states in international politics, he shared with the realists some important 
ideas. He grounds his views on an anti-utopian attitude, which dismisses all 
visions of world peace, inter-civilizational dialogue, cosmopolitan society, and 
universal civilization. Conflict, and the division of the world between friends 
and foes, is considered the essence of world politics, and even human nature.
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2
Clashing Civilizations: A 
Toynbeean Response to 
Huntington
IAN HALL
Exactly forty years before Foreign Affairs published Samuel P. Huntington’s 
original ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ article, in the northern summer of 1993, 
the British historian Arnold J. Toynbee was in the middle of a stormy debate 
about an equally controversial work of civilizational history and geopolitical 
prediction, The World and the West (Toynbee 1953). Three years away from 
retirement from his post at the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Chatham House), Toynbee was then 64 years old, and stood, as Huntington 
did in the early 1990s, at the pinnacle of his career, feted as modern sage for 
his sweeping grand historical studies and his acute analyses of international 
politics. His books were selling in the hundreds of thousands and his opinions 
on a wide range of topics avidly sought by the public (see McNeill 1989).1 
The appearance of The World and the West, however, marked the start of 
Toynbee’s fall from grace. Thereafter, his reputation began to decline, in part 
because the political views he expressed in that book – best thought of as 
left-liberal, internationalist, anti-colonial, and empathetic (though not 
sympathetic) towards Soviet Communism – were growing increasingly 
unfashionable, as Britain tried to reassert its grip on what remained of its 
empire and the Cold War-polarized political debate on both sides of the 
Atlantic (Hall 2012). In this context, Toynbee’s argument in The World and the 
West and other publications that the West was ‘the arch-aggressor of modern 
1  On Toynbee’s moment of ‘Fame and Fortune’, see McNeill 1989, 205–234. 
Toynbee’s image even appeared on the cover of Time magazine, on 17 March 1947, 
with the title, referring to his prognostications about the West: ‘Our civilization is not 
inexorably doomed’.
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times’ was not at all well received (Toynbee 1953, 2).2 In parallel, his standing 
as a scholar fell too, as the historical profession grew much less tolerant of 
civilizational history, as well as the kind of religiosity Toynbee increasingly 
professed. Ironically, just as the idea of the ‘West’ became prominent in 
American and Western European political discourse, the concept of 
civilization was in the process of being set aside by academic historians as 
unhelpfully vague and imprecise (see Geyl 1956).
By the time Huntington revived ‘civilization’ as a unit of historical and 
geopolitical analysis in 1993, Toynbee’s work had long been set aside as little 
more than a curiosity.3 It is not surprising, therefore, that his ideas did not 
feature in Huntington’s original Foreign Affairs article, nor that they received 
relatively short shrift in the book-length version of The Clash of Civilizations 
(Huntington 1993; Huntington 1998). But there are good reasons, I argue in 
what follows, to revisit Toynbee when reading Huntington’s argument. His 
concept of civilization, developed in A Study of History (12 volumes, 1934–
61), and especially his explorations of ‘encounters’ between civilizations and 
the effects he thought those encounters had, are useful instruments for 
destabilizing some of Huntington’s key claims. 
Defining Civilizations
There are many differences between Huntington and Toynbee’s projects, 
especially in their conclusions and their policy prescriptions, but they had 
similar aims and assumptions. Both sought to use civilizational history to 
explain contemporary phenomena. Huntington’s aim was to try to provide a 
parsimonious explanation for what he perceived as new patterns of behavior 
by states (and some non-state actors) in post-Cold War international 
relations, patterns that he argued could not adequately be explained by 
existing state-centric theories (Huntington 1998, 19–39). In particular, he was 
interested in the agitation and civil conflict that had emerged towards the end 
of the 1980s in parts of the Muslim world, in the soon-to-be-dissolved Soviet 
Union and state of Yugoslavia, between Hindu nationalists and Muslims in 
India, and between Tibetans and Han Chinese (Huntington 1993). Toynbee 
too was interested in explaining the causes of conflict, but his objective was 
to explain why the West had so catastrophically descended into a devastating 
war in 1914 and why international disorder persisted after 1919. Struck at the 
outset of the First World War by the apparent parallels between what he knew 
of ancient Greek history, especially of the Peloponnesian War, and the 
2  For one vehement rebuttal, see Jerrold 1954. For a more measured assessment, 
see Perry 1982.
3  McNeill (1989, 243–258) traces this decline. Recently, there has been a mini-revival 
of Toynbee studies. See, for example, Hutton 2014 and Castellin 2015.
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present, he set out to ascertain whether other past civilizations had 
experienced similar episodes of conflict – ‘Times of Troubles’, as he called 
them – and to determine whether the episodes had similar causes (Toynbee 
1956b, 8; see also Hall 2014).
Both Huntington and Toynbee determined that the best way to explain the 
causes of contemporary conflicts was to look at civilizations rather than at 
states or other kinds of political or social groups. Toynbee began to explore 
this possibility first in The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (1922), 
which tried to explain the ferocity of the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–22, with 
its grim episodes of what later became known as ethnic-cleansing,4 but only 
set it out in full in the first volume of his Study of History (1934). His argument 
was that historians must take a civilizational view of the past, because the 
histories of lesser social bodies made little sense in isolation. Civilizations, on 
this view, were the necessary context within which historical events must be 
interpreted, rather than things like nation-states, which were modern 
inventions (Toynbee 1934, 44–50). Huntington’s account of a civilization was 
strikingly similar. In the book version of The Clash of Civilizations he defined a 
civilization as ‘the broadest cultural entity’ and argued that ‘none of their 
constituent units can be fully understood without reference to the 
encompassing civilization’ (Huntington 1998, 43 and 42). For both, only a 
civilizational view was sufficient to explain the phenomena they wanted to 
analyze. 
Contacts and Clashes
Both Toynbee and Huntington acknowledged, of course, that these 
understandings of civilizations generated problems for the stories that they 
wanted to tell. Toynbee knew from the start that using a civilization to frame 
the interpretation of some historical episode might not, in fact, be sufficient. 
Civilizational boundaries (in so far as we can define them) are porous; 
civilizations interacted with others, and thus it might be necessary for 
historians to place things in an even wider context if they were to explain 
them properly. He had done this in the Western Question, a study of what 
happened when two civilizations came into contact ‘in space’, to use his 
language, but he had also long been concerned with contacts ‘in time’, where 
a civilization drew up inherited knowledge or beliefs from an earlier one.5 In 
particular, as a classicist, Toynbee was interested in contacts between the 
ancient Greek or ‘Hellenic’ civilization, which he considered ‘dead’, and later 
civilizations, especially the transmission and mediation to the West of ideas 
4  For background, see Clogg 1986.
5  The issue of contacts was the subject of Toynbee’s (1954) A Study of History, vol. 
VIII.
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and practices by the medieval Byzantine empire, but also the influence of the 
Hellenic ideas on both the Muslim and Hindu worlds.6 
What Toynbee found in his Study of History, indeed, was that civilizations are 
rarely immune from outside influence, either from past civilizations or present 
ones. Only a couple of examples rose and fell in relative isolation, unaffected 
by others. Most emerged either out of a pre-existing civilization, drawing on 
its legacy of ideas and beliefs in a process Toynbee called, in his peculiar 
idiom, ‘Apparentation-and-Affiliation’(1934, 97–105). Thus the West and the 
Orthodox world drew on Hellenic civilization; what he called the Babylonian 
and Hittite civilizations drew on the Sumerian; the two branches of the 
modern Islamic world, Arabic (Sunni) and ‘Iranic’ (Shia), drew on the pre-
Islamic ‘Syriac’ civilization; and what he took to be contemporary ‘Far Eastern’ 
civilization, in China, Korea, and Japan, drew on a pre-existing but distinct 
‘Sinic’ civilization, and so on (Toynbee 1954b, 107).7 Then there were 
encounters between ‘living’ civilizations that shaped those involved. Some led 
to ‘fruitful’ exchanges (Toynbee gave the examples of the influence of Hellenic 
thought and art on ancient India, and then later on both medieval Christianity 
and Islam, as well as the Renaissance); some to the near total collapse of 
civilizations (such as those in the Americas); and some to retrenchment and 
resistance (as occurred in parts of the ‘Far East’ and the Muslim world when 
they encountered the modern West) (Toynbee 1954b).
Huntington, for his part, also wrestled in The Clash of Civilizations with the 
issue of boundaries and inter-civilizational contacts. He conceded that:
Civilizations have no clear-cut boundaries and no precise 
beginnings and endings. People can and do redefine their 
identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of 
civilizations change over time. The cultures of peoples interact 
and overlap. 
He recognized too that civilizations ‘evolve’, observing that ‘[t]hey are 
dynamic, they rise and fall, they merge and divide’ (Huntington 1998, 44). But 
Huntington insisted that ‘[c]ivilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, 
and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real’ 
(Huntington 1998, 43). Moreover, he asserted that, historically, civilizations 
6  For an early essay on this topic, see Toynbee 1923. In the essay, Toynbee wrote: 
‘Ancient Greek society perished at least as long ago as the seventh century A. D.’, but 
that the West was its ‘child’ (289), the inheritor of a ‘legacy bequeathed’ (290). He 
recognized, however, that the Muslim and Hindu worlds were also heirs.
7  Some of these supposed civilizations, such as the ‘Syriac’, ‘Sinic’, and ‘Far Eastern’ 
were (and remain) controversial.
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had rarely interacted, and there were few instances of inter-civilizational 
contact that led to really significant changes in the one or the other, until the 
modern era. Prior to 1500 CE, he argued, contacts between them were either 
‘nonexistent or limited’ or ‘intermittent and intense’ (Huntington 1998, 48). 
Distance and transport technologies prevented anything more. 
Only after 1500 CE, with the invention of new technologies that permitted 
more people to travel longer distances, Huntington maintained, did situations 
arise in which civilizations could be substantially changed by encounters with 
others. Importantly, however, he asserted that not all civilizations were 
changed to the same extent, and implied that some elements of a civilization 
– its cultural or religious kernel – could not be changed, though it could be 
destroyed. Instead, in the modern period, he argued ‘[i]ntermittent or limited 
multidirectional encounters among civilizations gave way to the sustained, 
overpowering, unidirectional impact of the West on all other civilizations’ 
(Huntington 1998, 50). The result was the ‘subordination of other societies to 
Western civilization’. This occurred not because of the superiority of Western 
ideas, Huntington insisted, but because of the superiority of Western 
technology, especially its military technology (Huntington 1998, 51). And 
despite their ‘subordination’ to Western power, he maintained, non-Western 
societies remained culturally distinct and resistant to Western cultural 
influence.
The technological unification of the world by the West thus brought into being, 
for Huntington, a ‘multicivilizational system’ characterized by ‘intense, 
sustained, and multidirectional interactions among all civilizations’ (Huntington 
1998, 51). It had not, he went to great pains to argue, generated anything like 
a ‘universal civilization’.8 No universal language is in the process of formation, 
he argued; rather, languages once marginalized by imperial powers are being 
revived. Nor are we seeing a universal religion emerge; instead, adherents of 
major religions are becoming more entrenched in their beliefs, some even 
more fundamentalist. In sum, modernization has taken place without 
Westernization, strengthening non-Western cultures insofar as they have 
acquired new technologies, including new weapons, and reducing ‘the relative 
power of the West’ (Huntington 1998, 78).
Technologies and Ideas
Toynbee was also deeply concerned by the impact of the West on the rest of 
the world – that was the central theme of his incendiary The World and the 
West. His work on Turkey, during the First World War and after, left him well 
8  Huntington devoted an entire chapter of the book to the debunking of that 
suggestion (1998, 56–78).
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versed in the dynamics of modernization in a non-Western society, under the 
Ottomans and then under Kemal Ataturk. In his Study of History he ranged 
much further, examining Peter the Great and then the Bolshevik attempts to 
modernize Russia, the Meiji Restoration in Japan, and Sun Yat-sen’s attempt 
to reform post-Qing China. He recognized that the spread of Western 
technologies to other societies was undercutting the relative power of the 
West, but he also emphasized that modern weapons and military science 
were not the only inventions that were aiding the revival of non-Western 
societies. Political and other ideas, including philosophical arguments and 
religious beliefs, Toynbee argued, had also changed those societies, and 
fueling what became known, in the 1950s, as the ‘Revolt against the West’ 
(Hall 2011).
Although during the course of writing A Study of History, Toynbee offered 
different accounts of what occurred when civilizations encountered each 
other, he was consistent in insisting that the effects were much more dramatic 
than Huntington suggested. Like Edward Gibbon, he argued that ‘major’ 
religions were the product of the intrusion of ‘foreign’ ideas into a civilization, 
as Christianity had arisen as Jewish millenarianism, appeared on the fringes 
of the Greco-Roman world, slowly infected its consciousness and – for the 
young Toynbee as for Gibbon – destroyed that classical world (Gibbon 2010). 
Later, as Toynbee shed his liberal rationalist agnosticism and became more 
sympathetic to religion, his view of the birth of Christianity and other major 
religions changed (see Toynbee 1956a), but he remained convinced that 
ideas transmitted by inter-civilizational encounters could bring about major 
social and political changes within civilizations. Like Huntington, he argued 
that encounters might lead to the transmission of just one technology or idea 
and not others, much less to an entire corpus of civilizational ideas and 
beliefs. In The World and the West, as we have seen, he detailed how 
modern technology had been transmitted to Russia, Turkey, and the ‘Far 
East’, while Western religious ideas, for example, had been rejected. Toynbee 
suggested we understand this process by way of a metaphor borrowed from 
physics. This was what happened, he argued, ‘when the culture-ray of a 
radioactive civilization hits a foreign body social’, as the latter’s ‘resistance 
diffracts the culture-ray into its component strands’ (Toynbee 1953, 67).
Toynbee rightly recognized, however, that modern military technology was not 
the only thing that had been transmitted to the non-West during the period of 
Western imperial expansion. He was particularly concerned with the 
transmission of political ideas, especially nationalism and the concept of the 
nation-state, ‘an exotic institution’, as he put it, ‘deliberately imported from the 
West…simply because the West’s political power had given the West’s 
political institutions an irrational yet irresistible prestige in non-Western eyes’ 
(Toynbee 1953, 71). A sound internationalist, Toynbee was deeply exercised 
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by this spread of nationalism and the nation-state, an institution he thought 
both obsolete, given the economic unification of the world, and even more 
worryingly, prone to being set up as some kind of false idol for the masses to 
worship (Toynbee 1956a, 27–36).9 But setting this normative spin aside, his 
core point – that inter-civilizational encounters spread more than technology 
and weapons – is surely irrefutable; indeed, the notion that the sovereign 
state, organized along national lines or not, was spread by Western imperial 
expansions is the consensus view in contemporary International Relations 
(see Bull and Watson 1984).
Toynbee was deeply troubled also by the spread of things like Western 
consumerism, which he thought, like Mohandas Gandhi, could even infect 
non-Western societies like India to their detriment (Toynbee 1953, 79–80). 
But at the same time, he outlined a more positive message, which also 
challenges key elements of Huntington’s thesis, and sits uneasily with other 
aspects of his own thinking. Although much of Toynbee’s Study of History was 
taken up by warnings against mimesis or the imitation of others, as well as 
pleas for authentic creative ‘responses’ to ‘challenges’,10 he was also 
convinced that the technological and economic unification of the world by the 
West had fundamentally changed our – humanity’s – historical perspective.
This change generated a number of effects. First, Toynbee observed, it made 
it harder for certain societies to think of themselves as a ‘Chosen People’ and 
uniquely civilized (Toynbee 1948, 71–79). A few in the postwar West, he 
thought, still suffered from this delusion, but it would pass in time, as they 
realized that Western history was not as unique as they had been taught 
(Toynbee 1948, 79). Second, it was now possible to study the thought of 
others’ civilizations. Non-Westerners, he noted, were doing this in numbers, 
‘taking Western lessons at first-hand in the universities of Paris or Cambridge 
and Oxford; at Columbia and at Chicago’, as was right and proper as the 
heirs to the riches of all past and contemporary civilizations. Some had 
‘caught…the Western ideological disease of Nationalism’, Toynbee lamented, 
but at least their historical perspective was no longer ‘parochial’ (Toynbee 
1948, 83). They, he observed, ‘have grasped the fact that…our past history 
has become a vital part of theirs [italics in original]’. What was needed was for 
Westerners to make a similar leap, recognizing that Africa’s or China’s past 
was also ‘theirs’, in the same way that they regard the histories of the ‘extinct 
civilizations’ of ‘Israel, Greece and Rome’ as theirs (Toynbee 1948, 89). 
9  He also warned against the idolatrous worship of world-states, philosophers, 
religious institutions, and technology, among other things.
10  See especially Toynbee, Study of History, vols. II and III. Creative responses to 
challenges, he posited, brought about ‘growth’ (that is, loosely, progress) in civilizations. 
He derived this theory from a number of sources, especially from the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson.
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The unification of the world, Toynbee argued, meant that all histories 
belonged to all, and that meant the distinction between Western and non-
Western was no longer tenable:
Our own descendants are not going to be just Western, like 
ourselves. They are going to be heirs of Confucius and Lao-
Tse [sic] as well as Socrates, Plato, and Plotinus; heirs of 
Gautama Buddha as well as Deutero-Isaiah and Jesus Christ; 
heirs of Zarathustra and Muhammed as well as Elijah…; heirs 
of Shankara and Ramanuja as well as Clement and Origen;…
and heirs…of Lenin and Gandhi and Sun Yat-sen as well as 
Cromwell and George Washington and Mazzini (Toynbee 
1948, 90).
This was heady stuff, of course, and it led Toynbee off toward trying to come 
up with a plan for a syncretic religion, blending insights from existing ones, 
that might serve to overcome political conflict and serve as the basis for the 
future reconciliation of the world (see Toynbee 1956a; Toynbee 1954a). But 
his core point – that the philosophies and concepts of all civilizations, both 
‘living’ and ‘extinct’, were now for the first time available for all to read, study, 
adopt, and adapt, accepting the challenges of translation – was a powerful 
one, especially in view of Huntington’s insistence that civilizations are divided 
along sharp lines, despite the economic and technological unification of the 
world. 
Conclusion
The conclusion to the book version of The Clash of Civilizations opens, oddly 
enough, with a discussion of Toynbee’s warning of the ‘mirage of immortality’ 
he thought beguiled and distracted civilizations in decline (Toynbee 1945a, 
301). But where Toynbee called for an effort to draw upon the inheritance 
bequeathed by all civilizations to construct new social and political institutions 
befitting of the ‘ecumenical community’ created by the West’s unification of 
the world (Toynbee 1954a), Huntington argued for something narrower . In 
The Clash of Civilizations and especially in Who are We? (2004), he called for 
the renewal and revival of the West, which he thought had been weakened by 
immigration and by multiculturalism, which aided and abetted the spread of 
non-Western cultural and religious beliefs and practices, by economic 
malaise, and by ‘moral decay’(1998, 304). The United States, he argued, 
must defend the Anglo-Saxon Protestant beliefs and practices that delivered 
past social and political success, so as to ensure it can play the necessary 
role of the West’s ‘core state’.
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Toynbee, of course, warned against such policies, which he characterized as 
anachronistic archaisms. But more importantly, as we have seen, his Study of 
History raises questions about the assumptions that underlie Huntington’s 
prescriptions. In particular, Toynbee’s work suggests that historical encoun-
ters between civilizations were more frequent and consequential than 
Huntington allowed. Second, it points to the extent of the transmission not just 
of technologies, but also of social and political ideas, and to their impact, as 
bodies of thought like Jewish millenarianism encountered Hellenic philosophy 
to create Christianity, for example, or indeed how Christian ideas shaped 
Hindu revivalism.11 Third, it draws attention to agency and away from 
Huntington’s overly structural account of ideas and beliefs, pointing to the role 
played by both scholars and political actors in borrowing, accepting, 
appropriating, and indeed manipulating ‘foreign’ philosophies and religious 
concepts, as well as technologies, for their own purposes, as Toynbee’s non-
Western students did when they recognized, implicitly or not, Western history 
as ‘theirs’ as well as ‘ours’. In turn, of course, that draws attention to the great 
unanswered, pressing question of The Clash of Civilizations: who is 
responsible for this resurgence of cultural and religious politics in the post-
Cold War era?
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Samuel Huntington and the 
American Way of War
ERIK RINGMAR
It is now 25 years ago that Samuel Huntington published his ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ article in Foreign Affairs (Huntington 1993). In the time that has 
passed since then it has become abundantly clear why his argument fails. 
Understood as an explanation of the logic of world politics, his thesis is simply 
untenable. ‘This book is not intended’, as he admitted in the longer version of 
the argument, ‘to be a work of social science’ (Huntington 1996, 13). There is 
in fact nothing much that Huntington can either explain or predict. His 
discussion of the various ‘civilizations’ and their supposed features remind 
you of a textbook from a Chinese middle-school with its portrayal of ‘the five 
races of mankind and their inherent characteristics’. None of this can be 
taken seriously. Moreover, the argument is offensive. It is offensive to be 
boxed into a ‘civilization’ and to be told that you are the same as the people 
confined to the same box, and that, moreover, you are sufficiently different 
from the people confined to other boxes for there to be confrontations 
between you. Well, many of us would not like to be put in the same box as 
Huntington. It is enough to make you want to go put on a hijab.
If, on the other hand, all Huntington ever wanted to say was that ‘culture’ 
matters, he is not saying anything original or new. Only the most doctrinaire of 
Neorealists ever believed that ideas play no role in world politics. The Cold 
War, colonialism, Putin in the Crimea, the European Union, economic 
development and trade, migration and global warming – it is all a matter of 
ideas and values; that is, a matter of culture. But the rest of us knew that 
already and we did not need 9/11 to remind us.
In this article we will do three things. First we will draw a distinction between 
‘cultures’ and ‘civilizations’ and explain why civilizations cannot clash. 
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Secondly, we will make use of a historical example – the Second Opium War, 
1856–1860 – in order to explain how ‘civilizational wars’ come about. Finally, 
we will reflect on the place of such wars in American foreign policy and on 
Huntington’s own role in fomenting civilizational conflicts.
Why Civilizations Cannot Clash
‘Clash’, says the dictionary, is a word of onomatopoeic origin with three basic 
definitions (‘Clash’ 2017). The first meaning, closest to the sound made by the 
word itself, is the ‘din resulting from two or more things colliding’. The second 
meaning is ‘skirmish’ or ‘hostile encounter’, no doubt derived from the sound 
two swords make as they engage. The third meaning denotes an opposition 
or a contradiction of some kind, such as ‘a clash of beliefs’ or personalities. 
Garments too can clash if, for example, their colors do not match. It is as if 
the beliefs, personalities or garments, synesthetically, made a din. Yet 
civilizations cannot clash, we will argue, since they are not the kinds of things 
which, synesthetically or otherwise, make a din when juxtaposed.
In order to see why, let us continue our etymological exposé. Compare 
‘cultures’ with ‘civilizations’. Culture refers to ‘cultivation’, that is, to the ‘tilling 
of the land’ (‘Culture’ 2017). To cultivate a plant is to care for it and to make it 
grow. Metaphorically speaking, what is being cultivated by a culture is the 
human soul – compare individuals and societies that ‘flourish’, ‘flower’ or 
‘bloom’. What grows always grows in a particular location and farmers are 
sedentary since they must stay in one place to plant the crop, water and weed 
it, to harvest and store it. In order to protect what we grow, we drive stakes 
into the ground and build fences which separate what is ours from that which 
belongs to others. Engaged in these activities, we make a place out of space. 
These few acres are the land that feeds us, which fed our ancestors and 
which will feed our descendants in turn. Cultures, we believe, can be nurtured 
and protected in the same fashion. A culture is always our culture, it belongs 
to people like us, the place where we live, and it identifies who we are. The 
solid walls that surround it safeguard our way of life and keep trespassers 
out.
If culture finds its metaphorical basis in agriculture, civilization finds it in 
exchange. A civis is a ‘citizen’, a city-dweller, and as such he or she is 
‘civilized’ in a way that peasants never can be. City people, they will 
themselves tell us, are not country bumpkins. They get their food from shops, 
not from the ground; they have clean hands and clean clothes; they drive 
sports cars and drink café lattes. And while city-dwellers typically consider 
this level of sophistication to be a result of their personal achievements, it is 
really a consequence of the exchange networks to which cities are 
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connected. It is these networks – including places located very far away 
indeed – that civilize them. Through the networks we come into contact with 
things that can be compared and judged in relation to each other, and 
suddenly we have a choice between better and cheaper options, between the 
newer and the never-before-tried. This broadens our horizons and improves 
our lives. This is why civilization depends on the unencumbered circulation of 
goods, people, ideas, faiths and ways of life. Thus while cultures require 
walls, civilizations require bridges. As a result, in cities we always come 
across unexpected things and strange people. The effect may be unsettling 
but also liberating. We no longer have to be confined to, and carry the burden 
of, our culture; we no longer have to be who we are. Civilization provides us 
with a means of escape. Stadtluft macht frei. 
This is not Huntington’s definition of a civilization to be sure. To Huntington a 
civilization is ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of 
cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from 
other species’ (Huntington 1993, 24). Civilization, that is, is a sort of super- or 
perhaps supra-culture. For us, by contrast, a civilization has no particular 
content but denotes instead a mechanism or a social practice. Civilization is a 
process – a civilizing process – which works by means of openness and 
exchange. Civilization, for that reason, has no particular content but operates 
instead with whatever cultural content the historical context provides. Take 
the Muslims in al-Andalus. They civilized Spain in the ninth century by 
connecting its cities to the great centers of Arabic culture in the Middle East. 
In fact, they connected Spain to Persian culture too, and to Indian, Central 
Asia, and even Chinese. As a result of these civilizing connections, the great 
library in Córdoba had books made of paper, not vellum, and was far larger 
than any library in Christian Europe; the old Visigoths came to eat lemons, 
play the lute and compose far better poetry; they used better plows and 
irrigation techniques too, and put on deodorant and brushed their teeth with 
toothpaste. Or consider how the entire canon of classical Greek texts, saved 
for posterity by the caliphs of Baghdad, was transmitted to Spain where the 
works of Aristotle, Hippocrates and Ptolemy for the first time became 
available in Latin. Europeans later came to call this ‘the Renaissance’.
Islam, Huntington claimed in a statement endlessly recycled after 9/11, ‘has 
bloody borders’ (Huntington 1993, 35). This is not the case, not because 
Muslims are nicer than Huntington gave them credit for, but because 
civilizations have no borders. Borderlessness, we said, is a defining 
characteristic of a civilizing process. This, indeed, is why the word ‘civilization’ 
was put within scare quotes by German authors in the nineteenth century 
(Spengler 1927). To them, civilization was a superficial idea, something which 
anyone could pick up in the market place, or something, like a shirt, which 
you easily can change and discard. A Kultur, by contrast, is the very skin that 
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contains your body; it defines who you are and cannot be exchanged or 
thrown away. The Germans of the nineteenth century loved their Kultur not 
because it necessarily was better than other cultures but simply because it 
was theirs. This was the problem with the liberté, égalité, fraternité of the 
French Revolution. Once slogans like these began spreading across Europe, 
they were not confined to a specific society and belonged to no one in 
particular. They had a universal reach – compare the Déclaration des droits 
de l’homme of 1789 – designed to appeal to the largest number of customers. 
There was nothing wrong with these catchphrases, but they corresponded to 
no lived reality.
Strictly speaking, and we are speaking strictly here, cultures cannot clash. 
Cultures simply exist side by side, each one rooted to its own particular soil. 
The fences and the walls separating them make sure that there is no mixing 
and no miscegenation. From this point of view a ‘culture clash’ is something 
that occurs because a person from a society with one culture moves to a 
society with another culture. The cultures are not moving, people are. The din 
of the clashes ceases when the person finally has come to adjust to the new 
conditions. When in Nome, we do like the nomads.
But civilizations cannot clash either. Exchange is an activity in which you 
engage freely; it is an affair between consenting adults. Exchange is all a 
matter of how much something costs per kilo; how many pennies for your 
thoughts; how many tits for a tat. And you can always refuse to make a deal. 
Free trade, by definition, cannot be forced (Ringmar 2011a). Markets for that 
reason operate as a conflict resolving device. Instead of making a big, 
centralized, decision which people end up fighting over, the conflict can be 
resolved if you turn it into a myriad of small, decentralized, decisions which 
individuals make for themselves. Since the civilizing process operates by 
means of such self-regulation, civilizations do not clash.
The problem, however, is that civilizations can come to clash with cultures 
and cultures with civilizations. The lived reality, to speak with the nineteenth-
century Germans, can come to be exchanged for the superficial catchphrase; 
a person’s real face for a mask; the skin for a shirt – and this, unsurprisingly, 
can be a cause for concern and resentment. This is how civilizational wars 
happen.
Why ‘Civilizational Wars’ Happen
The nineteenth century was an era of colonial warfare; it was also an era of 
‘civilizational wars,’ or what we really should call ‘a clash between two 
cultures occasioned by a process of exchange.’ The French had a mission 
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civilisatrice which took their soldiers and colonial administrators from the 
mountains of Kabylia to the jungles of Vietnam. Meanwhile, the British 
shouldered the ‘white man’s burden’ in India, in Africa, and in most other 
corners of the globe. The Germans, for their part, did their best to improve the 
lives of the indigenous population of southwestern Africa (Erichsen and 
Olusoga 2010). The savages must be civilized, even if it goes against their 
will; failing that, we must control them, and failing that, alas, the savages 
might have to be killed. And the wars intended to spread European culture 
have continued to this day, although we might refer to them as ‘promoting 
democracy’ or ‘freedom’, or perhaps as a ‘duty to protect’.
Importantly, in the background of these conflicts are the culture-transforming 
forces unleashed by the rapid expansion of global markets in the nineteenth 
century. No one has written about this better than Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels. It is the ‘profit motive’, they argued in The Communist Manifesto, 
which set the Europeans on a chase for markets around the world (Marx and 
Engels 1910 [1848]). And once the search for profits came to replace all other 
concerns, each culture was dramatically transformed. The profit motive 
destroyed feudal relations and replaced them with market relations; it shook 
up old habits, confounded established truths and toppled old gods. Culture 
was everywhere replaced by civilization. The profit motive ‘compels all 
nations, on the pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; 
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to 
become bourgeois themselves’ (Marx and Engels 1910 [1848], 18).
The great example which Marx and Engels had in mind was the opening up of 
China which was expected in the wake of the Treaty of Nanjing, concluded in 
1842, six years before The Communist Manifesto was published. ‘The cheap 
prices of commodities’, as they put it, are the ‘heavy artillery’ which ‘batters 
down all Chinese walls’ (Marx and Engels 1910 [1848], 18). The British 
business community had long waited for such access. China contained, they 
believed, some 350 million eager consumers – ‘a third of mankind’ – and if 
they only could reach them, enormous profits were to be made. The problem 
was only that the Chinese authorities refused to open up – the only trade 
permitted took place with the one city (‘Canton’) of Guangzhou in the south. 
This was obviously not good enough and eventually the British merchants 
convinced their government to go to war with the Chinese over the issue – 
two wars, in fact, the two Opium Wars, 1839–42 and 1856–60. Marx and 
Engels were wrong, in other words. Cheap prices were not the ‘heavy artillery’ 
which forced the walls of China to come down. Instead the walls came down 
by means of the heavy artillery of heavy artillery.
To the British this was not only a commercial but a civilizational war. Hiding 
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behind their walls the Chinese had become utterly ignorant of world affairs, 
the British argued; they knew nothing, for example, of the remarkable 
inventions and discoveries which recently had taken place in Europe. China 
was stagnant, ruled by ‘the despotism of custom’, and since the country never 
changed, it had no history (Mill 1849, 126–127; 130). At best the Chinese 
were ‘half-civilized’, but many Europeans considered them simply as 
‘barbarians’. If the country is to improve, John Stuart Mill argued in 1859, ‘it 
must be by foreigners’. Fortunately, just such help was at hand. In October 
1860, a combined Anglo-French army made it to Yuanmingyuan, a large 
compound of palaces and pleasure gardens located northwest of Beijing, 
which contained the emperor’s vast collection of works of art, treasure, and a 
full-scale library (Ringmar 2013b; Ringmar 2011b, 273–98). First the French 
looted the palaces and then the British burned down the whole compound 
down. Some critics, the authorities back in London worried, might consider 
this an ‘act of barbarism’, but a measure of barbarism is required if we ever 
are to civilize the Chinese. Only a great jolt can awaken them from their 
stupor.  
When news of the wars in China reached London, Lord Palmerston, the prime 
minister, was pleased. Palmerston was a liberal and a staunch defender of 
Britain’s commercial interests abroad. In power almost continuously from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, he never missed an opportunity to stress 
the civilizing impact of commerce. It would be ‘to the great and manifest 
advantage of the people of China if a larger commercial intercourse were 
established between them and other countries’ (Palmerston 1857, 1827). ‘I 
am heartily glad’, he wrote when the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan was 
completed. ‘It was absolutely necessary to stamp by some such permanent 
record our indignation at the treachery and brutality of these Tartars’ 
(Stanmore 1906, 350). ‘These semi-barbarous Governments appear to deal 
with each other with treachery and cruelty’, as he put it to parliament, ‘and 
they are apt to think that they may act in the same manner against civilized 
Governments. It was, therefore, necessary to prove to them by some signal 
retribution that such deeds are not to be committed with impunity’ 
(Palmerston 1843, 403–4).
Yet not everyone in England agreed (Ringmar 2011a, 5–32). Edward Smith 
Stanley, the 14th Earl of Derby, was a conservative critic. Derby was a Tory 
and a former prime minister, who was deeply suspicious of democracy but 
also of free trade. He had defended the protectionist Corn Laws back in the 
1840s and he had no time for talk of ‘civilizing missions’. Derby was proud of 
British liberties but believed they were rooted in British traditions and could 
not simply be dug up and exported abroad. It was his love of his own culture 
which made him respect the cultures of others. Now he defended the 
Chinese. ‘I am an advocate’, he began an hour-long speech to parliament, 
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‘for perplexed and bewildered barbarism against the arrogant demands of 
overweening, self-styled civilization. I am an advocate for the feeble 
defenselessness of China against the overpowering might of Great Britain’ 
(Derby 1857, 1155). Derby refused to accept that it had been necessary to 
destroy the imperial palaces. ‘I think it likely to produce a painful and 
prejudicial impression against us as to the mode in which we carry on our 
military operations, and it appears to me to have been a mistake in point both 
of judgment and policy’ (Derby 1861, 384).
Another critic was Richard Cobden. He was in all respects the very opposite 
of Derby: a radical and a self-made man, a founding member of the Anti-Corn 
Law League and the most vocal proponent of free trade both in and outside of 
parliament. Cobden believed in all the progressive causes of the day: a 
broadened franchise, abolition of the church rates, Catholic emancipation. He 
was active in the peace movement too and a supporter of disarmament and 
negotiated settlements of international conflicts. Cobden strongly supported 
the liberal values he associated with European civilization, but he was at the 
same time adamant that civilization cannot be spread by violent means. It is 
only through the power of our example that we can convince the Chinese to 
open their borders. Meanwhile, said Cobden, China deserves our respect: ‘If 
in speaking of them we stigmatize them as barbarians, and threaten them 
with force because we say they are inaccessible to reason, it must be 
because we do not understand them; because their ways are not our ways, 
nor our ways theirs’ (Cobden 1857, 1420–21).
Cultures cannot clash, we said, and neither can civilizations, but civilizations 
can clash with cultures and cultures with civilizations. Modeling our 
explanation on the example provided by the Opium Wars, we can conclude 
that the first step to a ‘civilizational war’ –  ‘a clash between two cultures 
occasioned by a process of exchange’ – is taken when the political 
representatives of a culture feel threatened by the impact of openness and 
free markets and decide to protect themselves against it. The second step is 
taken when the proponents of free exchange oppose such measures and 
decide to remove them by force. The problem, in other words, is not the 
conservatives – the Lord Derbys of this world – they are friendly, if deeply 
conservative, multiculturalists. Multiculturalists are happy to live and let live 
and they take it for granted that cultures can exist peacefully coexist side by 
side. Neither is the problem the true liberals – the likes of Richard Cobden. 
True liberals are peace-loving free-traders who insist that exchange must be 
free and who trust the civilizing process to run its course. The problem is 
rather the liberals with access to firearms and the determination to use them 
– Palmerston and his ilk in the nineteenth century and their armed, liberal, 
counterparts today. They are the ones who wage ‘civilizational wars’ by 
barbarian means; establish democracy and human rights at gunpoint, and 
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impose free trade by force.
‘Civilizational Wars’ and US Foreign Policy
After 25 years, we said, we all know what the problem is with Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. It is bad social science, or rather 
no social science at all; it is as clichéd as a Chinese middle-school textbook; 
it is offensive since it forces people into boxes which are set in opposition to 
each other. Moreover, we can now add, it is dangerous and war-mongering. 
But in order to understand the danger which Huntington’s argument 
represents we need to place it in the context of the American way of war.
Compare Europe. Wars in Europe from the early modern period onwards 
were fought between states that all resembled each other. Culturally 
European states were all more or less alike and what separated them was 
nothing but their respective Staatsräson and the logic of power politics. They 
were constantly at war with each other mainly since the anarchical logic of 
their international system made it impossible for one country to trust its 
neighbors and since the means devised to assure peace – balances of power 
and alliance politics – often proved insufficient. Europeans shared the same 
culture – what they, and later Huntington, called the same ‘civilization’ – and 
among civilized people, they argued, you could expect a certain kind of 
conduct. Civilized people are not supposed to kill unarmed prisoners of war, 
for example, to loot libraries and places of religious worship, or to destroy the 
foundations of ordinary people’s livelihood. However, none of these rules 
applied in wars with people outside of Europe, and the reason was that the 
‘savages’ the Europeans encountered here fought their wars by savage 
means (Ringmar 2013a). That is, they made no distinctions between soldiers 
and civilians, never hesitated to kill children or mothers or to destroy crops, 
orchards and animals (Colby 1927). In order to defeat such enemies, the 
Europeans concluded, they too had to become savages. Colonial warfare 
was for that reason extraordinarily brutal.
When Americans in the nineteenth century turned their backs on Europe, they 
turned their backs on the European type of wars. Only corrupt kings and their 
scheming advisers, the inhabitants of the New World decided, would quibble 
over Staatsräson and balances of power. The United States was to be a new 
and better kind of society, established in the wilderness of the new continent. 
Differently put, American society was constituted in relation to a frontier, the 
other side of which was inhabited by non-Europeans. The obvious question 
was how to relate to them. One alternative would have been Lord Derby’s 
multi-cultural solution. Cultures, we said, do not have to clash, and American 
and native cultures could quite easily have lived peacefully side by side. 
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Another alternative would have been Cobden’s pacific exchange. The natives 
were eager tradesmen, after all, and their societies were also quickly 
transformed under the impact of world markets. But none of this was to 
happen. The Americans were settlers, we should not forget; they were 
colonizers, and soon the frontiers of their empire expanded rapidly westward 
(Grant 1933). As a result, all the wars in which they engaged were wars 
fought on behalf of their way of life. And when the American landmass finally 
was exhausted, the civilizational wars continued in the Philippines, Vietnam, 
and more recently against ‘savages’ in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Europeans fought wars on behalf of their culture too, we said, but the 
difference is that they took place in the colonies and the colonies were always 
very far away. As such the ‘civilizational wars’ came only to involve a small 
fringe of the population. Europeans in general did not follow colonial events 
and the colonies had little impact on popular conceptions of the world or on 
European society (Porter 2004). Returning home from the colonies, few 
people wanted to listen to the soldiers’ stories and instead they were often 
criticized for the uncivilized ways in which they treated the natives. The 
colonial soldiers reacted with resentment and pointed to the hypocrisy of the 
people at home who wanted the goal but were not willing to agree to the 
means (Pontecorvo 1966). A gulf separated the pieds noirs from the general 
population and the former were generally considered by the latter as 
militaristic cranks. The Europeans still fight wars on behalf of their culture – 
the French intervention in Mali in 2013 is a recent example – but they are still 
wars of a colonial type that leave little impact on European society.
In America it did not work this way. The wars fought on behalf of American 
culture were not fought in some far-away colony but right at home. They did 
not concern the interests of a small fringe, but instead the very existence and 
survival of the country. The soldiers who returned home from the fronts were 
greeted as heroes and given prominent places in government; the pieds noirs 
were incorporated into the state. This established a tradition of thinking about 
oneself in relation to the rest of the world but also a certain American way of 
making war. It is simply inconceivable that someone with the mindset of a 
Rumsfeld, a Cheney, a Wolfowitz or a Perle would make it in European 
politics. In the U.S., by contrast, militaristic cranks such as these became 
members of the establishment. It is equally impossible, let us conclude, that 
someone with Samuel Huntington’s mindset would make it in European 
academia. It is not that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars; 
it is rather that Americans still are fighting the ‘civilizational wars’ of the 
nineteenth century. For the past 25 years, Huntington’s thesis has aided and 
abetted liberals with access to firearms; presenting them with suggestions, 
imperatives and hopes. As such his argument is likely to produce just the 
kinds of wars it purports to explain. It is a classic self-fulfilling prophecy.
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* I am grateful to Amanda Cheney, Diane Pranzo, Eric Sangar, Ted Svensson 
and an audience at Stance, Lund University, for comments and suggestions 
on a previous version.
References
“Clash.” 2017. Wiktionary. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/clash Accessed 14 
November 2017.
Cobden, Richard. 1857. “The War in China.” Hansard, House of Commons, 
144: 1391–1485.
Colby, Elbridge. 1927. “How to Fight Savage Tribes.” The American Journal of 
International Law 21, no. 2 (April): 279–88.
“Culture.” 2017. Wiktionary. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/culture Accessed 14 
November 2017.
Derby, Edward Henry Stanley. 1861. “Vote of Thanks.” Hansard, House of 
Lords 161: 366–93.
Derby, Edward Henry Stanley. 1857. “War with China.” Hansard, House of 
Lords 144: 1155–1245.
Erichsen, Casper, and David Olusoga. 2010. The Kaiser’s Holocaust: 
Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism. London: 
Faber & Faber, 2010.
Grant, Madison. 1993. Conquest of a Continent: Or, The Expansion of Races 
in American. New York: C. Scribner’s sons.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 
72(3): 22–49.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1910 [1848]. Manifesto of the Communist 
Party. Translated by Samuel Moore. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & company.
36Samuel Huntington and the American Way of War
Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. London: John W. Parker & Son.
Palmerston, Third Viscount. 1843. “China: Vote of Thanks.” Hansard, House 
of Commons, 66: 547–74.
Palmerston, Third Viscount. 1857. “The War in China.” Hansard, House of 
Commons, 144: 1726–1846.
Pontecorvo, Gillo. 1966. La battaglia di Algeri. Rialto Pictures. Film.
Porter, Bernard. 2004. “‘Empire, What Empire?’: Or, Why 80% of Early-and 
Mid-Victorians Were Deliberately Kept in Ignorance of It.” Victorian Studies 
46(2): 256–63.
Ringmar, Erik. 2011a. “Free Trade by Force: Civilization against Culture in the 
Great China Debate of 1857.” In Culture and External Relations: Europe and 
Beyond, edited by Jozef Bátora and Monika Mokre, 5–32. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Ringmar, Erik. 2011b. “Malice in Wonderland: Dreams of the Orient and the 
Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China.” Journal of World History 
22(2): 273–98.
Ringmar, Erik. 2013a. “‘How to Fight Savage Tribes’: The Global War on 
Terror in Historical Perspective.” Terrorism and Political Violence 25(2): 
264–83.
Ringmar, Erik. 2013b. Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the 
Palace of the Emperor of China. New York: Palgrave.
Spengler, Oswald. 1927. The Decline of the West: Form and Actuality. 
Translated by Charles Francis Atkinson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Stanmore, Arthur H. 1906. Sidney Herbert, Lord Herbert of Lea: A Memoir. 
London: Murray
37 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
4
Why (Clash of) Civilizations 
Discourses Just Won’t Go 
Away? Understanding the 
Civilizational Politics of Our 
Times
GREGORIO BETTIZA & FABIO PETITO
The notion that relations between civilizations are central drivers of 
international politics has become a key feature of international relations 
discourses and practices since the end of the Cold War. Some see these 
relations as marked by conflict and confrontation, most notably in the case of 
Samuel Huntington’s (1996, 1993) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ theory. Similar 
ideas, however, can also be found in Bernard Lewis’ (2002) analysis of the 
malaise afflicting the Muslim world, in the ‘Asian values’ debate (Zakaria and 
Yew 1994), or in Aleksandr Dugin’s (2014) efforts to situate Russia at the 
center of an anti-Western and anti-liberal Eurasian civilization. Such 
narratives are not just confined to the realm of academia, but permeate 
political discourses around the world. A view of an Islamic civilization attacked 
and violated by the West has animated Al Qaeda’s rhetoric and given impetus 
to Daesh’s actions. Conservatives in the United States and Europe have 
likewise portrayed a West under assault by Islam, whether culturally, 
demographically, or militarily. Donald Trump’s ‘Muslim ban’, for instance, is 
directly a consequence of these views. Eurasianism is the ideological linchpin 
of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to construct a Eurasian Economic Union juxtaposed 
with the European Union. 
Against narratives and actions of clash, discourses, initiatives and institutions 
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focused on promoting inter-civilizational dialogue and understanding have 
similarly flourished since the late 1990s. In the UN context, the year 2001 was 
designated as the Year of the ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’ on the proposal 
of then-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammed Khatami. This 
initiative was followed in 2005 by the launch of the UN Alliance of 
Civilizations, which has since developed a permanent secretariat in New York. 
In the last 15 years, UNESCO and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) have developed actions and programs on dialogue of civilizations. 
Similarly, many NGOs and interreligious platforms like, for example, the 
Sant’Egidio Community International Meetings ‘Peoples and Religions’ and 
the World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’, have used the idea of 
dialogue of civilizations as a vision to counter the dangerous possibilities of 
clashes. Leaders of very different political, cultural and religious orientations 
like Václav Havel, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Barack Obama have called for the 
need for more dialogue and understanding across civilizational lines in 
international relations. 
In short, the notion that we live in a world where civilizations compete or 
cooperate, potentially clash or hopefully dialogue, has taken hold in 
international politics today. Why? Why have civilizational imaginaries and 
narratives become part of everyday international discourses, institutions and 
practices? Why has this turn towards, what we label as, civilizational politics 
occurred since the end of the Cold War? In other words, why civilizational 
politics now?
The current literature on civilizations in International Relations (IR) is divided 
along two dominant perspectives, which we label Primordialist and Critical. 
Primordialist perspectives, most clearly represented in the writings of Samuel 
Huntington (1996, 1993), treat civilizations as long-standing, almost-static, 
essences with clear-cut boundaries and tend towards forms of cultural 
reductionism. These argue that the crisis of secular ideologies and the 
process of globalization are intensifying civilizational consciousness and 
awareness of differences. Critical perspectives, often inspired by the writings 
of Edward Said (2001; also Said 1978), see civilizations mostly as discourse 
and tend to privilege a power-based approach. These argue that present-day 
narratives of civilizational difference are the latest instalment of age-old 
colonial discourses that seek to divide the West from the Rest and legitimize 
the former’s exercise of power over the latter. Finding both approaches 
wanting in explaining the rise of civilizational politics in post-Cold War 
international relations, we build on the most recent scholarship on 
civilizational analysis (Arnason 2003; Eisenstadt 2003; Katzenstein 2010a) 
and advance a third Sociological perspective which aims to avoid both 
cultural and power reductionism while focusing on their crucial relation.
39 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
Primordialist and Critical Approaches to Civilizations
Primordialists have presented civilizations as concrete, macro-cultural entities 
with long, continuous and distinct histories and boundaries, which profoundly 
structure the way societies, economies, polities and states within them 
function in the international system. Primordialists’ views of civilizations are 
most clearly articulated in the writings of ‘clash of civilizations’ theorists, like 
Huntington, Lewis or Dugin. It is also recognizable to a lesser extent in the 
writings on the dialogue of civilizations. Especially when it emphasizes the 
overwhelming centrality of the religious dimension and the view that mutually 
exclusive and internally monolithic – but not irremediably antagonistic and 
irreconcilable – religiously-shaped civilizations exist in the world.1
By taking Huntington as our main Primordialist voice, how would this 
perspective explain the rise of civilizational politics in international relations 
today? For Primordialists the turn towards civilizational imaginaries and 
narratives in the post-Cold War is explained along two lines. The first is a sort 
of ‘ancient hatreds/Cold War freeze’ argument. Civilizations were always 
there and have always mattered, but we were blinded to this reality by the 
power of secular ideologies – communism, nationalism, fascism, and 
liberalism – throughout much of the twentieth century. The century of secular 
ideologies had temporarily frozen the forces profondes of world history. The 
end of communism and fascism on the one hand, and the crisis of nationalism 
and liberalism on the other, have opened our eyes to what are our real and 
truest identities and our most profound traditions and beliefs, those rooted in 
civilizational belonging and culture (Huntington 1996, 21–28). The second 
argument is what can be labeled as the ‘interaction/friction’ argument. The 
processes of globalization which has taken over the world in the post-Cold 
War era, has made the world a ‘smaller place’ (Huntington 1993, 25), causing 
cultures to rub shoulders ever more closely. Increased interactions, and 
decreased space for autonomy and maneuver, has ended up intensifying our 
awareness that, rather than being all alike in a global village, we are actually 
all different across multiple civilizations and share commonalities within the 
same one. 
There are important problems with this ‘back to the future’ scenario 
Primordialists present. Both arguments laid out above point towards some 
kind of change happening in the post-Cold War, but under-theorize why this 
change is conducive to bringing to the fore civilizational imaginaries and 
narratives beyond stating that civilizations have always been there. Have 
they, though? Where do we see them? We are certainly not aided by the fact 
1  This approach can sometimes be found in the texts and declarations of some 
interreligious and inter-faith platforms.
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that, as Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2007, 47) pithily puts it, civilizations have 
‘no front office or central bureaucracy’ we can easily turn to or point at. 
Huntington’s definition of civilizations does not help us either since it is one 
that emphasizes, paradoxically in terms of his own Primordialist perspective, 
the subjective rather than objective nature of civilizations. Huntington (1993, 
24) tells us that civilizations are the ‘highest cultural grouping’, the largest 
‘we’, that people can use to distinguish one another short of what 
‘distinguishes humans from other species’. The question then is why do 
humans need to identify themselves with this particular grouping, after the 
end of the Cold War? Why aren’t, instead, the even larger ‘we’ of humanity or 
much narrower local identities drowning out civilizational ones? Why do 
increased interactions thanks to globalization necessarily accentuate what is 
different amongst us, rather than what is similar? 
While Huntington does gesture to a view of civilizations as constituted by 
subjective and intersubjective beliefs which evolve over time, he under-
theorizes why and how these subjectivities have changed with the end of the 
Cold War in ways that bring forth the civilizational politics we are witnessing 
today. In other words, Huntington’s cultural reductionism generates what the 
most recent sociological scholarship on civilizational analysis calls an 
‘identitarian bias’ (Arnason 2003, 4–5), that is an exaggeration of closure and 
internal unity. As a consequence, a presumed cultural core of civilizations 
becomes the overwhelming determinant, almost the independent variable, to 
explain important social, economic and political developments locally and 
globally. Huntington does not really need to explain the post-Cold War ‘return’ 
of civilizational politics, exactly because it is conceived of as a return to a 
centuries-long ‘primordial normality’ that had been interrupted by the 
‘exceptional abnormality’ of the short twentieth century of secular ideologies. 
The issue here is not to reject a priori an explanatory role for the cultural 
specificity of civilizations, but to understand the working of cultural patterns in 
a less deterministic way, avoiding what sometimes are tautological forms of 
reasoning. For example, take the issue of democracy and its cultural 
prerequisite: the question should not be about the compatibility or 
incompatibility of the cultural core of a particular civilization with democracy, a 
very common framing of the question in recent years in the case of the 
Islamic civilization. Rather, the question should be framed on the basis of two 
assumptions. First, the internal differentiation of civilizations some theorists 
do by talking of civilizational contexts, configurations, constellations, patterns 
or complexes to indicate a civilization’s internal complexity and dynamism 
(Katzenstein 2010b, 5). Second, the recognition that civilizational contexts 
can indeed ‘set the limits to internal cultural diversity or ideological pluralism’ 
(Arnason 2003, 5). Civilizational contexts generate constraints on the 
behavior of all actors that operate within this particular cultural frame of 
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reference. But these systemic factors circumscribe a set of possibilities rather 
than determine specific outputs. In order to explain a particular output – for 
example the prospects of democracy in a specific Muslim-majority country – a 
civilizational cultural analysis must be supplemented by an elite-centered 
analysis of power that makes sense of the struggles (ideological, economic 
and political) internal to a civilizational context. 
Eisenstadt (2003), for example, has shown the centrality of different patterns 
of dissent, protest and interactions between orthodox and heterodox 
traditions in understanding civilizational developments. Coming back to our 
example, the key focus of analysis should be on the relationship between the 
different competing interpretations of the Islamic legacy and the competition 
for power of the different groups, constituencies and sectors of societies 
involved. As a result, the general question of Islam and democracy could be 
answered by saying that Islam is what Muslims make of it within the 
constraint of its civilizational legacy. At the heart of this analysis we find the 
role of elites as initiators of change and carriers of innovative cultural projects 
as well as crucial mediators between cultural patterns and power relations 
(Eisenstadt 2003; also Arnason 2003).
Where Huntington leaves us in the dark, Critical approaches pick up. These, 
in fact, see no concrete reality to civilizations except their (inter)subjective 
ideological nature. Civilizations are ideologies, or better discourses of power, 
and that is why – Critical perspectives argue – they are so appealing and 
widely used. Notably articulated in the writing of Edward Said (2001; also 
Said 1978) and others (Adib-Moghaddam 2011; Hall and Jackson 2007), 
Critical approaches deconstruct civilizational invocations and narratives as 
the manifestation of age-old colonial discourses that seek to divide the West 
from the Rest, produce and reify inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries, and 
legitimize the West’s exercise of power over an ‘othered’ and ‘orientalized’ 
Rest. Even when civilizations are not represented in clash but in dialogue the 
effect is just as pernicious (Bilgin 2012, see also Sen 2006). That’s because, 
Critical perspectives insist, civilizational invocations help constitute a new 
form of false consciousness which problematically reifies singular and 
mutually exclusive belongings that either, on the one hand, overlook the 
multiple, fluid, and often hybrid identities we all hold or, on the other hand, 
mask what are instead more fundamental identities and objective disparities 
around gender, class, race, or power. 
Compelling as it is, this Critical approach runs into a number of problems 
when it comes to explaining today’s civilizational politics, however. The first 
problem, we argue, is that Critical scholars overwhelmingly focus on the role 
played by civilizational invocations in representing others as enemies. As 
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such, they can hardly explain why dialogue of civilizations narratives – a 
discourse that ‘others’ others as friends and partners instead of enemies 
(Bettiza 2014a, 10–11) – have had a remarkable success, becoming 
institutionalized in multiple instances. 
The second problem is the emphasis Critical perspectives put on civilizational 
narratives and imaginaries as discourses of power and hegemony. Such a 
view runs into trouble when we consider that civilizational belonging and 
ideas are often invoked in world politics with an anti- and counter-hegemonic 
spirit instead (Bettiza 2014b, 9). This is partly, for instance, the intent of both 
Mohammad Khatami as well as Osama Bin Laden who, from very different 
standpoints nonetheless present Islam and the Muslim world as under assault 
by Western military and cultural power and in need of defense. Immanuel 
Wallerstein has been one of the few radical scholars to recognize this 
paradox. In order to explain the new traction of civilizational politics, he has 
argued that ‘the concept of civilizations (plural) arose as a defense against 
the ravages of civilization (singular)’ (Wallerstein 1991, 224). More 
specifically, in the context of his world-system analysis, civilizational 
narratives, borrowed from the history of pre-capitalist ancient empires, are 
meant as identity-boosting devices for the periphery to challenge the cultural 
liberal hegemony of the core states of the capitalist world system.
Huntington’s own thesis is similarly a direct critique of modern liberal notions 
that Western culture and ideas, and thus by extension also its liberal 
economic and political projects, are universal and ought to be applied 
globally. As Huntington (1996, 184; see also Huntington 1993, 39–41) bluntly 
argues: ‘What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest’. Indeed, 
the late Harvard professor does ultimately call for a retrenchment rather than 
an expansion of Western power and influence internationally (Huntington 
1993, 48–49). Our intent here is not to present Huntington as some closeted 
post-colonial theorist, which he is not. His broad-brush simplifications and 
cultural determinism are intellectually pernicious, and his portrayal of Islam as 
having ‘bloody borders’ (Huntington 1993, 35) oozes prejudice and 
condescension. The point we are making though, is that civilizational 
discourses should not be read exclusively as constitutive of hegemonic 
projects, but also as participating in a politics of contestation and counter-
hegemony. 
Lastly, Critical perspectives have a further important limit. They cannot 
explain why such processes of ‘othering’ – either as enemies or friends – 
have, since the end of the Cold War, taken the civilizational discursive form 
and substance they have. The problem here, we find, is that Critical 
approaches often neglect the wider, extra-discursive social and cultural 
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forces, which have made civilizational imaginaries and narratives resonate so 
widely across the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall, in comparison to other 
categories in international politics today. In other words, we are faced with a 
power reductionism that is the asymmetrical opposite, but has similar logics, 
to the cultural reductionism of the Primordialist approach. Critical approaches 
view culture as easily instrumentalized to suit power interests without 
accounting for the autonomous role of cultural innovation within civilizational 
traditions as crucial in creating the ideological field of competition among 
different elite-groups and, therefore, in shaping local and global power 
structures. Therefore, we contend that an answer to the question of ‘why 
civilizational politics now?’ needs to explore and give concrete form to the 
interplay between cultural patterns and power structures. It is to this 
exploration – inevitably initial given the limited space – that we now turn.
A Sociological Approach to Civilizations 
We suggest a third line of thinking about civilizations, which better helps to 
explain why we have seen the remarkable and unexpected rise of 
civilizational politics – the idea that civilizations and their relations matter – in 
international relations from the 1990s onwards. We label this approach 
Sociological. Such an approach recognizes that, on the one hand, 
civilizations are intersubjective phenomena that change and evolve across 
time; but, on the other, as Peter Katzenstein (2010b, 5) puts it, civilizations 
should be thought of as ‘loosely coupled, internally differentiated, elite-
centred social systems that are integrated into a global context’. Hence they 
cannot be said (pace Huntington) to have a historically fixed and culturally 
distinguishable and invariable essence, which separates them along clear-cut 
boundaries; yet at the same time their cultural legacies, as we have argued 
before, constrain and produce structural effects on important socio-political 
developments beyond their discursive function. Therefore, we treat the 
meaning and interpretation of civilizations seriously. Unlike Critical app-
roaches, which singularly view civilizations as the instantiation of a particular 
form of hegemonic discourse, we suggest that because civilizational politics is 
primarily about the crucial relationship between culture and power 
synthesized by coalitions of cultural and political elites, wider social, cultural 
and political forces outside of the discursive realm must be integral to 
explaining why civilizational imaginaries and narratives are gaining growing 
salience today. 
In particular, we argue that civilizational imaginaries and narratives are 
becoming more prominent today in world politics for three reasons: (1) they 
are an expression, in more general terms, of novel forms of identity politics 
that draw upon culture, religion and tradition; (2) they provide novel ‘frames of 
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reference’ at a time when globalization contributes to the deterritorialization of 
national identities, borders and actor-hood; and (3) they constitute political 
and intellectual critiques of singular conceptions of modernity and liberal 
universalizing projects, while acting as sites for the articulation of programs of 
multiple modernities. We will now expand on these three logics that sustain 
civilizational politics today.
Civilizations as Expressions of Novel Forms of Identity Politics 
Civilizational imaginaries and discourses are acquiring salience today 
because they participate in a form of politics that has come to define our late- 
or post-modern times; that is, ‘identity politics’. This is a politics that does not 
put the state (like nationalism or fascism), economics (like Marxism, or neo-
liberalism), or the individual (like liberalism) first, but identity. Identity politics 
takes multiple forms. Generally, within more liberal-oriented milieus it focuses 
on issues of race, gender and sexuality. Within more communitarian-focused 
approaches, and here where civilizational invocations tend to gain the 
greatest strength, it focuses on issues of culture, religion and tradition. 
Drivers of identity politics in the past decades are multiple: globalization and 
the uncertainties and dislocations this process has brought about; the 
collapse of universalist ideologies like communism in the wake of the fall of 
the Berlin wall; and the resurging power and role of religion around the world. 
Identity politics expressed through civilizational discourses can take multiple 
forms. The more pernicious of these are represented by calls for cultural 
homogeneity, exceptionalism and authoritarianism often put forward by the 
extreme right, demagogues and populists, or fundamentalist movements. Yet 
it also can manifest itself in communitarian projects, like those of the dialogue 
of civilizations, which pose the question of justice in a culturally diverse world 
and stress the importance of some kind of global multiculturalism based on 
the recognition, acceptance, and respect of diversity. This is what Charles 
Taylor (1994) also calls ‘the politics of recognition’. The injustice brought 
about by the lack of recognition of a ‘thick’ difference and otherness moves 
attention to the level of identity and introduces a crucial new dimension to 
politics beyond the understanding of justice as equality (Marxism) or fairness 
(liberalism). In both cases, civilizational politics is made more prominent by 
this new philosophical and political centrality that the politics of identity has 
acquired in a globalized predicament of late/post-modernity where 
particularism seems to have increasingly stronger normative arguments on its 
side than universalism.
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Civilizations as ‘Frames of Reference’ 
As scholars who see civilizations either as objective facts or as discourses 
both concur, civilizations cannot be thought of as actors (Huntington 1996; 
Hall and Jackson 2007). As Fabio Petito (2011, 767), drawing on Johann 
Arnason, argues, ‘civilizations, defined in a fundamentally culturalist-religious 
sense’, are reasserting themselves ‘as strategic frames of reference, not as 
direct protagonists, of international politics (emphasis in original)’. Civiliz-
ations as strategic frames of reference, we suggest, become particularly 
salient with the end of the Cold War at a moment when globalization 
contributes to the progressive deterritorialization of national identities, borders 
and actor-hood. We are living, it is commonly argued, in a world of major and 
rapid transformations and change (Held 1999), with globalizing processes 
playing a critical role in dislocating, destabilizing, and pluralizing identities and 
actors within and beyond the state (Dunn and Goff 2004; Lapid and 
Kratochwil 1997). Likewise, technological innovations are diffusing power 
internationally while empowering individuals and non-state actors (Nye 2011, 
especially Chapter five). 
The deterritorialization of identities made possible by globalization produces 
at the same time apparently contrasting, but arguably mutually reinforcing, 
outcomes. On the one hand, as Olivier Roy (2010) has highlighted, a hyper-
individualization of identity as in the case of new forms of religiosity and 
conversions where religion is not anymore associated with a specific 
territorialized culture; on the other, an hyper-collectivization of identity 
whereby the erosion of territorialized identities is compensated for by the re-
politicization of the civilizational identity-marker as macro stabilizer of 
uncertainty and a sort of order-generating device. Moreover, we are 
presented today with a bewildering array of agents beyond simply the state 
that populate the international sphere and participate in important ways in 
global politics. These range from individuals (bloggers, leakers, entre-
preneurs, converts, lone-wolf terrorists, or journalists); to movements and 
organizations at the civil society level (NGOs, social movements, media 
outlets, religious institutions, terrorist organizations, or corporations); regional 
organizations (the European Union (EU), NATO, the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)); 
and international institutions (the UN or the World Bank). 
In this context, civilizational imaginaries help map and order along distinct 
macro-cultural categories an otherwise dizzying range of actors in world 
politics. Civilizations as strategic frames of reference thus also function as 
cognitive and intellectual shortcuts which allow observers and participants in 
world politics to ascribe not just a particular identity, but also certain values 
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and interests to a complex multiplicity of state and non-state actors in 
international relations. Following this logic then it is possible to view, despite 
their diversity, Amnesty International, President Trump and NATO as 
‘Western’ and hence promoting Western values and interests; the OIC, Al 
Qaeda, and President Khatami as constituting multiple voices emanating from 
the ‘Muslim world’; or Gazprom, Dugin and the Russian Orthodox Church as 
more or less legitimate representatives of the voices and interests not simply 
of a state, but of a specific culture or civilization. Put differently, ordering the 
world along civilizations as frames of reference, shifts attention away from a 
focus solely on inter-state relations. It stresses instead relations among 
peoples understood as organized politically along different units – be them 
states, but also sub-state and supra-state actors – who are nonetheless tied 
together or differentiated from one another by particular macro-cultural 
identity markers, which are then in turn used to infer specific interests and 
behaviors.
Civilizations as Normative Critiques
Invocations to civilizations and civilizational politics in international relations, 
as Critical approaches note, do certainly participate in a range of problematic 
and exclusionary forms of politics and projects. However, as an intellectual 
project, theories of civilizational clashes, like those exposed by Huntington, 
and of dialogues, like those put forward by Mohammad Khatami, Fred 
Dallmayr, and others (Dallmayr 2002; Hobson 2007; Petito 2007) are 
generally guided by an important anti-hegemonic ethic. Thus invocations to a 
world constituted by multiple civilizations, are often part of an intellectual 
undertaking centered on critiquing liberal teleological, universalist, 
understandings of progress and modernity, and associated liberal political, 
economic, and normative projects which originate from the West and are 
fervently exported, promoted or imposed on the rest of the world. 
Moreover, as both Eisenstadt (2003) and Arnason (2003) have suggested, 
civilizational backgrounds and legacies are the necessary conditions to make 
sense of the different and varied patterns of modernity. In other words, the 
plurality of civilizations is the precondition for the pluralization of modernity. 
From this perspective, modernity is seen as a sui generis civilization, not 
unlike the emergence of the great worldwide religious traditions of Christianity 
and Islam, consisting, however, of ‘a set of infrastructural innovations that can 
be adapted to diverse civilizational contexts’ (Arnason 2003, 34). This is 
crucial as we will miss a fundamental dimension if we do not recognize that 
civilizational politics is part of the elite-driven ideological political struggle in 
contemporary Chinese (‘Asian values’, Confucian model, etc...), Indian 
(Hindutva), Russian (Orthodoxy) politics and in the politics of Muslim-majority 
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countries (Islamisms, Sharia law, etc.). Civilizational politics is also about the 
re-articulation, reinterpretation or even re-invention of civilizational legacies 
and their core cultural patterns or orientations into contemporary political 
programs of modernization.
As Fabio Petito (2015) notes, the turn towards civilizational narratives 
constitutes in part that revolt against the West that Hedley Bull talked about. 
In particular, such narratives are seen as constituting the fifth and last stage 
of this revolt: the struggle for cultural liberation – that follows those for 
sovereign equality, political independence, racial equality, and economic 
justice. More recently, Petito (2016) has gone further to suggest that 
civilizational politics should not be confined only to the realm of post-colonial 
struggles, but also take place in the context of the rise and emergence of a 
more multipolar world as countries like Russia, China and India re-assert 
themselves as major powers. 
To sum up, the final reason for the post-Cold War growth of civilizational 
politics, is that it provides an overarching discourse that connects a range of 
deeply normative critiques of globalization, modernization, Western 
hegemony and the liberal order with the articulation of different alternative 
(multiple) ways to deal with the modern predicament. In the international 
realm, critiques then differ in important ways, however, when articulated along 
a clash or dialogue perspective. 
Clash theorists, like Huntington, see civilizational diversity and cultural 
pluralism as incommensurable and thus a perennial source of tensions and 
conflicts. The best that we can hope for, these theorists argue, is prudence 
and restraint. Scholars and political leaders advancing a civilizational 
dialogue perspective, instead, generally value cultural pluralism, they see it 
as a source of enrichment and a key for building a more peaceful and just, 
less hegemonic or Western/liberal-centric, international order. What is 
required to reach such a goal, and to dispel narratives of clash, are 
intercultural and inter-faith dialogues and initiatives across all levels to foster 
greater understanding, appreciation and cooperation among actors populating 
an inescapably diverse international community. Similarly, within each 
civilizational context the reinterpretation of civilizational legacies into 
alternative paths to development and modernization is rarely uncontested and 
uniform and more often assumes rather opposed ideological orientations. 
Therefore the analysis of the civilizational backgrounds to modernizing 
processes cannot be only a cultural-historical exercise but it must be also a 
social analysis of the power dynamics and structures at play.
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Conclusion
To conclude, civilizational imaginaries and discourses are a way to 
understand and practice world politics in the context of a post-Cold War 
international system marked by: the progressive assertion of culture, tradition 
and religion as an expression of late/post-modern forms of identity politics; 
globalization and the deterritorialization of political identities and actorhood; 
and attempts to resist hegemonic liberal narratives and modernizing projects, 
while seeking to articulate alternative and multiple modernities.  
The new global predicament of identity politics has opened up the space for 
civilizations to reassert themselves as crucial discursive vectors of 
contemporary global politics and antagonisms. This requires a highly power-
sensitive analysis of the new global ideological patterns, as has been rightly 
pointed out by Critical approaches to civilizations. Civilizations, however, are 
also operating beyond this discursive dimension as crucial legacies and 
cultural orientations in the anti-liberal politics of multiple modernities projects. 
Here a cultural-based understanding of civilization is a necessary condition to 
make sense of the divergent, uneven and different paths of development and 
modernization around the world. Yet, and crucially contra Primordialists, 
culture alone is not sufficient in identifying social and political outcomes, 
which are very much influenced by elite-based power struggles and 
interactions. 
Within the limited scope of this paper, the Sociological approach put forward 
here has thus attempted to outline a way to avoid the limits of both cultural 
and power reductionisms. It has sought to do so by pointing to the mutually 
reinforcing relations between civilizations as ideological-strategic frames of 
reference for global politics and, at the same time, as cultural legacies and 
orientations for the articulation of programs of alternative modernities. The 
hope has been to offer some initial analytical tools to better make sense of an 
international context where civilizational politics are here to stay for the 
foreseeable future.
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Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ Today: Responses 
and Developments
JEFFREY HAYNES
It is now a quarter of a century since Samuel Huntington first published his 
treatise about what he understood as an epochal event in international 
relations: the post-Cold War ‘clash of civilizations’. 
Since the late 1970s, the talk has been of the impossibility of different sets of 
values, norms and beliefs living side-by-side in an increasingly globalized 
world. In 1993, the late Samuel Huntington published one of the most cited 
articles in international relations literature: ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ 
(Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22–48), followed three years later by a 
book-length treatment of the same issue. Why are the article and book so 
important for our understanding of the post-Cold War world? Why are they 
collectively a touchstone for nearly all contemporary debates about the 
capacity of different groups to live together in relative amity not enmity? 
Origins and Development of the Clash of ‘Clash of Civilizations’
Bernard Lewis (1990), the British orientalist, was the first to claim there was a 
‘clash between civilizations’ in a speech at Johns Hopkins University in 1957. 
Lewis argued that Islam and the West had differing values which would only 
be resolved following conflict. Initially, however, Lewis’s contention did not 
create much of a stir. This was hardly surprising given that the main foreign 
policy issue confronting the West in the late 1950s was dealing with what was 
widely perceived as an expansionist Soviet Union. Four decades later, 
Lewis’s clash between civilizations had become a clash of civilizations. This 
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was the claim of Samuel Huntington, who contended that a clash between the 
West and the ‘Muslim world’ would be the key foreign policy issue for the US 
(and the West more generally) after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Like Lewis, 40 years earlier, Huntington argued that one of the two ‘sides’ was 
ideationally destined to prevail over the over. Because of their differing 
values, it would not be possible for them to unite to defeat humanity’s myriad 
common problems (such as climate change, poverty, and gender inequality). 
The relationship between a scholarly argument relating to, and popular 
understanding of, a phenomenon is not always clear. Had things turned out 
differently, Huntington’s arguments on the ‘clash of civilizations’ would 
probably have been debated only by a few scholars, without much impact on 
policy-makers or popular understanding of how the world works. But the 
events of 9/11 made Huntington’s arguments mainstream and centre stage. 
The 9/11 attacks had been preceded by others which, with hindsight, could be 
seen as initial signs of a ‘civilizational war’ between the West and the Muslim 
world. A first jihadi assault on the Twin Towers in 1993 was followed in 1998 
by attacks on two US embassies in Africa. The 1993 and 1998 attacks, 
coupled with 9/11, seemed to some to be clear signs that Islamist extremists 
were willing to take the ‘clash of civilizations’ to the stage of open conflict with 
the US. Neither President George W. Bush nor President Barack Obama 
responded to terrorism carried out by actors motivated by Islamist ideologies 
by declaring war on ‘Islam’. President Bush stated a week after 9/11 that ‘[t]
hese acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the 
Islamic faith’. The US response, Bush decreed, was to go to war with al-
Qaeda terrorists, whose words and deeds perverted ‘the peaceful teaching of 
Islam’ (Bush 2001). A few years later, Obama also denied that there was a 
‘clash of civilizations’ between the US and the Muslim world. In a major 
speech in Cairo in 2009, not long after assuming the presidency, Obama 
sought to reach out to Muslim-majority societies, aiming to set relations on an 
improved footing (Obama 2009). However, neither Bush nor Obama was 
successful in preventing a ‘clash of civilizations’ mentality from spreading and 
gaining strength at the popular level in America, especially among those who 
identify with the political and religious right. Right-wing political media such as 
Fox News and certain politically conservative evangelical leaders became 
more and more bluntly critical of Islam with each passing year. 
By the time of the presidential campaign in 2016, the issue of the relationship 
between the US and the Muslim-majority world was very much in the 
spotlight. During the electoral process, the republican candidate for president, 
Donald Trump, stated (among many other things) that ‘I think Islam hates 
us’ (2017). There was no attempt to clarify that he was referring only to 
‘radical Islamic terrorists’ (Trump 2017). Few on the hard-right thought he 
needed to offer any clarification or qualification.
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My argument in this brief piece is not that Huntington’s article and book were 
so important because his argument was ‘correct’ or ‘right’. My claim is 
twofold: First, Huntington’s article was and is important because it captured 
perfectly the end-of-the-Cold War zeitgeist, a way of seeing the world which 
has endured in the uncertain years which have followed, as exemplified by 
the hostility shown to ‘Islam’ by candidate (now President) Trump. Second, 
Huntington’s argument has proved to be an abiding statement about 
globalisation and the hopes and fears that it conveys. It is almost irrelevant 
that his focal point: the impossibility of the West – read; the US – and ‘Islam’ – 
read; ‘Islamic radicalism/fundamentalism’ – living together in harmony was 
laughingly over-simplified, redolent of the paranoia of someone experiencing 
the shattering of a stable, safe and unchanging world suddenly and 
demonstrably confronted with the scenario of the post-World War II paradigm 
smashed to smithereens. What was a card-carrying Realist, such as 
Huntington, to do under these circumstances? The response was to find a 
new enemy and dress it up in the same preposterous ‘baddy’ clothes that had 
marked the treatment by US Realists of the Soviet Union from the start of the 
Cold War in the late 1940s and transfer the characteristics of conflict to a new 
‘actor’: ‘Islamic fundamentalism.’
It may be worth recalling that a quarter century ago in the early 1990s, the 
world was just emerging from a 50-year period of secular ideological 
polarization, focused on the US and the Soviet Union, the poster children of 
very different worldviews: ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘global communism’. 
Contrary to today’s triumphalist claims of some in the US, the US did not ‘win’ 
the Cold War; rather, the Soviet Union ‘lost’ it. Unable to compete with 
America in a competition for global dominance, its shaky, dysfunctional and 
misanthropic political/social/economic system spectacularly imploded within a 
seemingly impossibly short period of time: apparently as strong as ever in the 
mid-1980s, by 1991, the Soviet Union and its system as well as its parasitic 
coterie of attendant nations were no more. This left a gulf, a hole, a vacuum. 
How, and with what, to fill it?
Globalization, redolent of democracy, capitalism and freedom, was the heady 
force which defeated the USSR. In addition, globalization was also the factor 
which reinjected religion back into international relations, having been forced 
in the centuries following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 into marginal-
ization. The sudden demise of the Cold War, as well as the Soviet Union and 
its attendant secular ideology, opened the way for a new focus on ‘culture’ 
and ‘civilizations’, of which religion is very often an integral aspect. The 9/11 
attacks on the United States were a key event in the debate about the role of 
cultural and religious difference – especially, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ – in 
international conflict, especially in the way that they focused attention on al-
Qaeda’s then dominant brand of globalized cultural terrorism. For some 
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scholars, analysts and policy makers – especially but not exclusively in the 
United States – 9/11 marked the practical onset of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash 
of civilizations’ between two cultural entities: the ‘Christian West’ and the 
‘Islamic world’, with special concern directed at Islamic ‘fundamentalists’ or 
‘radical terrorists’. This is not to suggest that Huntington’s arguments have 
had it all their own way. For some, 9/11 was not the start of a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ but rather the last gasp of transnational Islamist radicalism. (It 
remains to be seen if still unfolding events in Mali, Niger, Nigeria and 
elsewhere are the start of a new phase of Islamist radicalism.) On the other 
hand, it is hard to disagree with the claim that the events of September 11 
thrust culture to the forefront of the international agenda, providing 
Huntington’s thesis with a new lease of life. Henceforward, many 
commentators were no longer inhibited in attributing essentialist character-
istics to the ‘Christian West’ and ‘Islam’. After 9/11, there was a pronounced 
penchant to see the world in a Huntington-inspired simplistic division, with 
straight lines on maps – ‘Islam has bloody borders’, Huntington averred 
(1993, 35) – apparently the key to understanding what were increasingly 
portrayed as definitively ethically and racially defined lines across the globe. 
September 11, 2001, as well as many subsequent terrorist outrages, were 
perpetrated by al-Qaeda or its followers; all involved extremist Muslims that 
wanted to cause destruction and loss of life against ‘Western’ targets that 
nevertheless often led to considerable loss of life, for example in Istanbul and 
Casablanca, among Muslims. The US response – the Bush administration’s 
‘war on terror’ – targeted Muslims, some believe rather indiscriminately, in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Some have claimed that these events 
‘prove’ the correctness of Huntington’s thesis. In such views, the 9/11 attacks 
and the US response suggested that Huntington’s prophecy about clashing 
civilizations was now less abstract and more plausible than when first 
articulated in the early 1990s. 
Others contend, however, that 9/11 was not the start of the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ – but, as already noted, the last gasp of radical Islamists’ 
attempts to foment revolutionary change which had begun with Iran’s 
revolution in 1979 and carried on into the 1980s with determined attempts by 
Islamist radicals to gain state power in Algeria and Egypt. We can also note, 
however, that 9/11 not only had major effects on both the US and international 
relations but also contributed to a surge of Islamic radicalism in Saudi Arabia. 
This was a result not only of the presence of US troops in the kingdom, as 
highlighted by al-Qaeda’s then leader, the late Osama bin Laden, but also 
due to a growing realization that the function of Saudi Arabia’s ulema was and 
is overwhelmingly to underpin and explain away the unearned and 
unrepresentative dominance of the ruling king, his extended family and 
parasitic entourage.
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The United Nations’ and ‘Moderate’ Muslims’ Response to the ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’
Huntington’s argument about the ‘clash of civilizations’ coincided with what 
some have called the ‘return’ of religion to international relations. Higher 
profile for religion in international relations was manifested in various ways, 
including an increasing presence at the world’s only global intergovernmental 
organization, the United Nations (UN). The role of religion at the UN 
expanded greatly after 9/11. The UN itself instituted a new entity in 2005: the 
Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), whose name was a direct riposte to 
Huntington’s argument about the inevitability of civilizations clashing in the 
post-Cold War world. The UNAOC was created by the UN General Assembly 
and headed by the UN Secretary-General, following a request from the 
governments of Spain and Turkey. This is not to imply that the UN suddenly 
‘got’ religion after decades of secular focus or that the UN is now the focus of 
a single, coordinated faith voice. Indeed, UNAOC’s concern with civilizational 
disharmony is itself a manifestation of difference in this regard. A major 
analytical controversy in this regard is what is meant by the term ‘civilization’ 
and how do such entities act in international relations, including at the UN. 
For example, while today inter-civilizational tensions and conflicts are typically 
linked to the perceived polarizing effects of globalization, half a century ago 
the focus was on different values between the West and secular Arab 
nationalists. When Bernard Lewis coined the phrase ‘clash between 
civilizations’ six decades ago, he was referring to a then extant ideological 
issue, that is, the baleful relationship of contemporary Arab nationalists, such 
as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the country between 1956 until his 
death in 1970, and who frequently expressed hostility towards the West. By 
the early 1990s, the focus had changed from secular nationalist hostility to 
Western security concerns with ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. 
Petito (2007; 2009) notes that, partly in response to Huntington’s claims of 
civilizational conflict, a counter narrative emerged stressing how vitally 
important it is for harmonious international relations that there is improved 
dialogue to deter a ‘clash of civilizations’. A key milestone in this regard came 
in 1998, when the then-president of Iran, Seyed Muhammad Khatami, called 
for improved ‘dialogue among civilizations’ during an address to the UN 
General Assembly. Following Khatami’s call, the General Assembly 
designated 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, an initiative 
strongly supported by the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). Yet, before Khatami’s initiative could firmly take root 
and develop, his efforts were derailed by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon. They were quickly followed by the US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) which de facto killed Khatami’s ‘dialogue 
among civilizations’ idea. Yet, international concern was too pronounced to 
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give up on the idea of improved dialogue between civilizations and before 
long the Alliance of Civilizations initiative was announced under the auspices 
of the UN.1 The UNAOC was initially suggested in 2004 at the 59th Session of 
the UN General Assembly by the then Prime Minister of Spain, José Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero, supported by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime 
minister at the time. The UNAOC was formally launched a year later by the 
UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan. In 2007, Annan’s successor, 
Ban Ki-moon, appointed a former president of Portugal, Jorge Sampaio, as 
head of UNAOC. Sampaio held the position until September 2012, when he 
was replaced by Qatar’s Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser, a former leader of the 
UN General Assembly, who took up the role in March 2013.
UNAOC prioritizes building ‘a global network of partners including States, 
International and regional organizations, civil society groups, foundations, and 
the private sector to improve cross-cultural relations between diverse nations 
and communities’ (2017c). To this end, a ‘Group of Friends’ supports UNAOC, 
comprising, at the time of writing (October 2017), 120 governments and 26 
international organizations (IOs) (2017a). In addition, UNAOC has 
‘memorandums of understanding’ with 16 ‘Partner Organizations’, including 
some IOs also listed in the Group of Friends2, such as the Council of Europe 
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and some entities which 
are not, including the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Global Dialogue Foundation 
and La Francophonie (2017b). The aim of UNAOC reaching out to both state 
and non-state actors is to highlight its focus: not appearing to be solely a UN-
focused, top-down body, remote from the concerns of governments, NGOs 
and ‘ordinary’ people. The overall aim is to roll back a putative or real ‘clash 
of civilizations’ and instead develop enhanced dialogue between cultural and 
religious groups for mutual, long-term benefit. 
While the UN has sought fit to establish an entity with the express purpose of 
repudiating Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’, ‘moderate’ Muslims have also 
responded to his contention by stressing the common ‘moderate’ ground 
which Christians and Muslims occupy. Kamali (2015, 9) argues that there are 
strong injunctions to moderation within the Islamic tradition:
1  It did not help that Khatami was a former president of Iran during an era when 
relations between Iran and the West, especially the US, became strained as a result of 
Iran’s nuclear power aspirations.
2  ‘A Group of Friends is a usual practice both in the UN framework and in other 
international arenas by which the country which is sponsoring a particular international 
initiative – whereas it is Spain and Turkey at the Alliance of Civilizations process, 
Finland with the Helsinki Process, or Canada in the Responsibility to Protect – creates 
an informal group with those other member states supportive of the initiative to promote 
it, give support and content and ensure its advance in the agenda of the different 
intergovernmental bodies’ (Manonelles, 2007: fn. 3). 
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Wasatiyyah (‘moderation’) is an important but somewhat 
neglected aspect of Islamic teachings that has wide-ranging 
ramifications in almost all areas of concern to Islam. 
‘Moderation’ is primarily a moral virtue of relevance not only to 
personal conduct of individuals but also to the integrity and 
self-image of communities and nations. Moderation is an 
aspect, in its Qur’anic projections, of the self-identity and 
worldview of the Muslim community, or ummah.
There have been several attempts since the early 2000s to pursue initiatives 
both within the Muslim world and in interfaith contexts, with the aim of 
highlighting and pursuing the path of ‘moderation’, to improve interfaith 
relations between Muslims and Christians. Several initiatives highlighting 
wasatiyyah followed 9/11: six institutional developments and four non-
institutionalized initiatives. The institutional developments were: (1) 
International Assembly for Moderate Islamic Thought and Culture (based in 
Jordan, 2003); (2) International Centre for Moderation (Kuwait, 2004); (3) 
Centre for Islamic Moderation and Renewal (Doha, 2008); (4) Global 
Movement of Moderates Foundation (Malaysia, 2012); (5) Institute 
Wasatiyyah Malaysia (Malaysia, 2013); and (6) International Institute of 
Wasatiyyah (Malaysia, 2013). The four non-institutionalized initiatives were: 
(1) The Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association Charter of 
Moderation in Religious Practice (Singapore, 2003); (2) The Mecca 
Declaration (Saudi Arabia, 2005); (3) The Amman Message (Jordan, 2005); 
and (4) ‘A Common Word between Us and You’ (Jordan, 2007). These and 
other interfaith and inter-civilizational initiatives and reform measures are 
significant not only because of their ideas and orientations stressing 
moderation – in contrast to the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis which stresses the 
lack of moderation and common ground between civilizations – but also 
because they explicitly expose incorrect, entrenched perceptions, such as: 
Islam is incapable of change; Islam is a violent religion; Muslims do not speak 
out against religious extremism and terrorism; and all Muslims reject religious 
pluralism and interfaith dialogue (Kamali 2015, 80).
The overall impact of assertions of Islamic ‘moderation’ is difficult or 
impossible to gauge accurately. However, one of the initiatives, ‘A Common 
Word between Us and You’, an open letter dated 13 October 2007, turned out 
to be controversial. The letter was organized and sent out by Jordan’s Royal 
Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought. It was signed by 138 influential 
Muslim leaders and scholars from around the world, ‘from a wide variety of 
denominations and schools of thought within Islam, and addressed to the 
contemporary leadership of Christian Churches, federations and 
organizations’ (Marciewicz 2016, 23). It was clearly an attempt to stress the 
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importance of common ground between the faiths and to try to undermine the 
‘clash of civilizations’ argument. 
The open letter called for peace between Muslim and Christians, contending 
that followers of both faiths should try to work together to find common 
ground between them. This is in line with the Qur’anic decree: ‘Say: O People 
of the Scripture? Come to a common word between us and you: that we 
worship none but God’ (Qur’an, Chapter three, Verse 64). It also accords with 
the Biblical commandment to love God and one’s neighbour (Matthew, 
Chapter 22, Verses 37 and 39). The open letter set in train a spirited interfaith 
dialogue between Christians and Muslims. In 2008 ‘A Common Word’ was 
awarded the Eugen Biser Award, given by a German foundation, and the 
Building Bridges Award from the UK-based Association of Muslim Social 
Scientists (‘“A Common Word” Receives AMSS (UK)’ 2008). The initiative did 
not attract support from all Christians. According to Pavlischek (2008, 61), this 
was because, following ‘the initial flurry of responses following its publication 
in November 2007, more careful measure has been taken of “Loving God and 
Neighbor”’. Pavlischek, an evangelical Christian, writing in the pages of The 
Review of Faith & International Affairs, contends that ‘A Common Word’ 
received ‘withering theological criticism’, including its ignoring of the crucial 
issue of religious liberty. Pavlischek notes that while the Royal Aal Al-Bayt 
Institute was sending out ‘A Common Word’ it was simultaneously 
issuing ‘fatwas denouncing apostates on a website it sponsors’. 
The open letter was published in October 2007. By February 2008, the fatwas 
to which Pavlischek refers had been removed from the website (Durie 2008). 
The Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought (2009) issued a summary 
document on the open letter, which also included a commentary. It stated 
that ‘takfir (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims’ are forbidden. It is not 
known why the fatwas were removed. However, for some Christians, this was 
the most crucial aspect of the open letter, highlighting what appeared to be a 
fundamental difference between Christians and Muslims and which supported 
the ‘clash of civilizations’ argument that the values of the different worldviews 
(Western and Muslim) were so different as to make the finding of common 
ground difficult or even impossible. Pavlischek (2008) argued that whereas 
Christians assert ‘the right of individual human beings to choose, proclaim, 
and change their religion without fear of legal sanctions’, in Islam there is 
nothing like the same freedom to move to another religion. In short, the issue 
of religious freedom is one of the main critiques of Islam from Christians. This 
is because, as Marshall (2016) explains, ‘major factors in contemporary 
Christian persecution [include] Christianity’s virtually intrinsic association with 
pluralism and freedom’ (Paul Marshall 2016, quoted in Philpott and Shah 
2017, 4).
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Conclusion
What of the goal of improved cross-cultural relations between diverse nations 
and communities, in direct riposte to Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ 
argument? Historically, neither the Christian/Western nor Muslim worlds have 
worked assiduously to achieve improved inter-civilizational dialogue and 
bridge building. Yet, a new and mutually rewarding relationship has the 
potential to emerge between the Muslim and Christian worlds, where 
accumulated wisdom and insights for necessary progress provide the basis of 
a valued coexistence. After 9/11, it is clear that such an improved relationship 
would be premised not on ideas of cultural superiority, but on mutual respect 
and openness to cultural eclecticism. In other words, Muslims and Christians 
can learn from each other and cooperate in the pursuit of shared values. The 
goal is to engage meaningfully and consistently in inter-civilizational bridge-
building so as to develop and deepen normatively desirable values and 
expand common understandings of truth, to transform an increasingly conflict-
filled relationship to one with collective good works serving humanity and the 
demonstration of the soundness of common values and contribution to 
civilizations (Said 2002, 7). It remains a moot point, however, the extent to 
which the pursuit – and the finding – of common ground between the West 
and the Muslim world is destined to replace the confrontational rhetoric of 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’. We have seen that both the UN and 
‘moderate’ Muslims have stressed that interreligious and intercultural dialogue 
is the way forward. But, will politicians like Donald Trump listen and act 
accordingly?
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The Kin-Country Thesis 
Revisited
KIM RICHARD NOSSAL
One of the key features of Samuel Huntington’s world of clashing civilizations 
was the phenomenon of ‘kin-country rallying’. States that were part of the 
civilization, Huntington argued, were like kin, and, more importantly, behaved 
like kin. Kin-countries, he argued, were a crucial part of the ‘remaking’ of 
global politics in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the introduction of ‘kin’ 
relationships in international relations was a novel feature in a broader idea 
that was already widely seen as ‘novel and jarring’ (Betts 2010, 188).
The purpose of this chapter is to revisit the idea of kin-country in 
contemporary international relations. I argue that the novelty of kin-country 
rallying in the 1990s when Huntington first outlined his ‘new’ approach to 
world politics (Huntington 1993, 35–39) was largely because his identification 
of the dynamics of kinship in world politics challenged the core assumptions 
of international relations theory that was so dominant in the American 
academy at the time. By contrast, for those outside the United States, the 
phenomenon of kin-country was historically familiar, even if, like Molière’s 
Monsieur Jourdain, who was delighted to discover that he had been speaking 
prose all his life without knowing it, they had not been using the language of 
kin-country. I conclude, however, that while Huntington’s kin-country approach 
provides a much clearer way to understand the relations among some 
countries than orthodox international relations theory, it is unlikely to be used, 
since it is so intimately identified with the broader civilizational clash thesis.
The Kin-Country Syndrome
When Huntington was writing his Foreign Affairs article in late 1992, an article 
in the Boston Globe caught his eye. H.D.S. Greenway, at the time the senior 
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associate editor of the newspaper, noted that the war that was raging in 
Bosnia was having ripple effects far beyond the Balkans. Greenway was 
reporting on an emergency meeting of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation was known before 
2011), being held in Jeddah. The OIC was seeking to redress the military 
balance between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims by having a 
United Nations arms embargo lifted. Greenway noted that this was a good 
example of the ‘complicating factor’ of the relationship between ‘an ethnic 
group and its kin country’ (Greenway 1992).
Greenway provided a number of other examples. He argued that the 
Russians had on numerous occasions intervened in the Balkans to protect 
Orthodox Christian Slavs, going so far as to suggest that ‘if the Russians had 
not mobilized to stop Austrian bullying of Serbia in 1914, World War I might 
have been prevented’. He noted that both Greece and Turkey were deeply 
engaged with what he called ‘their kinsmen’ in Cyprus. Britain found itself 
similarly engaged in Northern Ireland. Russians continued to be engaged in 
the politics of the former Soviet republics over mistreatment of Russians in 
those countries. Serbia was a ‘hostage to the Serbs in Bosnia’, with the 
government of Slobodan Milošević manipulating the Bosnian Serb minority 
‘as Berlin manipulated the Sudetan Germans in the 1930s’. Greenway had a 
catchy phrase for what was going on in Jeddah, a phrase that appeared in the 
headline of the article: the ‘kin-country syndrome’.
Huntington took Greenway’s phrase and expanded on the idea of family, and 
built kinship relations into his civilizational argument. However, it should be 
noted that unlike many of the other elements of his civilizational argument, 
which were often well-grounded in theoretical and empirical works in the field, 
Huntington did not explicitly ground his discussion of kinship in either the 
original Foreign Affairs article, or the 1996 book that flowed from it, in any of 
the huge extant literature on kinship (for a review of late-twentieth century 
theoretical literature on kinship, see Peletz 1995). Instead, he just used the 
terms kin, kinship and kin-country without further elaboration; no doubt he 
assumed that his readers would use their own understandings of what kin, 
kinship and kin-country might involve. As a result, without a theoretically-
grounded understanding of kinship, it is never precisely clear what drives the 
ties that create the kin-country syndrome. Using Greenway’s example of the 
Jeddah meeting of the CIO in December 1992 that so inspired Huntington, it 
is not clear whether the ‘kinship’ observed there was driven by descent, 
religion, culture, identity, nationality, national interest, or a shared member-
ship in a common civilization. Huntington, needless to say, would have 
argued the latter, but, as critics note, that is precisely one of the enduring 
flaws of the civilizational argument: actually defining those civilizations.
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Huntington, however, seemed untroubled by this lack of definitional and 
theoretical rigor. Clearly working on the assumption that readers would know 
kinship when they saw it, he sketched out the essence of the kin-country 
syndrome and how it would affect global politics in the future. Central to the 
discussion was, of course, the identification of civilization as the core focus of 
global conflict after the end of the Cold War between competing ideologies. 
And while Huntington (1996, 44) averred that civilizations were cultural rather 
than political entities, he nonetheless argued that what he called ‘core states’ 
within civilizations played a central political role:
In the emerging global politics, the core states of the major 
civilizations are supplanting the two Cold War superpowers as 
the principal poles of attraction and repulsion for other 
countries…. States in these civilizational blocs often tend to be 
distributed in concentric circles around the core state or state, 
reflecting their degree of identification with and integration into 
that bloc (Huntington 1996, 154).
In a world of civilizations, Huntington suggested, ‘the core states of 
civilizations are the sources of order within civilizations and, through 
negotiations with other core states, between civilizations’ (1996, 156). Within 
civilizations, order is created because of ties of kinship:
A core state can perform its ordering function because member 
states perceive it as a cultural kin. A civilization is an extended 
family and, like older members of a family, core states provide 
their relatives with both support and discipline (1996, 156).
Huntington argued that the kinship felt by people in different nations within a 
civilization has significant political effects. In particular, ‘in civilizational 
conflicts, unlike ideological ones, kin stand by their kin’ (1996, 217). This 
leads to ‘kin-country rallying’ (1996, 20) – or as he called it in the Foreign 
Affairs article ‘civilization rallying’ (1993, 35) – which is marked by ‘efforts by a 
state from one civilization to protect kinsmen in another civilization’ (1996, 
208). This rallying involves both governments and peoples: in some cases, 
diasporas will take the lead in organizing support – financial, military, and 
political – for their civilizational ‘kin’; in other cases, governments will be the 
prime movers.
Such kin-country rallying, Huntington contends, will have a critical impact on 
contemporary global conflict. In a world of nation-states, Huntington 
contended, conflicts between states will be largely limited to the protagonists, 
or those with a deep and direct interest in devoting blood and treasure to the 
66The Kin-Country Thesis Revisited
cause. Nations X and Y might go to war with each other, but the likelihood of 
widening that conflict is highly limited. In a world of civilizations, by contrast, 
the dynamics of kin-country rallying have the effect of widening wars. When 
wars break out on what Huntington called the ‘fault lines’ of civilizations 
(1993, 29–35; 1996, 207–208), local groups A1 and B1 will fight each other, 
but each will seek ‘to expand the war and mobilize support from civilizational 
kin groups, A2, A3, A4, and B2, B3, and B4, and those groups will identify 
with their fighting kin’ (1996, 254). Moreover, contemporary transportation and 
communications make the internationalization of kin-country support easier to 
accomplish: money, goods, services, arms, and even people are moved 
effortlessly across national boundaries.
Huntington sought to provide evidence for his kin-country rallying thesis in 
both the Foreign Affairs article and his book. Following the lead originally 
provided by Greenway in 1992, he examined the war in Yugoslavia, and the 
willingness of groups and states to rally around the different warring parties 
during the course of the 1990s. He was able to point to numerous diasporas, 
particularly those in Western countries, that rallied to support their ‘kinfolk’ 
back home. In the 1990s, ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the former 
Soviet Union, Indonesia and the countries of the Middle East appeared to 
confirm the thesis, at least superficially.
But on closer examination, it is clear that there was in fact not as much 
civilization rallying as Huntington asserted. In a critique written two years 
before the book appeared, Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker noted 
just how selective Huntington was in the cases of rallying he presented, 
ignoring the ethnic and national conflicts that had raged in the Soviet Union 
for two decades before the end of the Cold War, or choosing to focus only on 
those ethno-national conflicts in the Middle East or Africa that proved his 
thesis while ignoring others. As Rubenstein and Crocker put it crisply, ‘that 
selectivity will not wash’ (1994, 121).
Moreover, because of the wonky way that Huntington defined the eight major 
civilizations that are supposed to comprise contemporary global politics, it is 
not at all clear that transnational conflicts, even at the so-called ‘fault lines’ 
between civilizations – fault lines that run suspiciously along the borders of 
sovereign nation-states – were inter-civilizational conflicts. However, while 
Huntington’s claims of kin-country rallying were clearly overstated, it can be 
argued that his identification of kinship as a factor in global politics – even if 
under-theorized – was a novel departure from the dominant orthodoxies of 
international relations theory in the 1990s.
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Kin-Countries in World Politics
Huntington’s identification of sentiments of ‘kinship’ across national borders – 
and in particular the existence of ‘kin-countries’ – stood in stark contrast to 
the orthodox theorizing in international politics about the relations of 
independent political communities dominant at the time that Huntington was 
writing – realism. While there were – and are – different strands of realism, all 
variants share a common assumption that independent political communities 
are atomistic, self-regarding, and fundamentally selfish in their relations with 
all other political communities.
The most durable realist is Hans J. Morgenthau (1948; 2005), whose path-
breaking work in the late 1940s was so dominant during the Cold War era that 
it was still being revised and used as an IR text in 2005, fully 25 years after 
his death in 1980. Morgenthau’s classic conception of international relations 
was that world politics was little more than the endless struggles of self-
interested units seeking to avoid domination by others in an environment that 
is fundamentally anarchic and comparable to a Hobbesian state of nature, 
where there was no government, and thus where everyone treated one 
another as an enemy. In this view, the units may take different forms over 
time – since 1648, they have predominantly been sovereign nation-states – 
but the essence of their interaction is unchanging over time: they define their 
interests in terms of power and struggle with each other to seek a balance of 
power.
There were critiques of Morgenthau’s classical realist perspective. For 
example, Keohane and Nye (1977) argued that the classical realist portrait 
did neither describe nor explain the relations between the United States and 
its European allies in the 1970s. That relationship, they argued, was not 
determined by raw power politics; rather, they argued that there was a 
‘complex’ degree of interdependence between the US and Western Europe, 
and this changed the nature of their relationship: their economic and security 
relationship altered the way that power was exercised across the Atlantic. 
Likewise, English School theorists like Hedley Bull (1977) argued that 
classical realist theory did not capture the degree to which politics between 
independent political communities invariably sought to establish a social 
order, and that while sovereign nation-states in the contemporary system may 
be self-seeking, global politics was far removed from the kind of grim 
Hobbesian state of nature painted by classical realists.
Another important strand was the elaboration in the late 1970s and early 
1980s of a ‘new’ realism (Keohane 1986), purporting to offer a more 
theoretically rigorous version of classical realism. ‘Neorealists’ (or, more 
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correctly, structural realists) argued that world politics could be best 
understood by its structure. In this version of realism, states were led to 
dominate others by the anarchic structure of the system in which they found 
themselves. Structural realists like Waltz (1979) and Walt (1986) argued that 
the only way to avoid domination by others was by seeking power, either 
singly or in combination with other states. The apogee of this view of the 
impact of structure was reflected in the theory of ‘offensive’ realism, which 
asserts that every great power is forced by the nature of the system, as 
Mearsheimer (2001, 29) put it, to search ‘for opportunities to gain power over 
their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal’.
In turn, neorealism (or structural realism) and offensive realism spawned the 
emergence of a neoclassical realist school that argued that the structure of 
the system, while important, does not necessarily have such overweening 
deterministic power. Rather, other factors, such as perception and misper-
ception of others, a country’s domestic politics, including the capacity of state 
leaders to mobilize a state’s power or generate domestic support, all 
contribute to a state’s foreign policy behavior (for example, Rose 1998).
For all their differences, however, what unites the strands of realist thought is 
the belief in the atomistic existence of states – even if they do exist in a 
‘social’ context, as English School scholars suggest; the importance of 
selfishness based on materialist conceptions of interest; and the importance 
of power to advance those interests.
While the tenets of realism are continually challenged by alternative 
theoretical approaches, it is important to recognize the degree to which the 
tenets of realist thought remain strongly entrenched, not only in the academy, 
but also in policy circles. Consider the perspective of H.R. McMaster, the U.S. 
National Security Advisor in the administration of Donald J. Trump, and Gary 
D. Cohn, Trump’s chief economic adviser. In an op-ed written after Trump’s 
first foreign trip in May 2017, they wrote that the president had:
a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a ‘global community’ 
but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and 
businesses engage and compete for advantage… Rather than 
deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we embrace 
it (McMaster and Cohn 2017).
Needless to say, an interest-based, atomistic view of world politics will have 
important implications for how one understands how foreign policy is made, 
how alliances and coalitions work, why states will intervene in some conflicts 
and not in others, and whether non-material factors will shape foreign policy 
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outcomes. Fouad Ajami put the interest-based argument succinctly in his 
response to Huntington’s 1993 article: ‘States avert their gaze from blood ties 
when they need to; they see brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their 
interest to do so’. He went on to remind us of the lessons of the Melian 
dialogue:
Besieged by Athens, [the Melians] held out and were sure that 
the Lacedaemonians were ‘bound, if only for very shame, to 
come to the aid of their kindred’. The Melians never wavered in 
their confidence in their ‘civilizational’ allies: ‘Our common 
blood insures our fidelity.’ We know what became of the 
Melians. Their allies did not turn up, their island was sacked, 
their world laid to waste (Ajami 1993, 9).
The problem with the orthodox realist theories of international relations, 
however, is that they cannot account for those international relationships that 
are patently not marked by the atomism and selfishness predicted by the 
orthodox theory. For there are a number of international relationships where 
there is a rather different political dynamic at work, one that does not conform 
to the predictions of any of the realist perspectives. On the contrary: in some 
international relationships, ties of ‘sentiment’ – in other words, kinship – must 
form much of the explanation for the relationships of these countries (and 
indeed their governments and peoples). These are not atomistic units, always 
seeking self-interest pure and simple, with outcomes determined by power 
differentials. Rather, they are linked by ties of different sorts: economic, 
commercial, familial, political, diplomatic, strategic, language, and culture. 
And power, when it is exercised, tends to be exercised in a less brutal fashion 
than predicted by realist theory.
Importantly, there is an ‘insider’ element that comes with such shared 
attributes as language, culture, institutions, and history that provide crucial 
commonalities for peoples of different and independent political communities. 
Such shared attributes provide the basis for widely shared cultural 
understandings that tend not be present when such critical elements are 
absent. In short, there are some international relationships that simply cannot 
be understood through a realist lens. 
One could point to the former communities of the British Empire – Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and post-imperial Britain itself – as 
prototypical kin-countries. The relationships between and among these five 
countries are fundamentally different than relations among most other states, 
and certainly do not conform to the way that realists describe and explain 
international relations. 
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First, there is a sense of commonality, shared identity – the ‘we-feeling’ 
identified by Deutsch (1957) that is so necessary for the establishment of a 
security community (Adler and Barnett 1998). To be sure, that shared identity 
is stronger in some cases than others: the strong ‘we-feeling’ across the 
Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand does not compare, for 
example, to feelings between Americans and Australians. But there can be 
little doubt that in all five communities, there is a sense of exceptionalism that 
means, for example, that the use of force between these countries as a 
means of securing national objectives has become unthinkable. In this, these 
five countries constitute an unambiguous security community (Adler and 
Barnett 1998) that is also a zone of democratic peace (Roussel 2004); their 
relationships among each other exhibit the dynamics predicted in cases of 
complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977).
Second, there is a deep culture of interconnectedness between these 
communities. These connections are not just driven by material factors such 
as trade and investment, but in people-to-people links between families, 
students, and tourism. Of particular importance are the connections at the 
transgovernmental level that we simply do not see in many other international 
contexts (Fox, Hero and Nye 1976; Thompson and Randall, 2008). Relations 
are marked by a complex institutionalization that binds these separate and 
independent communities. The Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance is one 
manifestation of that close relationship. The ease with which government 
officials are exchanged in some of these dyads (in particular Australia-New 
Zealand, Australia-Canada) is another. Likewise, the willingness of the United 
States to give the command of units of its armed forces to Canadian officers 
on secondment speaks to a culture of closeness that is not to be found in 
other dyadic relationships.
Third, there are strong links that manifest themselves in military terms. In a 
historical context, the kin-country relationships of some of these dyads 
featured that most basic feature of kinship in a social context: the willingness 
of members of one political community to put themselves in harm’s way to 
protect the interests of another community. Consider the case of Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand during the Imperial era. Australians, Canadians 
and New Zealanders fought in the Boer War in 1899, and in 1914, by which 
time all three countries were self-governing dominions within the British 
Empire. Hundreds of thousands of Australians, Canadians and New 
Zealanders were willing to put themselves in harm’s way in defence of a wider 
political community (Nossal 2004). 
While in a post-Imperial context there is little that remains of those earlier 
sentiments – during the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, for example, none 
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of the former dominions offered to assist Britain in its war against Argentina – 
there is nonetheless a continued willingness to commit the nation’s resources 
to the defence and assistance to a cause that might be objectively ‘foreign’ 
and ‘alien’, but which one believes to be (or constructs as being) one’s own, 
and hence in one’s self-interest. Thus, for example, Australia and New 
Zealand both contributed troops to the American war in Vietnam in the 1960s. 
And Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand all responded by sending 
troops to Afghanistan after the attack on the United States on 11 September 
2001. 
One small, but telling, indication of the nature of the relationship has been the 
tendency to use the language of family to describe others in the community. 
In the Imperial era, for example, it was common for Australians, Canadians 
and New Zealanders to refer to Britain in national discourse as the ‘mother 
country’. Today, ‘cousins’ tends to be the preferred familial metaphor (Patten 
2006; Blaxland 2006), though the language of family and kin continues to be 
used in official discourse. For example, when Donald J. Trump met Theresa 
May, the British prime minister, on 27 January 2017, he began his remarks by 
noting his own family connection to the United Kingdom; and May, for her 
part, noted that the US-UK relationship was ‘based on the bonds of history, of 
family, kinship and common interests’ (White House 2017).
But to what extent are these kin-countries connected to Huntingtonesque 
civilizations? The analysis above suggests that civilization – as defined by 
Huntington – has very little to do with the kinship ties between these five 
countries. To be sure, they are all part of the ‘West’, as broadly defined by 
Huntington, but the particular kinship links that continue to bind Australia, 
Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States together cannot be 
explained in the kind of ‘civilizational’ terms that Huntington uses. 
On the contrary: as Srdjan Vucetic (2011) has shown, the construction of a 
larger ‘kin-country’ community between these countries was racial rather than 
civilizational. The key, he argues, was the idea of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ race that 
identified a commonality between Britain and its ‘white dominions’ (in order of 
seniority, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) on the one hand and the 
United States on the other that was racial, even though it was often referred 
to in linguistic terms by such enthusiasts as Winston S. Churchill as the 
‘English-speaking peoples’. To be sure, that definition of ‘race’ did not mirror 
objective reality: there were French-speaking Canadians; indigenous peoples 
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States; a ‘Celtic fringe’ 
(Vucetic 2011, 28) in the United Kingdom (and Australia); and, in the United 
States, a large African-American population and a Hispanic population that 
grew over the course of the twentieth century. But as Vucetic shows, 
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constructions of Anglo-Saxonism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries finessed and marginalized these groups. Instead, the ‘race 
patriotism’ (Vucetic 2011, 29) of the era stressed the superiority of Anglo-
Saxons over others. Indeed, what British leaders, such as Arthur Balfour and 
Joseph Chamberlain, openly called a ‘race alliance’ lay behind the 
rapprochement between the British Empire and the United States at the turn 
of twentieth century. And this, in a path-dependent way, set the stage for the 
consolidation of a security community between countries that evolved in the 
post-Imperial (but not post-imperial) order of the twentieth century, a security 
community that continues in the twenty-first century.
Importantly, this racialized construction of Anglo-Saxonism, bounded as it was 
with a linguistic fence, was purposely designed to exclude others who might 
nonetheless have been part of a broader Western civilization. The ‘West’ as a 
Huntingtonian civilizational group might have grown from the British-American 
rapprochement and the Entente Cordiale across the English Channel in the 
early twentieth century to the expansion of both NATO and the European 
Union after the collapse of the Soviet Union at century’s end, but the kind of 
kin-country relations that developed between the United States, Britain and 
the three former dominions never developed with any other countries within 
the Western alliance.
Moreover, it is clear that the kin-country relationship that developed between 
these countries is a cas unique in contemporary global politics. While we can 
find patterns of friendship between countries developed on numerous bases – 
language (la Francophonie, Cumbre Iberoamericana, for example), religion 
(Organization of Islamic Cooperation), or even former colonial membership 
(the Commonwealth or La Francophonie) – there simply is no comparable 
grouping of states that have the same kind of relationship as these five 
countries.
Conclusion
I have argued that Huntington was right to call attention to the phenomenon 
of kin-countries. To be sure, most students of international relations and 
foreign policy in the smaller kin-countries explored in this chapter were 
already aware of the phenomenon, even if, like Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain, 
they were not using the language of kin-country in their scholarship. But they 
fully understood that there are certain international relationships that are 
simply not well explained by orthodox international relations theorizing, 
particularly not realist theories.
But, paradoxically, the idea of kin-country can only be made useful if it is 
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stripped of its ‘clash of civilizations’ baggage. In other words, looking at some 
international relationships through the lens of a sense of kinship – whether 
defined, as Vucetic does, as a racialized identity, or focusing on attributes 
such as politico-strategic or economic interests, language, common historical 
origins or political institutions, culture, religion, or ‘way of life’ – makes 
considerably more sense than trying to understand those relationships using 
the precepts of realism. But those kinship ties, it is clear, have little to do with 
‘civilization’, as Huntington was using the term. Likewise, the ‘rallying’ that 
was so central to Huntington’s conception of kin-country is not only 
problematic more generally – as widely noted by critics – but makes no 
appearance in the relationships of the kin-countries looked at in this chapter.
In short, the concept of kin-country remains too closely identified with 
Huntington’s broader civilizational argument to be able to enjoy anything but a 
tadpole existence, and certainly will never be able to develop autonomously 
from the project that spawned it 25 years ago. Kin-country seems doomed to 
be an analytical category that is useful but, sadly, unusable.
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Huntington vs. Mearsheimer vs. 
Fukuyama: Which Post-Cold 
War Thesis is Most Accurate?
GLEN M.E. DUERR
In the aftermath of the Cold War – a 45-year ideological struggle between the 
United States and the Soviet Union – several scholars forecasted the future 
of conflict and geopolitics post-1991. Three prominent books – Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, and Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, all with 
compelling theses, provide a roadmap as to possible future outcomes. These 
three books have been selected, in part, because Huntington actually 
criticizes the main theories of the two others authors in Chapter one of his 
book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(Huntington 1997, 31, 37).
Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of History and the Last Man, outlines the 
success of democracy and free-market capitalism as the dominant ideology 
that would proliferate throughout the world after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, and the representative death of communism as a viable ideological 
position (Fukuyama 1992). In a sense, warfare in the post-Cold War is 
unlikely given the rise of democracy and interdependence, Fukuyama argues. 
Since democracy is the final form of human government, debating Karl Marx’s 
admonition that communism would replace capitalism; Fukuyama effectively 
argues the opposite of Marx that capitalism has triumphed. Fukuyama also 
argues that although democracy is not a panacea to cure all problems of 
humanity, it is the final form of government. 
John Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, provides an 
overview of the international system from a structural realist (also known as a 
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neo-realist) perspective, specifically offensive realism. In contrast to early 
classical realist scholars like Hans Morgenthau, Mearsheimer argues that the 
structure of the international system is a cause of war, not necessarily moral 
concerns, or the particular characteristics of a given leader. In contrast to 
other structural realists like Kenneth Waltz, Mearsheimer argues that – on the 
questions of how much power states want to accumulate – states want as 
much power as they can get, rather than what he terms defensive realists 
who contend that states are interested in maintaining the balance of power 
(Mearsheimer 2001, 22). 
Mearsheimer’s core predictions circulate around the changing dynamics in 
geopolitics as related to ‘great powers’. Mearsheimer argues that conflict is a 
fact of the international system because ultimately the dynamics of great 
power politics lead to wars over dominance of the system. Mearsheimer’s 
book concentrates on an almost 200-year period from the start of the 
Napoleonic Wars, 1792, to the end of the Cold War, 1991. He argues that 
three central wars occurred – the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World 
War II – when the international system of balance of power politics was both 
unbalanced and multipolar (Mearsheimer 2001, 357). Thus, even though 
Mearsheimer does not directly discuss the post-Cold War world, his theory 
provides predictive power as to what will happen in the future based on 
characteristics that, he argues, have held over time. In the post-Cold War 
world, other ‘great powers’, given enough time, will seek to balance the power 
of the United States. The world is particularly conflict-prone when a multi-
polar world arises, especially if the balance-of-power becomes unbalanced 
(Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, when Mearsheimer published his book in 2001, 
the US was clearly the only superpower in the world. 
Finally, Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ article in Foreign Affairs 
spawned such furious debate in 1993 that Huntington published a full-length 
book in 1996 to assuage his critics (Huntington 1993; Huntington 1997). 
Revolving around nine civilizations, Huntington argues that the future of 
warfare would be fought along civilizational ‘fault lines’. The civilizations 
include the West, Latin America, Africa, Orthodox, Sinic, Islamic, Hindu, 
Buddhist and Japanese. From the 1993 article to the 1996 book, Huntington 
added Japanese as a separate civilization, and changed Confucian to Sinic. 
One of the most controversial components of Huntington’s argument is the 
line ‘Islam has bloody borders’ (Huntington 1993, 35) inferring that the Islamic 
civilization in particular tends to become violently embroiled with other 
civilizations on its periphery. The case here is based on wars such as the 
Yugoslav war, conflict in Sudan and Iraq, as well as the Philippines.
 Each thesis provides compelling reasons as to the future of the world, 
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especially during the post-Cold War period. Huntington and Mearsheimer, in 
particular, utilize a theoretical argument in order to provide a forecast of the 
future. This is the major upside of using an accepted theory because it allows 
for predictions despite the fact that no scholar can readily predict what will 
actually happen. As John Mearsheimer is fond of saying, ‘the leaders of 
tomorrow are in the fifth grade today, and we have no way of predicting how 
they will act. But, theory provides us with a framework of their expected 
behaviors’.1
Now that an overview of each scholar’s major post-Cold War thesis has been 
presented, this chapter will first assess the arguments of Fukuyama and 
Mearsheimer as to their predictive power. Which topics and events has each 
author correctly predicted, and which topics and events has each author 
missed; in essence, which theory is most accurate? Given that this volume is 
an assessment of the work of Samuel Huntington, special attention is paid to 
the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis in the latter half of the chapter, but always 
with a comparison of Fukuyama and Mearsheimer in the background. 
Ultimately, I argue that each scholars’ prediction has, at periods of time in the 
post-Cold War era, looked very strong, whilst, at other times, their predictions 
have either not come to fruition, or been incorrect. Each thesis is still 
salvageable, but democracy is currently on the decline, which undercuts 
Fukuyama; great power competition has still not really emerged, which 
undercuts Mearsheimer; and civilizational identity remains limited, which 
undercuts Huntington. For each scholar, however, is known for their 
comprehensive grasp of history, so their work should be assessed regularly to 
see if their predictions correctly prognosticated events in the long term. 
Which Theory is Most Accurate?
At various points since the formal end of the Cold War in 1991, each of the 
scholars’ predictions has looked at times like a successful explanation of the 
current era, but also, at other times, like respective theses that missed the 
central explanatory factors of the period – prognosticating after all is a very 
difficult endeavor. Fukuyama’s thesis looked strong throughout the 1990s with 
the proliferation of democracies and states adopting free-market principles, 
even with requisite state protections (perhaps best called mixed economies). 
However, with 9/11, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ theory began to take hold as a better explanation of why 
geopolitical actions happened the way they did. Moreover, with the rise of 
China, and the resurgence of Russia – both utilizing an illiberal model of 
governance – Fukuyama’s thesis was likewise challenged by Mearsheimer’s 
1  Mearsheimer made this statement at the 2013 International Studies Association 
conference in San Francisco, California, on a panel discussion. 
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prediction that other states would attempt to balance the power of the 
hegemon. Despite the challenges, parts of Fukuyama’s thesis still hold in that 
democracy remains an appealing force in world politics. Even though demo-
cracy has declined for the eleventh straight year, 87 of the 195 measured 
countries are still labelled as ‘free’ (Freedom House 2017). Tangentially, 
Fukuyama’s work also buttresses the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which 
layers his prediction with a Churchillian argument that democracy is the best 
form of government despite its flaws. Although Fukuyama did not construct 
the DPT, his positions on democracy strengthened the DPT by emphasizing 
the importance of democracy as the final form of human government. The 
DPT still holds if democracy and war are given strict definitions, and if 
intrastate conflicts are omitted. These two points show that Fukuyama’s End 
of History thesis is at the very least still relevant today. 
For Fukuyama, democracy is central. The DPT posits that mature 
democracies do not go to war with other mature democracies (see Doyle 
1986; Doyle 2005). The monadic version of the theory – assessing whether or 
not democracies are peaceful or not compared to non-democracies – is the 
argument that, yes, democracies are generally more peaceful than any other 
type of regime. For the monadic theory, the actual evidence however is at 
best mixed since democratic countries like the United States and the United 
Kingdom still frequently go to war against non-democracies. However, some 
evidence exists as to support the dyadic version of the theory – assessing 
whether mature democracies are more peaceful when surveying their 
likelihood of going to war against other mature democracies – that, yes, 
democracies do not really go to war with each other. In general, the dyadic 
version of the DPT is upheld statistically, and in the academic literature. 
Depending on how democracy and war are defined, it is possible to argue 
that the DPT has held from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the 
present – a span of over 200 years. There are numerous cases that might 
upend this thesis, but if a democracy is defined as a mature democracy 
replete with robust democratic institutions, and a history of competitive 
elections. If war is defined as 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, rather than 
25. Finally, if civil wars, or intrastate wars, are omitted, then the veracity of the 
dyadic version of the DPT might still hold. Fukuyama’s adherence to 
democracy buttresses the concept that mature democracies are the final form 
of government due to a range of social goods for the people, but also in 
minimizing interstate violence in the future. 
What undercuts Fukuyama’s thesis, however, is the stubbornness of China to 
reform even with significant per capita economic growth; Russia’s backsliding 
into authoritarianism under President Vladimir Putin; Turkey’s authoritarianism 
under President Recep Erdoğan; and numerous strongmen that have 
emerged even since 2010 such as President al-Sisi of Egypt. In a sense, the 
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2010s have been dominated by an authoritarian resurgence where the 
strongman figure is seen as necessary in order to provide stability in a 
tumultuous economic and security environment around the world. In 2008, 
Fukuyama defended his thesis arguing that while autocracy has increased, 
especially in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, authoritarian 
leaders can only go so far – ‘If today’s autocrats are willing to bow to 
democracy, they are eager to grovel to capitalism’ (Fukuyama 2008). In his 
op-ed in The Washington Post, Fukuyama concedes that democracy is not 
necessarily the end of history given the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, but he 
argues that this challenge may subside or be defeated.
The work of John Mearsheimer is still largely untested for two main reasons. 
First, because US power remains central to security discussions in Europe – 
his theory rests on a return to great power rivalry in Europe, which, he 
argues, would return if the United States vacated its troops from the 
continent. Second, because the US remains the sole superpower, even if 
great power rivals are emerging elsewhere in the world, no country can 
balance American power, thus an unbalanced multipolar world is impossible. 
On the first point, Germany has not yet developed the requisite strategic 
autonomy to become a military superpower, which is well within Berlin’s 
arsenal should it pursue a more muscular foreign policy if latent tensions with 
the US continue to develop. For example, schisms between President George 
W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and their contemporaries Trump 
and Merkel suggest that this division is possible. Mearsheimer cannot claim 
credit yet because the world remains devoid of great power conflict. Inter-
dependence and cooperation still prevail and have disrupted the challenges 
that Mearsheimer predicted with rising multipolarity in the state system. 
Mearsheimer also argues (2006) that given the Thucydidean trap of 
international relations – that one power cannot rise without coming into 
conflict with the falling power – China and the US will engage in some form of 
confrontation in the future. He ultimately argues that the US will treat China 
much the same as it did the Soviet Union during the Cold War with a policy of 
containment, and defeat China if Washington pursues smart policies. 
Multipolarity takes time to emerge, but with the rise of the Chinese economy 
coupled with technological improvements to their military, Beijing has 
emerged as a superpower for some academics, pundits, and policymakers. 
Russia’s military actions in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Syria in 
2015 suggest that Moscow may be a resurgent actor in world affairs, worthy 
of great power status. There is some evidence of emerging multipolarity, then, 
with China, Russia, and other major actors like India. Questions, however, 
remain on the actions of Germany and Japan – both of which should emerge 
as ‘great powers’ under Mearsheimer’s model. Thus, Mearsheimer’s theory is 
still largely untested because the correct conditions of unbalanced 
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multipolarity have not yet emerged.
Huntington Debates Mearsheimer and Fukuyama
Interestingly, as noted in the introduction, Huntington specifically criticizes the 
theories of Fukuyama and Mearsheimer in Chapter one of his book because 
they both provide contrasting visions of the post-Cold War world. In a sense, 
Fukuyama’s thesis is one of harmony in the post-Cold War world – a point 
that Huntington vigorously views as overly optimistic and unlikely – because, 
in Fukuyama’s view, there would be no major struggles over ideology in the 
future such as those that preceded World War I, World War II, and the Cold 
War (Huntington, 1997, 31). Fukuyama concedes that conflicts would still take 
place in the “Third World” (now usually called the developing world), but that 
the end of history marks ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and 
the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government’ (Huntington, 1997, 31). 
Assessed from the vantage point of 2018, 25 years after his initial prediction, 
Huntington is certainly right in his pessimism of Fukuyama’s thesis, at least to 
some degree. Fukuyama’s thesis has not delivered the universalization of 
Western liberal democracy, and has eroded since its high point in 2010. 
However, unlike World War I with monarchism, World War II with fascism and 
the Cold War with communism (see Mazower 1999), the post-Cold War world 
does not have one, distinct ideology with which capitalism and liberal 
democracy are competing. Fukuyama therefore cannot be easily dismissed, 
especially if the backsliding of democracy in the 2010s is merely a blip on a 
wider trend towards democratization, and if there is no major competitor for 
liberal democracy. Perhaps the rise of authoritarian state-centric capitalism in 
China and Russia provides an alternate ideological model for post-Cold War 
conflict, but democratic variants in Japan and South Korea still show that 
democratization is highly prized in tangent with a state-driven form of 
capitalism. 
Huntington also criticizes Mearsheimer, specifically over his predictions on 
Russia and Ukraine, although he makes two contradictory claims. First, 
Mearsheimer predicts that ‘the situation between Ukraine and Russia is ripe 
for the outbreak of security competition between them. For a great power like 
Russia that shares a long and unprotected common border, like the one 
between Russia and Ukraine, often lapse into competition driven by security 
fears. Russia and Ukraine might overcome this dynamic and learn to live in 
harmony, but it would be unusual if they do’ (Mearsheimer 1993, 54 cited in 
Huntington 1996, 37). Huntington refutes this argument and instead argues 
that a civilizational approach is a better explanation of the peace between the 
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two countries because they share the same civilizational culture – thus, 
peace is the more likely outcome. However, in a later section of Huntington’s 
book, the second point he makes on Ukraine/Russia, is that he describes 
Ukraine as a ‘cleft country’, which is torn, in a sense, between two 
civilizations (Huntington 1997, 166). ‘A civilizational approach’, Huntington 
argues that it, ‘highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a 
separation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more 
violent than that of Czechoslovakia but far less bloody than Yugoslavia’ 
(Huntington 1997, 37). 
When viewing the world in 2018, 25 years after the publication of The Clash 
of Civilizations, Mearsheimer’s thesis certainly looks better than Huntington’s 
given Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the interjection of covert 
Russian forces in the Eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. 
Huntington is still correct in his assessment that a split of Ukraine would be 
bloodier than Czechoslovakia, but less so then Yugoslavia, but incorrectly 
diagnosed Mearsheimer’s state-centric argument that Russia and Ukraine 
would likely engage in some form of violent war over security concerns, rather 
than civilizational kinship. Against Mearsheimer, Huntington’s thesis is 
certainly less accurate in some places. Mearsheimer correctly predicts the 
likelihood of violence between Russia and Ukraine, something that 
Huntington dismisses because he assumed that civilizational identity would 
become paramount, rather than the security-based rivalry that Mearsheimer 
asserts. Huntington’s discussion of Ukraine as a ‘cleft country’ revitalizes his 
argument because it implicitly notes the possibility that Ukraine would splinter 
– a bold prediction to make when assessing any country. Moreover, 
Huntington’s assessment that Ukraine would split in a manner more violent 
than Czechoslovakia, but less violent than Yugoslavia, is currently correct. 
Mearsheimer thus holds some leverage over Huntington on this issue, but the 
depth and specificity of Huntington’s predictions purport his sophisticated 
foresight.   
9/11, the Afghan and Iraq wars, the Failure of the Arab Spring, and the 
Rise of ISIS
Turning specifically to Huntington for the remainder of the chapter, what are 
the successes of his argument? Huntington’s thesis presents some explan-
ation of 9/11, the failure of the Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, and the threat of 
terrorism especially in the West. Yet, at the same time, inter-civilizational fault 
lines have not produced mass conflict. Civil wars are relatively rare even in 
places where civilizations meet (see Goldstein, 2011). Parts of Huntington’s 
thesis hold in the measures noted above, but his explanation should have 
generated more conflict, and less cross-civilizational cooperation such as the 
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rise of BRICS, and the inter-civilizational coalition to defeat ISIS.
Where has Huntington been successful? In his book, Huntington provides 19 
bullet points (Huntington, 1997, 38-39) that show how the post-Cold War 
world is moving towards a civilizational approach. Since the publication of his 
book, there are certainly many more bullet points that could be added. 
However, four major events fall categorically successful for Huntington’s 
prediction. As noted in the above section, Huntington’s theory showed 
significant accuracy in 2001 with 9/11 – if Huntington’s clashing civilizations 
thesis had been taken more seriously, some argue, the US could have better 
prepared for a 9/11-type event. In the aftermath of 9/11, the wars on 
Afghanistan and Iraq also provide some justification for Huntington. 
The war on Afghanistan received widespread support and NATO’s triggering 
of Article V – Huntington predicted the concept of civilizational kin rallying, 
especially in times of war or major attack. The Iraq War was much more 
contentious, and, in some senses, caused inter-civilizational disagreements 
since France, Germany, and Canada, among others in the West opposed the 
invasion of Iraq, all trying to offset the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis by not 
aligning with the wider Western civilization. This cuts against Huntington’s 
thesis to some degree, but the waging of war by a country from one 
civilization (the West) against another (Islamic) bolsters the original ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis. 
At the outset of the Arab Spring when Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in 
Tunisia in December 2010, it kick-started a chain of protests across the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). When President Ben Ali of Tunisia was 
ousted followed in quick succession by President Mubarak of Egypt in 
January 2011 and then President Gadhafi of Libya in the midst of a bloody 
civil war, it seemed like the MENA region – the last vestige of widespread 
autocracy – might begin the process of democratization. The President of 
Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh also resigned, and liberal reforms took hold in 
Morocco, Kuwait, and Jordan among other cases. Fukuyama’s thesis 
recovered somewhat in 2011 and 2012 despite the downturn of democracy 
elsewhere in the world. 
However, as protests in Syria beginning in March of 2011 segued into a 
fissiparous civil war, the early optimism of the Arab Spring began to wane, 
before finally petering out. Democratic successes are still evident in some 
MENA societies, and further reforms may still be enacted, but at least for now, 
the Arab Spring movement has subsided. Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ 
theory did not predict the short-term failure of the Arab Spring. However, he 
did predict that Islam would be the prominent defining feature of the MENA 
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region as an Islamic civilization controversially implying that some of the 
values would be anathema to values in other civilizations such as democracy 
in the West.  
The rise of ISIS as a significant player in the conflicts in the Middle East, 
especially in Syria and Iraq, but also in Yemen and Libya, does not 
necessarily uphold Huntington’s thesis, but provides some suggestion of 
Huntington’s prediction. Since Huntington (1997) divided the world into nine 
different civilizations including an Islamic civilization, the goal of ISIS is to 
unify this civilization under a radical Islamist banner. Huntington is incorrect in 
the sense that a majority of people in the Middle East and North Africa still 
reject the ISIS-vision of a radical form of sharia law, but Huntington argues 
that Islam will be the key defining feature of the civilization. At this point, 
Huntington’s thesis still holds since a group like ISIS rose to prominence. 
A global war involving core states of the world’s major civilizations is highly 
improbable but not impossible. Such a war, we have suggested, could come 
about from the escalation of a fault line was between groups from different 
civilizations, most likely involving Muslims on one side and non-Muslims on 
the other (Huntington 1997, 312). 
On one of Huntington’s most controversial points, ‘Islam has bloody borders’ 
the rise of ISIS suggests some accuracy on the part of Huntington given the 
deadliness of this group. Missed in the wider narrative, however, is the 
prevailing peace in the world. The political scientist, Joshua Goldstein, shows 
that interstate war has declined dramatically such that in some years, there 
were no interstate wars at any place in the world (Goldstein 2011). Although 
conflict has increased since 2011, interstate violence remains relatively rare. 
Thus, Huntington’s assertion that ‘Islam has bloody borders’ is on one level 
true, it ignores the decline of violence everywhere. Based on Huntington’s 
prediction, one would actually expect a lot more violence in places where the 
Islamic civilization meets other civilizations, and yet political violence, and 
both interstate and intrastate wars remain relatively low compared to other 
points in human history.  
Overall, on all four points, and despite some shortcomings, Huntington 
remains relevant to the post-Cold War debate. At the end of his book, Samuel 
Huntington openly wrestled with the idea of a clear civilizational identity. He 
argues, for example, that the United States should reject multiculturalism in 
order to preserve its place in the Western civilization, 
The futures of the United States and of the West depend upon Americans 
reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically this means 
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rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism. Internationally it means 
rejecting the elusive and illusory calls to identify the United States with Asia 
(Huntington 1997, 307). 
There is a portion of the above quote that suggests Huntington predicted the 
rise of an American presidential candidate like President Donald Trump – 
someone with an America First type disposition that is generally viewed as 
more nationalistic than previous presidents. Trump’s success, in some ways, 
is due to a Huntingtonian admonition to rally around one’s civilization (see 
Huntington 2004), one that President Trump has thus far fulfilled given his 
disdain for globalization, and his desire to reduce illegal immigration 
especially from civilizations outside of the West. Although there are some 
clear distinctions, President Trump’s rhetoric and actions mirror some of the 
three sentences listed above as important by Huntington to maintain the 
United States’ role as leader of the West. Huntington’s work was very 
controversial when first published in 1993 leading to a vociferous debate in 
the pages of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere. When viewing the world in 2018, 
Huntington is no less controversial, but also still seems to speak to the 
present. As a means of testing whether his thesis still holds intellectual 
ground 25 years later, the mere fact that Huntingtonian assessments are still 
relevant in the 2016 and 2020 US Presidential Election debates, shows an 
answer in the affirmative. The same critiques of Huntington being too broad, 
not specific enough in some areas, and conceding some ground to his 
intellectual rivals exemplified by Fukuyama and Mearsheimer, all remain. 
Nevertheless, scholars cannot discount Huntington because core parts of his 
arguments still remain relevant to the narratives of today even if Huntington is 
clearly incorrect in some places.  
* The author would like to thank Jacob Mach for his help with researching 
content for this chapter. The original idea for this chapter comes from Dr. 
Andrew Barnes and Dr. Steven Hook of Kent State University.
References
Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and world politics.” American Political 
Science Review 80(4): 1151–1169.
Doyle, Michael W. 2005. “Three pillars of the liberal peace.” American Political 
Science Review 99(3): 463–466. 
Freedom House. 2017. “Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global 
Democracy.” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-
world-2017 Accessed 15 February 2017.
86Huntington vs. Mearsheimer vs. Fukuyama: Which Post-Cold War Thesis is Most Accurate?
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?.” The National Interest 16: 
3–18.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: 
Simon and Schuster.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2008. “They can only go so far.” Washington Post, 24 
August. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/22/
AR2008082202395.html Accessed 22 June 2017. 
Goldstein, Joshua S. 2011. Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed 
Conflict Worldwide. New York: Penguin.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 
72(3): 22–49.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1999. “The lonely superpower.” Foreign Affairs 78(2): 
35–49.
Huntington, Samuel P. 2004. Who are we?: The challenges to America’s 
national identity. New York:  Simon and Schuster.
Mazower, Mark 2000. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: 
Vintage Books.
Mearsheimer, John. 1993. “The case for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent.” 
Foreign Affairs 72(3): 50–66.
Mearsheimer, John. 1990. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the 
Cold War.” International Security 15(1): 5–56.
Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: 
WW Norton & Company.
Mearsheimer, John. 2006. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History 
105(690): 160–162.
87 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
8
Plus ça Change… Civilizations, 
Political Systems and Power 
Politics: A Critique of 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’
ANNA KHAKEE
In an article – and later a book – that have received more attention than 
perhaps any others in International Relations, Samuel P. Huntington predicted 
that the ‘West and the rest’ would clash because of differences in religion and 
civilization as the ‘highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level 
of cultural identity people have’ (Huntington 1993, 24). Huntington’s 
hypothesis was that ‘the fault lines between civilizations’ would replace Cold 
War ideological boundaries as the ‘flash points for crisis and bloodshed’ 
(Huntington 1993, 29; Huntington 1996, 125).
Over the 25 years since its first publication, Huntington’s essays have been 
widely discussed and roundly criticized from a variety of perspectives. Indeed, 
it would probably be fair to say that while ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ made 
Huntington (1993) more of a household name that that of any other political 
scientist, it at the same time reduced his – previously stellar – standing in 
scholarly circles. Peers have found fault with its logic, consistency and strong 
tendency to simplify complex phenomena (Bottici and Challand 2006), 
perfunctory treatment of empirical case studies (Ajami 1993), lack of backing 
by empirical statistical evidence (Russett et al 2000; Henderson and Tucker 
2001; Fox 2001), confounding political and social conflict with religious and 
civilizational confrontation (Todorov 2010), and insufficient attention to the 
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heterogeneity of political culture within each major civilization (Sen 1999, 15–
16; Voll and Esposito 1994). More broadly, many scholars have been 
disturbed by the blurring between purportedly dispassionate scholarly 
prediction and the conjuring up of civilizational animosities and discord 
(Herzog 1999; Tipson 1997; Bottici and Challand 2006). After the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, however, Huntington received some more positive feedback 
(see e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2003; Betts 2010).
Twenty-five years on, what can usefully be added to this wealth of existing 
analysis? This chapter proposes a brief contemporary analysis of the 
empirical validity of the prediction – after all, Huntington’s main goal was 
prognostic. Just as Huntington’s article and book were, in essence, essays, 
so is this chapter. The focus is on the increasingly conflictual relations 
between Russia and the West as arguably the most important example of a 
purported ‘civilizational’ clash today. Can this clash be usefully analyzed in 
terms of discordant Orthodox and Western civilizations in line with 
Huntington? Theoretically, the chapter seeks to critically explore the 
Huntingtonian relationship between civilizations and regime types. In fact, for 
Huntington, civilizations are directly related to political systems, and this is 
important for understanding why they clash. However, the chapter argues 
that, rather than take a ‘civilizational detour’, it is more analytically fruitful to 
focus directly on how and why ideologically different political systems and 
regimes clash and how this can be circumvented. Doing so also avoids 
conflating regime interests and ideology from the more diverse interests and 
ideational viewpoints of citizens.
The Ukraine Crisis: A Civilizational ‘Exhibit A’?
Huntington was primarily interested in explaining and predicting patterns of 
military tension and warfare. In this sense, the conflictual relations between 
Russia and the West can arguably be considered the most important example 
of a purportedly ‘civilizational’ clash today. The other main contender, the 
bloody Middle East conflagration is, in fact, pitting non-state armed groups, 
states, and coalitions of states from within the same Islamic civilization – 
aided by a variety of external powers – against each other: interestingly, 
Huntington did not even mention the Shia - Sunni divide in his 1993 article, 
although he did so, albeit rather briefly, in his book. Thus, the wars across the 
Arab world do not, as predicted, follow from a fault line conflict between 
Muslims and non-Muslims (Huntington 1996, 208), but constitute primarily an 
intra-Muslim conflagration.1 A second possible contender, the (so far non-
1  The Mediterranean border between European Christendom and the post-Ottoman 
Islamic South (to employ a Huntingtonian vocabulary) is, in contrast very deadly. Over 
12,200 deaths have been recorded during 2014–2016 in the Mediterranean 
89 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
lethal) tensions around the South China Sea and the Koreas, are, again, 
‘intra-civilizational’ border conflicts or, even, pitting two parts of the same 
nation (the two Koreas) against each other. There is of course a clear element 
of great power rivalry present, but to define these in civilizational terms does 
not seem to add anything to a classical Realist, power political understanding 
of the tensions (cf. Betts 2010). 
It might seem futile to attempt to counter Huntington’s broad-brush theoretical 
framework with one single case study, not least since Huntington himself 
stresses the generality of his theory and the fact that it is not meant to be 
exhaustive or apply to each case (Huntington 1996, 29–30 and 36–37). 
However, if his theory cannot explain a key defining feature of the present-
day international security system, its utility is put in serious doubt. Moreover, 
though brief, the case study illustrates how important it is to move beyond 
facile and hastily drawn conclusions à la Huntington. Huntington may have 
created a sweeping and richly illustrated account, but breadth here becomes 
a main weakness: scratch the surface of an at first glance plausible set of 
illustrative cases, and another, more complex, pictures emerges.
The conflict over Ukraine is at the heart of the souring of relations between 
the West and Russia. It could at first glance be offered as the perfect civilizat-
ional ‘Exhibit A’. Although Huntington is inconsistent in his argumentation2, he 
explains that ‘the most significant dividing line in Europe’ is the eastern 
boundary of Western Christianity, inter alia cutting through Ukraine, thus 
‘separating the more Catholic Western Ukraine from Orthodox Eastern 
Ukraine’ (Huntington 1993, 30). He seems almost prophetic when he writes:
(International Organization for Migration 2017). However, to analyze these deaths in 
terms of a religious or civilizational conflict between the two sides is hardly apposite: 
causes are to be found in the intra-Muslim conflagration mentioned above as well as 
economic and political conditions in parts of the Global South.
2  While he generally refers to Ukraine as a ‘cleft country’ encompassing large groups 
of people from two different civilizations (Huntington 1996, 137–138 and 165–167), he 
at the same time claims that:
“Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations 
where it might otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the 
possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly 
Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is 
what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians 
should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close 
relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for 
conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the 
issues between the two countries (Huntington 1993, 38).”
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As one Russian general put it, ‘Ukraine or rather Eastern 
Ukraine will come back in five, ten or fifteen years. Western 
Ukraine can go to hell’. Such a rump Uniate and Western-
oriented Ukraine, however, would only be viable if it had strong 
and effective Western support. Such support is, in turn, likely 
to be forthcoming only if relations between the West and 
Russia deteriorated seriously and came to resemble those of 
the Cold War (Huntington 1996, 167–168).
In short, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are located precisely on the 
civilizational fault line which Huntington predicted would be ‘flash points for 
crisis and bloodshed’, and what we are currently seeing is, indeed, a festering 
confrontation over these areas between Russia and the West. 
However, this conclusion is too hasty. It is insufficient because it does not 
take into account how and why the conflict escalated in the first place. Russia 
was always testy on the issue of NATO and EU expansion, on grounds of 
power politics and spheres of influence rather than civilization (Haukkala 
2015). However, it had for a number of years tolerated the European Union’s 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), while trying to counter it with its own mix of soft 
and hard power projection (Averre 2009; Wiegand and Schulz 2015). For 
example, Russia had, however grudgingly, accepted EU rapprochement with 
countries in the Orthodox sphere, such as Serbia’s status as an EU applicant 
state. Thus, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
because of a fear of Ukrainian ‘Europeanization’ through closer ties with the 
EU – which did not offer any meaningful prospect for membership – is a 
relative break with the recent past. Had this been a civilizational conflict, we 
should not logically have seen such a pronounced shift. 
So what changed and led to escalation? Most authors agree that the fact that 
the successive successes of externally promoted so-called ‘color revolutions’ 
were creeping closer to Russian borders gradually changed perceptions in 
Moscow (Wilson 2010). Analysts see the extensive Russian anti-government 
protest movements in 2011 as a turning point: President Putin viewed them 
as a direct threat to the current Russian political system and hence to his own 
power, and, importantly, as orchestrated from the West (McFaul, 2014). The 
Russian regime came to fear what Western policy makers wished for, namely 
that ‘consolidating a pro-Western, democratic Ukraine would indirectly 
encourage democratization in Russia’ (Asmus 2008). In short, what we are 
seeing along the most conflictual of the so-called civilizational fault lines is not 
so much a civilizational conflict as a conflict over political regimes and a fear 
both of ‘regime change’ orchestrated from abroad and of loss of vital parts of 
the Russian traditional sphere of influence. 
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Civilizations, Political Systems, or Power Politics: What Do States 
Actually Clash Over?
But could not Huntington’s theory accommodate for this? After all, according 
to Huntington’s predictions, Western and non-Western states would clash 
mainly over two sets of issues, neither of which are civilizational per se. The 
first set of sources of interstate tension and conflict, Huntington predicted, 
would be economic competition, weapons proliferation, borders and the like – 
in short, classical issues of power politics. The second set was likely to be 
human rights, democracy, and institutions, which are all related to political 
systems or regime types (Huntington 1993, 40–41; Huntington 1996, Chapter 
eight). Although this is somewhat obfuscated by inconsistencies in his 
argumentation3, Huntington’s basic underlying assumption was that human 
rights are Western values and democracy is a Western system of rule. States 
from other civilizations have three alternatives. They can ‘band-wagon’, 
attempting ‘to join the West and accept its values and institutions’ (Huntington 
1993, 41). Alternatively, they can pursue, at great cost, a course of isolation 
from all Western economic, cultural, political and military penetration and 
influence. The third and most commonly adopted solution is to ‘balance’ the 
West, by modernizing economically and militarily in line with Western models, 
while ‘preserving indigenous values and institutions’ (Huntington 1993, 41). 
Thus, for Huntington, civilizations are very intimately related to systems of 
rule: Western-led economic modernization may become virtually global, but 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights remain Western values and 
institutions. As a result, the vast majority of non-Western states that choose 
‘isolation’ or ‘balancing’ can potentially clash with the West over such values.
However, the argument in this chapter is that the ‘civilizational detour’ made 
by Huntington – deriving differences in regime type from civilizational 
differences – is both redundant and misleading. It is more analytically fruitful 
to focus directly on how ideologically different systems of rule clash.
3  Intermittently, he sees democratization as a consequence of economic development 
and the social and political modernization that follows in its wake. Thus, for example, he 
writes – in line with classical Modernization Theory – that ‘[m]any Arab countries, in 
addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development 
where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce 
democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already 
occurred…’ (Huntington 1993, 32) and in another instance he argues that ‘[i]n the 
former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor 
and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become 
Armenians’ (Huntington 1993, 27). Both of course imply that democratic values can well 
go beyond the Western sphere. There is thus, throughout Huntington’s account, a 
tension between modernization theory and civilizational explanations for how and why 
democracy can arise.
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The ‘civilizational detour’ is redundant, as fears over regime stability and 
survival combined with Realist spheres of influence explanations are sufficient 
to explain the main current purported ‘civilizational’ clash pitting Russia 
against the West as discussed above (statistical analysis of conflict patterns 
since the end of the Cold War have reached similar conclusions regarding the 
paramount importance of Realist (and to a lesser extent Liberal) explanations 
for warfare) (see e.g. Russett et al 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001). 
Adding the contradiction between Orthodoxy and Western Christendom into 
the explanatory equation does not give it more power. For someone like 
Huntington, who is interested in parsimony and explanatory power, this is an 
important consideration (Huntington 1996, 29–30).
The ‘civilizational detour’ is also misleading. It is pointing to civilizational 
incompatibilities as the ultimate causes of conflict, when conflict over 
alternative political systems is clearly a more pertinent factor in explaining 
today’s clash between Russia and the West. Increasingly, the West and 
Russia are – just as during the Cold War – pitching two alternative political 
systems against each other: one more strongly focused on liberal democracy, 
individualism, and the rule of law, the other with an emphasis on nationalism, 
order, and ‘traditional’ values. This is also manifest in the conduct of foreign 
policy. Thus, apart from pursuing a classical policy of economic, political, and 
military sticks and carrots in its near abroad, the Russian leadership is also 
promoting ‘its’ values in neighboring states, helping to maintain in power 
those leaders with a similar ideological outlook (Finkel and Brudny 2012). The 
Russian government has also supported political groupings and parties in the 
West – including most famously the National Front in France and the 
Republican candidate (now President) Donald Trump in the US – that it sees 
as ideologically close. In so doing, the Russian government is not promoting 
Christian Orthodoxy or any particularly ‘Russian’ values, but rather classical 
authoritarian values such as nationalism, conservatism and patriarchy. It is 
doing so in response to Western democracy promotion, a constant, if not 
consistently applied, feature of US and European foreign policy over several 
decades (Diamond 2008; Robinson 1996; Schumacher et al 2017). Indeed, 
we might be witnessing a return to Cold War patterns of competitive value 
promotion globally.4
4  During the Cold War, the US, through inter alia Radio Free Europe and support for 
the Polish trade union Solidarity and other opposition groups, was trying to undermine 
the Soviet bloc. The USSR reciprocated through its support for European communist 
parties and covert attempts at trying to influence public opinion in Western states. 
Today, we see a return to a similar pattern of policies and activities: Russia, now a 
nationalistic, authoritarian and anti-liberal power, supports like-minded parties and 
movements in the West and beyond, tries to use new and old media to influence public 
opinion, etc.; the US pursues a similar policy through specific media outlets, foreign aid, 
and support for non-governmental organizations. After the end of the Cold War, US 
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The ‘civilizational detour’ is also misleading in that it conflates the interests of 
the rulers and those of the ruled. Just as liberal democracy, individualism, and 
the rule of law are not universally accepted in the West – and are indeed 
threatened by several Western political actors and groups, including those 
supported by the regime of Vladimir Putin – so are nationalism, conservatism, 
and patriarchy not supported across the board in non-Western societies. 
Moreover, popular support for particular sets of political values undergoes 
important shifts over time within the same purported civilization. As noted by 
Russett et al, ‘the political cultures of Germany and Japan changed radically 
after 1945 from their prewar fascism, in both cases becoming democratic and 
substantially anti-militarist. Yet both Germany and Japan remain deeply 
rooted in their distinctive civilizations’ (Russett et al 2000, 587).
Does this mean that Huntington’s policy prescriptions regarding the 
international promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law were 
wrong? In his book, Huntington roundly criticized ‘crusading democrats’ 
(Huntington 1996, 65), coolly noting that, historically, ‘[t]he West won the 
world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion… but rather by its 
superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; 
non-Westerners never do’ (Huntington 1996, 51). For him, ‘The central 
problem in the relations between the West and the rest is… the discordance 
between the West’s – particularly America’s – efforts to promote a universal 
Western culture and its declining ability to do so’ (Huntington 1996, 183). The 
only way for the West to shape non-Western societies in its mold would be 
through ‘the expansion, deployment, and impact of Western power. Imper-
ialism is the necessary logical consequence of universalism’ (Huntington 
1996, 310). Moreover, Western states will have other interests which will 
regularly trump their democratic and human rights principles, leading to 
hypocrisy and double standards (Huntington 1996, 184). The wiser 
alternative, Huntington argued, was to accept that ‘[t]he security of the world 
requires acceptance of global multiculturality’ (Huntington 1996, 318).5
Western governments have clearly not followed Huntington’s advice in this 
respect. Democracy promotion policies have remained a constant in their 
foreign policy and foreign aid toolboxes. Results have been mixed at best, 
with analysts regularly decrying inconsistencies and double standards, much 
activities have been complemented by EU and European governmental democracy 
assistance programs (largely absent during the Cold War). The Western, as well as 
non-Western, response to international value promotion on the home turf has been 
mixed: some states have remained open to external value promotion activities within its 
borders; others have reacted by trying to restrict it.
5  Again, Huntington is not entirely consistent, at one point noting that the US ‘must 
forge alliances with similar cultures and spread its values wherever possible’ 
(Huntington 1993).
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as Huntington noted. In the academic literature, there has been considerable 
debate regarding the type of democracy promoted by Western states, the 
cautious and non-confrontational nature of democracy promotion in some 
recipient countries, the declining effectiveness of various democracy 
promotion strategies over time, the political and strategic context of 
democracy promotion, its potentially adverse effects on political 
developments in autocratic states, etc. More rarely have academics debated 
the future of the agenda as a whole. 
The answer to the question ‘should democracy be promoted in autocratic 
states?’ might not have to be as categorical as both Huntington and Western 
governments would have it (Huntington wrote that [d]eep imperatives within 
American culture… impel the United States to be at least a nanny if not a 
bully in international affairs’ (Huntington 1996, 226–227)). It might be better to 
leave to civil society the world over the task of promoting democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law, thereby forging more genuine and less inconsistent 
agendas and partnerships across national, religious, and ideological 
boundaries.
Conclusions 
Huntington predicted that civilizational differences – largely based on religious 
divides – would lead the ‘West and the rest’ to clash. His ‘clash of civilizations’ 
has become something of a political myth (Bottici and Challand 2006) while 
sparking considerable academic controversy. This chapter argues that an in-
depth analysis of Huntington’s argumentation reveals the importance he 
accords to human rights and democracy as the basic cause of division 
between the ‘West and the rest’. In fact, his underlying assumption is that 
human rights and democracy are Western values. Thus, in fact, for 
Huntington, civilizations are directly related to political systems, and this is 
important for understanding why they clash. 
The argument proposed here is that it is more analytically fruitful to focus 
directly on how ideologically different political systems clash. This becomes 
particularly clear in the case of the increasingly conflictual relations between 
Russia and the West, which is the most important example of a purported 
‘civilizational’ clash today. With Ukraine at center stage, this conflict at first 
glance seems to confirm Huntington’s thesis to the letter, as he identifies 
Catholic Western Ukraine - Orthodox Eastern Ukraine as a civilizational ‘flash 
point’. However, such an analysis does not take into account how and why 
the conflict occurred: because of increasing Russian fear of externally 
promoted so-called ‘color revolutions’, in particular after the extensive anti-
government protest movements inside Russia itself in 2011. President Putin 
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viewed these as a direct threat to the current Russian political system, and as 
orchestrated from the West. 
Thus, what we are seeing along the most conflictual of the so-called 
civilizational fault lines is not so much a civilizational conflict as a conflict over 
alternative political systems. It pits liberal democracy, individualism and the 
rule of law against authoritarianism, nationalism, order and ‘traditional’ values. 
At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that these fault lines are 
also found within, rather than between, so-called civilizations. Power politics 
and ideology, in contrast with Huntington’s predictions, are alive and well. In 
this context, democracy promotion agendas of Western states have become 
more central to power politics and their future should arguably be more widely 
debated.
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Where Does Russia End and the 
West Start?
ANNA TIIDO
If you stand on the banks of the river Narva in North-Eastern Europe, you can 
see two medieval castles facing each other on both sides of the river. These 
castles are a powerful symbol of the border between Russia and Estonia, a 
border that, in our times, also separates the European Union and NATO from 
Russia. The question is: Is it also the fault line between two distinctive 
civilizations (Western and Orthodox)? According to Huntington in his 1993 
article ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, the great division among humankind in 
the new phase will be cultural, the ‘clash of civilizations’ will dominate global 
politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the 
future. Has this new phase arrived? This article will argue that the Estonia/
Russia border is indeed a fault line between the Western and Russian 
civilizations, and it leads to simmering conflict. This conflict also exists inside 
the Estonian society, as a large minority of Russian speakers reside in 
Estonia. 
To the East of Narva, the vast plains stretching through the Ural Mountains to 
the coasts of the Pacific Ocean form the territory of the Russian state. 
Samuel Huntington cites Carroll Quigley in distinguishing the Orthodox 
(Russian) civilization as emerging from the Classical (Mediterranean) one, but 
taking on a separate path later (Huntington 1996, 49). Huntington considers 
Russia creating a bloc with an Orthodox heartland. At the same time, 
according to Huntington, Russia is a torn country with its identity in 
permanent crisis (Huntington 1996, 164). It is important to note here that the 
Russian identity has always been defined in opposition to the ‘significant 
other’, and this other has always been the West. The West was either positive 
or negative, but it is always present in the visions of national identity and 
national interest (Tsygankov 2006, 17).
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There were several attempts to modernize Russia during the course of 
history. One famous attempt of modernization and Europeanization was 
undertaken by Peter the Great in the eighteenth century. Later on, in the 
nineteenth century, the debate between Slavophiles and Westerners 
dominated the intellectual debate in Russia. Relevant for our times is the 
experiment with democracy of the 1990s, when the authorities of Russia 
undertook radical reforms at home, and took a pro-Western course in foreign 
policy. The opinion leaders and policymakers of Russia could be divided 
according to their foreign policy attitudes into Westernizers, Statists and 
Civilizationists. Westernizers placed the emphasis on Russia’s similarities 
with the West, the importance of liberal values such as human rights, 
democracy and free market. Statists, in contrast, chose the values of stability, 
power and sovereignty over freedom and democracy. The statist main 
purpose though was pragmatic, defending the Russian national interest by 
geopolitical means. Civilizationists, on the other hand, saw Russian values as 
distinct from the West, and they wanted to spread these values around the 
world. Their response to the issues of the security of Russia was more 
aggressive than the Statists’. Statists basically think of defending the status 
quo and play the geopolitical game, they are not against negotiations with 
others. For Civilizationists, the Russian civilization is seen as superior, and 
this approach is connected to the ‘Third Rome’ dictum, and the ‘gathering of 
Russian lands’ (Tsygankov 2006, 7). 
The discourse of Civilizationism has started to dominate official Russian 
policy since the authority of Vladimir Putin was established. The ideas of 
Civilizationists and Eurasianists started penetrating official statements in the 
2000s, especially after the attempt at rapprochement with the West, and 
further drifted apart after. The frequency of the terms ‘morality’ and ‘spiritual’ 
in Putin’s speeches increased, especially since his return to the Presidency in 
2012. In his article of 2012, ‘Russia, the National Question’, Putin says that 
‘the goals of our foreign policy are strategic rather than short-term. They 
reflect Russia’s unique role in international affairs, in history and in the 
development of civilization’ (Putin 2012). What came to be called Putin’s 
conservative agenda, includes such values as heterosexual family, an 
emphasis on having children as a basis for individual life but also for the 
country’s demographic health; the fight against alcoholism; and respect for 
the elderly and for hierarchy (Laurelle 2015). In the nineteenth century, the 
issue of the unique Russian civilization was typically raised by conservative 
philosophers, especially Nikolay Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontiev. In the 
1990s and later, Russian philosopher and ideologist Alexander Dugin has 
claimed consistently that Russia is a civilization rather than a nation. Dugin 
started as a figure separate from the authorities, but his ideas slowly moved 
into the mainstream, and became very important to the establishment. 
Already in his book The Foundations of the Geopolitics in 1997 he writes that:
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The Russian people, as different from many other peoples has 
been formed as a carrier of unique civilization, which has all 
the distinct features of original and full planetary-historic 
phenomenon. The Russian people is the constant, which 
served as an axis for creation of not one, but many states: 
from the mosaic of the dukedoms of Eastern Slavs, Moscovite 
Rus, the Empire of Peter the Great and the Soviet bloc. (…) 
The Russian people did not just provide for the ethnic base for 
all of these state formations, but it expressed a special 
civilizational idea, unlike any other. It is not the state that 
formed the nation. The other way around, the Russian people, 
the Russian nation has been experimenting in history with 
different types of state systems, expressing in a different way 
(depending on circumstances) the specificity of its unique 
mission. The Russian people certainly belong to the messianic 
peoples. As any messianic people, it has universal all-human 
meaning, which competes not just with other national ideas, 
but other forms of civilizational universalism (Dugin 1997, 191).
As we can see, the ideas of Dugin are Civilizationist, he sees the Russian 
civilization as universal. The blurriness of Russianness, and Russia being not 
only a state, but also a civilization is connected also to the fact that Russians 
do not live only on the territory of the Russian state. Russians outside Russia 
are an important resource and inspiration for the policies of Russia. The main 
policies concerning Russians outside Russia are the policy of compatriots, 
and the more general framework policy of the ‘Russian World’. Actually, one 
can see the evolution from the more defined and, one could argue, 
bureaucratic policy of compatriots towards much more blurred and definitely 
more emotional trend of claiming the ‘Russian World’. We can see the trend 
from the policy with concrete measures, such as repatriation, towards an 
overwhelming ‘Russianness’. At the extreme end of this spectrum one can 
place the symbolic saying of Putin that Russia has no borders at all, which 
later was interpreted as a joke (RT 2016). The important document, where the 
legal concept of compatriots comes from, is the ‘The Federal Law on the 
State Policy of the Russian Federation in Relation to Compatriots Abroad’ of 
1999. This law actually does not define precisely who a ‘compatriot’ is. 
Legally speaking, according to the law, a compatriot is any citizen of Tsarist 
Russia, Soviet Russia or the Soviet Union. The compatriots are also 
descendants of other states’ citizens who do not belong to the ‘titular’ nation 
(‘titular’ meaning the ethnic nations of the former Soviet Union’s non-Russian 
republics – the word itself means the ethnic nation present in the name of the 
state, e.g., France - French, Estonia - Estonian) and are presumably Russian-
speaking. In the same way, anyone who feels linked to Russia considers 
himself or herself a compatriot – in such a case, this category is no longer a 
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legal one, but an ethno-psychological one. Not just the law, but Russian 
discourse in general, has ambiguous definitions of compatriots. In 2001, after 
the law was in force, Vladimir Putin said that 
… a compatriot is not a purely legal category. And even further 
– it is not a question of status or any advantages. This is, first 
and foremost, the question of personal choice. The question of 
self-determination. I would even say more precisely – of 
spiritual choice. This way is not always easy (Putin 2001). 
Similar statements appeared in the media at the time from other officials. In 
2001, Vladimir Putin signed the new document ‘The concept of supporting by 
the Russian Federation of the compatriots abroad at the present stage’, in 
which the notion of a ‘compatriot’ is even blurrier. ‘Persons permanently living 
outside of Russian Federation, but connected to Russia by historic, ethnic, 
cultural, language and spiritual links, who strive to preserve their Russian 
originality (самобытность) and willing to keep contacts and cooperate with 
Russia’ (Самородний 2014, 71). 
We can see the tendency from trying to embrace compatriots into the legal 
framework of the Russian Federation towards leaving this concept quite 
blurred. The manifestation of the Russianness is becoming a more emotional 
concept with the emergence of the so-called ‘Russian World’. The term 
‘Russian World’ was used in medieval accounts to define ancient Rus. It can 
be traced to the 11th century in the writings of Russian Grand Prince of Kiev 
Iziaslav Iaroslavich, who spoke of a ‘Kherson and Russian World’ in a letter 
addressed to the Roman Pope Clement (Laruelle 2012). The term seems to 
have been taken from his account in the nineteenth century by Count Sergey 
Uvarov (1786–1855), president of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and 
minister of education, famous for having crafted the tripartite emblem of the 
reign of Czar Nicholas I: ‘Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality’. However, the 
term was not commonly used, and preference was given to other concepts. 
The founding father of Slavophilism, Aleksei Khomyakov (1804–1860), spoke 
of the ‘Russian spirit’ (русский дух), the Silver Age philosophers Vladimir 
Soloviev and Nikolay Berdiaev of the ‘Russian idea’ (русская идея), and it is 
as common in Russia as in the West to encounter the idea of the ‘Russian 
soul’ (русская душа) when assuming that Russia is eternally 
miscomprehended. 
The current, post-Soviet term of the ‘Russian World’ emerged in the end of 
the 1990s. In their 1999 article, Petr Shchedrovitsky and Efim Ostrovsky 
elaborated on their definition of the Russian World. According to them:
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Over the course of the twentieth century, following tectonic 
historical shifts, world wars and revolutions, a Russian World 
was created on Earth – a network of small and large 
communities, thinking and speaking in Russian. It is not a 
secret that the territory of the Russian Federation contains 
only half of this Russian World. The state formation created on 
the territory of the Russian Federation at the turn of the 1990s 
did not turn out to be an adequate means for incorporating 
Russian society into the global historical process. (...) This 
process of social degradation (the collapse of the Soviet 
Union) has been compensated by the formation, over the 
course of the twentieth century, of a sizeable Russian diaspora 
in the world (Островский 1999).
In conclusion, the article highlights the innovative character of the Russian 
World as a sign of a new, globalized Russia: ‘A Russian World in a Peaceful 
World (русский мир в мире миров), attracting Russians from all over the 
world to participate in a new global meta-project’ (Laruelle 2015). The 
Russian World is characterized by a dual aspect: it is a brand for establishing 
Russia’s voice in the chorus of nations, but it is also a vessel for a more 
philosophical or religious messianism, with the notion that Russia’s message 
to the world has a universal value of salvation (Laruelle 2015). It is also 
important to note that in Russian, the term «мир» has not only one meaning 
(‘world’), but also the meaning of community, village community first of all, of 
‘everybody’ in a sense. It also has a third meaning – peace. The role of the 
Orthodox Church in Russia cannot be underestimated. It can be well 
explained by Huntington’s claim of the revival of religion in the world of the 
‘clash of civilizations’. He specifically mentions Russia, where Orthodoxy had 
gone through a major resurgence (Huntington 1996, 96).
It can be easily claimed that the recent revival of civilizational rhetoric is 
purely instrumental, and done with geopolitical purposes in mind. I claim that 
the thesis of Huntington is more relevant to explain the moves of Russian 
authorities. It is a conflict of different cultures and even emotions that drives 
Russia away from the West and into elaborating its own peculiar civilization.   
We could see now into the formation of attitudes in Russia, in what concerns 
the Russians abroad. What about the Western bank of Narva? The region of 
the Baltics has been populated for a long time, more than 6000 years since 
the end of the Stone Age. People known as Estonians or Aesti have been 
living here for around 1500 years (Raun 2001, 3). The origins of Finno-Ugric 
tribes are obscure. The first major theory by the Finnish scholar M.A. Castren 
in the nineteenth century postulated that a common homeland for the Uralic 
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and Altaic peoples was in the Altaic mountains of South-Eastern Siberia 
(Raun 2001, 6). Later, the ideas which denied the common origin of all these 
peoples emerged. By the present day, these peoples preserved their 
languages, which are not part of the Indo-European group. Later on, in the 
13th century, these pagan tribes fought the Livonian Order and were finally 
occupied by them. It has been the beginning of the settlement of the German-
speaking landed gentry on these territories. The first encounters with the 
Slavs took place early on, especially well-known is the conquest of the 
settlement of Tarbatu (present day Tartu) by the Prince Yaroslav in 1030 
(Miljan 2015, XXV).
The Livonian Order had some designs on the Slav lands to the East, and 
there were several armed conflicts. After many devastating wars, and 
especially the Nordic Seven Years War (1563–1570), Estonia, at the time 
known as Livonia, fell under Swedish rule. This period is still sometimes 
referred to colloquially as ‘good old Swedish time’ (Kõiv 2000). What later 
came to be called the ‘Northern War’ broke out in the region in 1707. It was 
connected to the tsar of Russia, Peter the Great’s policies of expanding to the 
West, and needing the ‘window to Europe’, as St. Petersburg was referred to 
(Ponsard 2007, 11). After 1721, Estonian territory became part of the Russian 
Empire and it remained this way until 1918.  
It is important to remember that by this time, Estonians were Protestants, and 
this led to the high level of literacy in their mother tongue, as everybody had 
to listen to the sermons in their native language and also know how to read 
the Catechesis. Thus, Estonian language education was spreading, and with 
time, the number of educated Estonians reached critical mass, which served 
as a basis for reconstruction of historic memory and emergence of indepen-
dent thinking (Laidre 2001, 85). It can also be claimed that according to the 
famous thesis of Max Weber, Protestantism led to the high morals and work 
ethics among the population. Max Weber notes that the German word for 
profession is Beruf or ‘calling’, the same is true about the Estonian language 
– elukutse is ‘calling’ or, more precisely, ‘life calling’. Thus, Protestantism 
claimed that you can achieve unity with God through your work, through your 
profession. Huntington also claims that there is a correlation between 
democracy and Protestantism, with many and first Protestant states 
becoming democracies (Huntington 1991, 37). Protestantism has great 
influence on the values of Estonians still, and these values sometimes clash 
with the Orthodox ideas of ethnic Russians. 
With the reign of Peter the Great, not much changed in the constitution of 
society: German aristocracy kept their privileges, the German language was 
used in administration, and Peter the Great actually called the new provinces 
104Where Does Russia End and the West Start?
his ‘German provinces’ (Faure and Mensing 2012, 119). Few Russian 
aristocrats owned the land in these territories. This arrangement was called 
‘Baltic special order’ in the Russian Empire. It must be noted that the Russian 
Empire did not see the necessity of forceful assimilation of the newly acquired 
lands and was rather tolerant towards different confessions. Its way of ruling 
was by using local aristocracy, and the German barons were also serving the 
Empire in the capital.
The Estonian people remained maarahvas or ‘countryside folks’ not having 
many opportunities for social mobility and being mainly peasants. For these 
people, both German aristocracy and Russians masters were ‘others’, and 
this is how the Estonian identity was formed. In the nineteenth century, the 
national awakening was taking place among Estonians echoing the overall 
European process of nationalist ideas. The Estonian model has its roots in 
the ideas of Johann Gottfried von Herder. For Herder, nationalism was more a 
cultural phenomenon than a political one (Schmidt 1956). As there was no 
state of Estonians, the emphasis on ethnicity mattered more. Thus, it has 
deep roots, which help us understand modern processes better. It was also 
during this time when under the rule of the Russian tsar Alexander the Third, 
the policy of ‘russification’ started. 
By 1918, the opportunity presented itself, after the devastating First World 
War, Bolshevist Revolution, and the Brest-Litovsk settlement. The Estonian 
Republic was proclaimed, followed by the War of Independence against 
Soviet Russia and Landeswehr, the forces of Baltic German aristocracy. The 
Estonian Republic existed until the 1940 occupation by the Soviet Union, 
which happened as a direct result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, 
and its secret protocol dividing this part of Europe into spheres of influence. 
The German occupation followed in 1941, and then Soviet occupation again 
in 1944, which lasted until 1991. Soviet authorities applied cruel policies of 
repression against the Estonian population including mass arrests and 
deportations to Siberia. After the Second World War, massive migration was 
conducted to the territory of Estonia, and a 1989 Soviet census established 
that about 30% of the population of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic 
were non-Estonians. They mainly came to work for the industries, and mostly 
they did not master the Estonian language (around 15% of newcomers spoke 
Estonian) (Rudensky 1994, 63). Another wave of ‘russification’ followed, when 
Russian became the language of communication in many spheres. As 
Perestroika started in the 1980s, there were the language issues, which were 
high on the agenda in Estonia, as the situation with the Estonian language 
was the most important problem next to the demand for autonomy (Rannut 
2004, 5). The language law was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Estonian 
SSR in 1989. The process of transformation is closely connected to the 
Singing revolution of civic disaccord with the Soviet rule starting around 1987, 
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protests against new projects of Soviet rule, such as the phosphorite 
excavation. There was an extraordinary show of solidarity in 1989 of the 
Baltic republics known as the Baltic chain, when about two million people 
from Tallinn to Vilnius joined hands to remind the world of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact. Notwithstanding attempts at russification, the Estonian 
identity was preserved as strong all through the years of all the occupations 
and mistreatment. 
Estonian identity developed in close connection with Western civilization, and 
naturally, after the declaration of independence in 1991, the main goal of the 
government was its reintegration with the West. The foreign policy of Estonia 
was flowing naturally from its source – the need to re-establish a nation-state 
based on the national identity of the majority ethnic group. The first goal was 
to ensure that the independence was for real, and thus, the Russian troops 
withdrawal was a must (Kauppila 1994). It took years of painful negotiations 
until 1994 when the last Russian soldier left Estonian soil. The border 
negotiations were conducted simultaneously, and this story is not yet finished, 
as the Russian Duma has not ratified the border agreements at the time of 
writing of this article. 
The second important objective of foreign policy was integration with the 
European Union and NATO institutions. The difficult negotiations led to the 
integration into these organizations in 2004. During these negotiations, 
Estonia had to get rid of its Soviet legacy and prove that it truly belonged to 
the West. The new institutions were formed and sustained. Especially 
important was the establishment of the rule of law according to Western 
standards. To this day, the judicial system functions properly. Estonia 
continues to rank high among countries according to the index of perception 
of corruption, placed on the 22nd position in 2016 (Transparency International 
2017). Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Toomas Hendrik Ilves said in 
1998, 
Estonia opted for a crash course in reforms and, as a result, 
enormous progress has been made since 1991: national and 
municipal elections have been completely free and open, the 
Estonian press is free and independent and there are thriving 
non-governmental organizations in every sphere of public life 
(Ilves 1998). 
The development of capitalism led to a thriving economy. By now, more than 
71% of the Estonian GDP is derived from the service sectors, industrial 
sectors yield 25% and primary branches (including agriculture) approximately 
four percent of the overall output (Invest in Estonia, n.d.) 
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Estonia was left with the legacy of about 27% of non-Estonians residing on 
the Estonian territory. The first reaction of Estonians was to ignore and 
neglect this issue – maybe the Russians would all move back ‘home’? There 
were plans of repatriation and strict citizenship and language polices were 
adopted. The main principle of the policies was that of restitution – meaning 
that the Estonian Republic was the legal descendant of the pre-war Republic, 
and not a new state. This is a crucial principle in order to understand 
everything else going on in the society. Citizenship was granted to everybody 
whose ancestors were residing in the pre-war republic, notwithstanding their 
ethnicity. All the people who came later had to pass the process of 
naturalization – meaning pass an Estonian language exam and demonstrate 
knowledge of the Constitution and citizenship legislation. It led to the situation 
where about one third of the minority population have no citizenship and are 
considered aliens. At the same time, it also enabled pro-Western policies, as 
there was no opposition in the Parliament to the course of reintegration with 
the West. 
By mid-1990s, Estonians realized that the Russians were a part of society, 
and they would not be leaving. It had been the start of the so-called 
integration policy. This is the policy of the inclusion into the society, though it 
first primarily concentrated on the need for non-Estonians to improve their 
command of the Estonian language. The general idea of the integration policy 
is to replace the attitude of ‘non-Estonians as a problem’ with the attitude 
‘non-Estonians as development potential’. The direction towards integration 
took place under the influence of three factors: the results of the academic 
research, the changing of political values, and the pressure from international 
organizations (Kallas, Mihkelsoo and Plaan 2012, 9).
In order to map the tendencies in integration, the Integration Monitorings are 
undertaken every now and then, the most recent results are of 2015 and 
2017. The Monitoring of 2017 showed that command of the Estonian 
language among non-Estonians is improving, and the majority of the 
population supports starting with Estonian language instruction in 
kindergarten. The results show though that the majority of both Estonians and 
non-Estonians communicate in their own language space (Kaldur et al. 2017, 
99). The results of various research also shows that it is not only the 
command of the Estonian language that divides the society, but the attitudes 
towards many issues are different for the two communities. In nowadays 
society, the difference of values is manifested in many ways, such as family 
patterns, attitudes towards LGBTI, the role of religion in life, state policies – in 
general, one can claim that Russians are more conservative in relation to 
these issues. 
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The attitudes towards LGBTI were thoroughly researched in 2014, and the 
data showed clear differences according to the major communication 
language of the respondents. Forty-nine percent of the Estonian-language 
respondents accepted homosexuality, with this number being just 21% for the 
Russian-speakers. Forty-four percent of Estonians and 73% of Russian-
speakers did not accept homosexuality (Turu-uuringute AS 2017). Attitudes 
towards religion were researched in 2015 and the results showed that 19% of 
Estonians and 25% of non-Estonians belong to a congregation with 46% of 
Estonians and 80% of non-Estonians having been baptized. Forty percent of 
the overall population considers itself Orthodox, and 36% considers itself 
Lutheran (Saarpoll OÜ 2015). The main clash in opinions, though, is going 
along the lines of the attitudes towards Russia and its policies, with the 
majority of Estonians seeing its assertive behavior as a threat, and the 
Russians seeing the need for better relations with the Russian state. Thus, 
79% of Estonians consider NATO membership to be a security guarantee, 
while only 28% of Russian-speakers do. At the same time, 67% of Russian-
speakers consider cooperation and good relations with Russia a security 
guarantee, and this number is only 13% for Estonians (Kivirähk 2015, 20). 
The recent study of the Estonian society ‘Estonian society in the accelerating 
times. The results of the survey “Me. World. Media.” 2002–2014’ analyzed, 
among other things, the ethnic identities of Estonia’s residents. One of the 
conclusions is that ethnic belonging is becoming dominant in comparison with 
other political identities – it is becoming the central identity a person applies 
to their self. Ethnic identity, both for majority and minority groups, is based not 
on political, but on cultural-religious symbols, values and practices, as one’s 
ethnic belonging is perceived as the opposite of territorial or political 
solidarity. The Estonian Russian population has developed a strong identity 
based on ethno-cultural and religious roots expressing ethnic opposition and 
spiritual solidarity. It has happened, according to the research results, as a 
reaction to societal developments which are considered negative by the 
minority (Vihalemm et al. 2017, 134). 
Conclusion
Now we are coming towards the interaction between these two states and 
societies, which we see are quite diverse. We could see the differences in 
culture and attitudes that support Huntington’s thesis of an Orthodox 
civilization as distinct from the West. Estonia belongs to the West with its 
history, culture and values. Russian Orthodox civilization influences the 
attitudes of Russians in Estonia a great deal. As Huntington also puts it, 
Russia has a ‘kin-state syndrome’ towards Russians outside Russia 
(Huntington 1996, 272). We can see that the present Russian state’s 
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orientation on civilizational discourse leads to the situation that many 
Russians abroad can identify themselves with Russia without taking any 
everyday practical decisions, such as repatriation. The Russians in Estonia 
live their everyday life in the European Union. At the same time, they 
preserve their emotional link to Russia. This phenomenon could be described 
as transnationalism, as the transnational audience preserves the double 
reference framework, as they constantly compare their situation to that of 
their kin-state (Vihalemm et al. 2017, 598). In a way, Russians outside Russia 
become ‘more Catholic than the Pope’, because they see the reality of their 
countries of residence and compare it with the virtual reality created by the 
Russian state media. We could see that the ‘clash of civilizations’ is 
happening both between the states of Estonia and Russia, and at the same 
time in the minds of the Estonian population, as the Russian minority is 
influenced by the Orthodox civilization. 
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The end of the Cold War is considered one of the most critical episodes in 
world politics that restructured the global order from a bipolar world to a 
multipolar order, divided along ethnic, cultural and religious lines. The concept 
of civilizations reappeared in the discipline of International Relations (IR) at 
this time, with the publication and subsequent debates centered on ‘The 
Clash of Civilizations’ by Samuel Huntington (1993) which predicted a world 
order based on different and antagonistic civilizations. The fundamental 
assumption made under the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis is that 
civilizations can be differentiated, based upon the fundamental incompatibility 
of beliefs, values and cultural norms among different civilizations. This ‘clash 
of civilizations’ hypothesis was challenged by several leading scholars. 
However, the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were construed as an endorsement of the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ hypothesis (Kapustin 2009). Huntington’s theory, contentious as 
it is, continues to occupy a prominent position in contemporary IR discourses. 
This is underlined by a number of commemorative publications marking 
different anniversaries of Huntington’s thesis (Barker 2013; Rose 2013).
Huntington has been critiqued primarily for being reductionist and essentialist 
in his understanding of civilizational identities; most critics have focused upon 
deconstructing the US-Islam dyad (Adib-Moghaddam 2010; Lyons 2014). I 
argue that, Huntington’s classification of the Chinese civilization, the Hindu 
civilization and the Eastern civilization as distinct categories, in particular, 
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clearly ignores the historical as well as contemporary affinities and inter-
connectedness between these civilizations. Contrary to Huntington’s 
reductionist view, IR has had a limited engagement with the legacy of 
peaceful and enriching interactions between the Chinese and Indian 
civilizations. 
This paper explores the assumptions of civilizational identities purely based 
on cultural, religious or geographical distinctions and their limitations. It 
reviews the ‘civilizations’ discourse in IR and discusses the concept of 
‘civilization-states’ in the context of China and India. It analyzes the key 
components of civilizational overlaps and exchanges between these two 
countries and the invocation of their ‘civilization-state’ identity in their 
contemporary bilateral relations. Rejecting Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ 
hypothesis in understanding ‘civilization-states’ like China and India, I 
conclude that it is critical to understand how states perceive their civilizational 
heritage, which both facilitates and impedes bilateral exchanges and the 
conduct of international relations.
Whither Civilizations in IR?
IR’s engagement with civilizations coincided with fundamental changes in the 
global order which ushered decolonization, globalization and the end of the 
Cold War. A civilization is considered the largest and highest socio-historical 
phenomenon, and consists of numerous, diverse and distinct cultures within 
itself (Dawson 1970). The emergence of the concept of civilizations in IR, 
goes beyond Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ and has led to the focus on 
how and why different civilizational identities have distinct worldviews. As 
Bettiza describes, ‘Civilizations are socially constructed when people 
somewhere not only identify themselves but are also recognized by others as 
either the archetypal representatives of a civilization’ (2014, 19). Martin Hall 
underlines the advent of civilizational identities in IR and argues that, 
‘civilizational analysis is important not least because the concept of 
civilization is being used’. It seems, ‘at this historical juncture, that the notion 
of civilization is a significant carrier of knowledge and of thereby attendant 
preferences and policies’ (Hall 2007, 199). Nevertheless, how do civilizations 
acquire political meaning and character?
As social collectives, civilizations represent ‘imagined communities’ similar to 
nation-states, however, civilizations are manifestly distinct to nation-states, 
both in temporal and spatial dimensions. This implies that unlike nation-
states, civilizations exist at sub-national and supranational levels and 
therefore, civilizations may be deployed in IR to represent ‘transnational, 
inter-human, and de-territorialized cultural communities’ (Bettiza 2014, 4). 
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This expanse of geographical and social diversity implies that civilizations 
encompass several distinctive constituents and are in a constant state of flux 
within themselves. 
Civilizations undergo changes both from their internal diversity and from inter-
civilizational encounters (Cox 2000, 220). Unlike the rigid territorial 
boundaries of nation-states, civilizations spill over national borders and defy 
territoriality and boundaries. The inter-civilizational interactions are 
ubiquitous; Europe’s progress to a ‘modern’ civilization was assisted by such 
exchanges with China, India, and the Islamic world (Arnason 2006). These 
inter-civilizational interactions assume political significance when civilizations 
are deployed as discursive practices for identity construction. Civilizational 
identity may be used to define the boundaries of a community by 
differentiating between self and the other; it can also be used to locate the 
self at the global, regional, or individual levels and also to evaluate others.
China and India at the institutional-state and individual-citizen levels have 
deployed the narratives of their glorious past to progress from not-so-glorious 
present to potentially glorious future. The histories for both China and India 
are not in museums, artefacts and archaeological specimens but in their 
visions of the thriving magnificence of their civilizational glories. However, it is 
not enough merely to claim an identity; that identity must have a degree of 
social effectiveness and political purchase and others must acknowledge the 
identity itself as legitimate. China and India both claim the status of rightful 
inheritors of their ancient civilizations; while these claims are not completely 
uncontested, they have general recognition in the society of nations. So what 
is the political salience of their civilizational heritage?
China and India: ‘State’ of the Civilizations
Civilizational entitlement allows states to consider themselves as the natural 
and worthy inheritors of their ancient civilizational glories, and frame policies 
to regain the power and status befitting of ‘their country’s size, population, 
geographic position and historical heritage’ (Malik 2011, 28). The civilizational 
legacies of China and India not only continue to define the national identities 
of the two states, but also set the background for the bilateral relations 
between them. There are remarkable similarities in the construction of 
Chinese and Indian national identities as modern nation-states; both frame 
their national identities in terms of civilizational entitlement and colonial 
occupation (Malik 2011).
This sense of entitlement is further entrenched in the national identity 
construction, as foreign occupation is held responsible for the loss of ancient 
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civilizational grandeurs and status. The colonial control not only interrupted 
traditional approaches to statecraft and international interactions based upon 
Chinese and Indian civilizational attributes, but it also altered the Chinese and 
Indian perceptions about the glories of their own civilizations (Sheel 2007). 
These civilizational attributes in China and India were derived from a 
combination of history, geography and culture. The geographical perspective 
accorded the population in the respective areas later identified as China and 
India, with a sense of cultural affinity among themselves. The old maritime 
and caravan routes facilitated the diffusion of trade, culture and religion 
among the Chinese, Indians and the rest of Asia. These cultural and material 
exchanges led to an international order based upon mutual reciprocity rather 
than absolute power or control.  
Tan Chung refers to this mutually beneficial interaction and the collaborative 
framework between China and India as ‘geo-civilizational’ rather than a 
‘geopolitical’ paradigm. It is quite extraordinary that despite the geographical 
proximity, unlike other Western civilizations, the Chinese and Indian 
civilizations have enjoyed peaceful and mutually enriching relations for over 
twenty centuries until the Cold War period. Chung (2009, 211) underlines this 
paradox, ‘it was during the Cold War that the two new republics were born 
and have paid heavy tuition fees to learn international politics’. A vibrant 
cultural, commercial and political relationship was blossoming between the 
two civilizations prior to the Christian era and was reflected in exchanges in 
diverse fields such as agriculture, science, mathematics, astronomy literature, 
linguistics, architecture and medicine (Sen 2004).
The postcolonial states of China and India adopted the idea of victimhood as 
an essential part of national identity construction, referred to as ‘the century 
of national humiliation’ in China and ‘a century of rule by an alien race and 
culture’ in India (Garver 2011, 103). China and India both claim to be victims 
of extractive colonialism and this sense of victimhood shapes their 
contemporary international relations objectives of protecting absolute 
sovereignty and reclaiming their international prestige. In the case of both 
China and India the national identity construction is sustained from the 
entitlement of glorious civilizational heritage. 
The construction of the national and civilizational identities is a multi-layered 
process that involves several competing frames of political, cultural, social 
and ethnic affiliations. These different affiliations often overlap and some of 
the characteristics used in this process of identity construction are shared 
between China and India. This is not to claim that both societies adopt exactly 
the same attributes in the construction of their civilizational identity; rather to 
highlight the differences in the definition and deployment of these 
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characteristics. Generally, national identity is associated with political 
representation while civilizational identity denotes cultural affiliations. 
However, in the case of China and India the national and civilizational 
identities are considered interchangeable, and both of these identities have 
acquired political connotations.
China and India share a common civilizational heritage largely through 
Buddhism, which may be considered as a coherent cultural complex, in a 
much broader sense than a civilization. In this case, Buddhism does not 
override the distinct civilizational identities contained within it. It is not the 
whole but one constituent element of the larger structure of the Chinese and 
Indian civilizations. The spread of Buddhism to China brought certain Indian 
cultural elements into China, and in due course, some of these distinctly 
Indian elements became part of the Chinese civilization. Sinicized Buddhism 
thrived alongside Confucianism and Daoism. It appears that while Buddhism 
as a shared inter-civilizational heritage may provide for greater convergence 
between China and India, it is now also portrayed as another avenue for 
sustaining the rivalry. The phenomenon of ‘faith diplomacy’ as a tool of 
international relations has gained prominence in recent times and both China 
and India have deployed Buddhism in their soft power diplomacy and cultural 
outreach, specifically in dealing with Central and Southeast Asian states 
(Scott 2016). 
In contemporary times China has preferred to deploy its Buddhist legacies as 
a diplomatic resource rather than deploying other cultural or philosophical 
traditions. Juyan Zhang claims that the Chinese state considers both 
Confucianism and Buddhism to have inherent ‘Chineseness’ (2013, 85). 
China is keen to promote its version of Buddhism and Tibetan figures such as 
the Panchen Lama, to counterbalance the global appeal of the Dalai Lama. 
China realizes the importance of Buddhism’s soft-power capabilities 
especially in the context of smaller Buddhist countries in Asia. As Juyan 
Zhang contends, ‘China would have fully employed Taoism if it were an 
internationalized religion’ (2013, 92).
Buddhism cannot be the only singular narrative of the civilizational heritage 
that frames China and India’s national and international policies. Some useful 
inferences can be made from the behavioral trends of the two countries at the 
domestic and international levels. India projects its civilizational status as 
‘domestically tolerant and pluralistic, and externally non-aggressive and non-
interventionist’ (Ollapally 2014). India’s international exchanges have been 
based on religious-philosophical ideas, cultures, and trade. China derives its 
civilizational status from humanist values, homogeneity and uniformity and 
externally on the idea of the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of cultural and material 
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superiority over the outside world (Scott 2007, 10). Both China and India’s 
international exchanges have been based on creating order, gaining prestige, 
maintaining dignity and achieving suzerainty rather than territorial occupation 
in the immediate neighborhood. 
It is significant to highlight that at the time of their birth as new nation-states 
both China and India were considered too fragile to stand on their own; their 
economy, internal security and external defense were considered to be 
vulnerable. It is quite remarkable that despite their limitations both China and 
India pursued independent foreign policies instead of bandwagoning with one 
of the superpowers in the bipolar world. This independent approach to foreign 
policy in China and India was a result of their adverse experiences with 
colonial powers but it was also driven by their strategic cultures. This strategic 
culture was grounded in China and India’s self-perception of being 
civilization-state rather than just former ‘empire-states’ or modern day ‘nation-
states’ (Malik 2011, 28). 
In 1954, China and India adopted ‘Five Principles’ (Pancha Sila) as the 
foundational framework of their bilateral interactions; it was an illustrative 
example of deploying the civilizational heritage to conduct international 
interactions. A Communist China under an atheistic Mao and a secular India 
under an averred non-religious Nehru adopted Pancha Sila, primarily a 
Buddhist concept. The Chinese Communist Party’s aversion to ritualistic 
religions has been well known while India after its partition on religious lines 
had proclaimed to profess secularism as its national identity. However, both 
China and India engaged in invoking an essentially religious system to guide 
their bilateral relationship. It is significant to underline Mao’s interpretation of 
Buddhism not in religious but cultural terms; ‘in Mao’s eyes, Daoism and 
Buddhism are all cultures, even excellent cultures’ (Fang 2014, 327). 
China and India could have invoked other concepts such as their postcolonial 
status, the idea of a pan-Asian camaraderie, developing world solidarity or 
some other mutually inclusive construct towards a cohesive and shared world 
view. The heritage of two ancient civilizations allowed both China and India to 
venture beyond the strictly nation-state based secular boundaries and 
accommodate some form of the religious system in their bilateral relations. 
Pancha Sila was one such example of assimilating contradictions between 
the nation-state and the civilizational heritage. The official policies of both the 
Chinese and Indian states were firmly tied to the secular ideals but a religious 
philosophical idea was used to promote bilateral cooperation. It can be 
claimed that in this case the civilizational heritage, prevailed over state-
centric thinking (Chacko 2013). The complex nature of the self-identity 
espoused by the Chinese and Indians is that of a ‘civilization state’ which is 
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discussed in the next section.
China and India: ‘Civilization-States’ 
The process of modern nation-state formation in the Westphalian order 
ignored various pre-modern and non-European models of the state and the 
existence of dynamic societies like China and India. A ‘civilization-state’ can 
be considered a political configuration similar to a ‘nation state’; however, 
while civilizations may be considered ‘imagined communities’ they are not 
represented by governments and additionally they do not have formal 
representatives (Bettiza 2014, 14). Civilizations are made up of ethnic groups 
who share a common geographic locus and a common set of values with a 
shared history, shared culture, and shared socio-political institutions. A 
civilization may be seen as a conglomeration of a variety of peoples or ethnic 
groups, continuation from ancient periods, social and cultural practices and 
also vast spaces (Wei 2012). In such a formulation, civilization can be 
interpreted as an enlarged ‘nation-state’. As a comparative example, Europe 
with an assortment of cultures, religions, ethnic groups, languages and 
vernacular diversity, can be considered one civilization, and in this context 
both modern India and modern China can be perceived as civilization-states 
(Jacques 2012).
It is important to highlight that, like civilization, the concept of ‘civilization-
state’ also has a postcolonial context. In their quest to be considered a 
civilized nation, several countries in Asia strived hard to emulate the 
institutions, practices, social norms and legal-political lexicon of their 
European conquerors; Japan and Turkey may be considered as the 
frontrunners of this trend (Duara 2001, 101). The discourses on the right for 
self-rule and anti-colonial movements in the colonies were framed in such a 
way that it was imagined that these countries could progress from uncivilized 
or half-civilized to civilized societies. The self-proclamation of being inheritors 
to ancient civilizations was one of the fundamental arguments to promote the 
idea of nationalism during the anti-colonial movements. Arguably, in 
contemporary times nationalists are able to deploy civilization as a 
supplement to nationalism (Duara 2001).
The association between nationalism, state and ancient civilizational histories 
should be seen in the context of how the right to statehood and the right to 
own history were interwoven during the periods of colonization (Bowden 
2009). German philosopher Hegel equated history to statehood and claimed, 
‘people or a nation lacked history . . . not because it knew no writing but 
because lacking as it did in statehood it had nothing to write about’ (Hegel 
cited in Bowden 2009, 79). In this context Hegel writes about India and its 
119 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
lack of history by claiming that ‘Hindoos have no History in the form of annals 
(historia) that they have no History in the form of transactions (res gestæ); 
that is, no growth expanding into a veritable political condition’ (Hegel 2001, 
181). Ranajit Guha, describes this process of inclusion and exclusion in world 
history and claims that the narrative of civilization shifted from ‘no writing, no 
history, to no state, no history’ (Guha 2002, 10). In such a diverse 
understanding of civilization and states, how do we understand the trajectory 
of China and India as ‘civilization-states’ that have mutually coexisted over 
centuries? 
Lucian Pye designated China as a ‘civilization pretending to be a nation-state’ 
(1992, 232). Pye’s assessment had negative connotations as he juxtaposed 
the state controlled Chinese polity against the normative Western-centric 
concept of the modern liberal state. The role of the ‘civilization-state’ in the 
Chinese political system was highlighted by Tu Wei-ming, who claimed that 
‘the civilization-state exercises both political power and moral influence’ 
(1991, 16). However, Tu Wei-ming lamented the marginalization of China 
from the global order, ‘It should be acknowledged, however, that for all her 
power and influence, China as a civilization-state is often negligible in the 
international discourse on global human concerns’ (1991, 16). The sub-
sequent two decades witnessed China’s rapid rise to global leadership, 
coupled with China’s renewed interest in framing its international relations 
discourse on its unique civilizational heritage. The advent of Xi Jinping as the 
Chinese president in 2012 propelled the idea of ‘civilization-state’ to the 
forefront of the political discourse; as Xi believed that ‘a civilization carries on 
its back the soul of a country or nation’ (2014). 
China can be considered a civilization-state based on its long and 
uninterrupted history, enormous geography, massive population, diverse 
demography, the continuity of traditions and cultural systems, and finally the 
incorporation of many ‘Chinas’ within one core political unit. The enduring 
influences of Confucian and Buddhist values in China, in one or the other 
form over a long period of history, make the Chinese civilization unique 
among all the ancient civilizations. Another defining feature of the Chinese 
civilization is its long-running existence as a political unit, since 221 BC when 
the first Chinese imperial state was founded (Gernet 1996). The landmass 
referred to as the Chinese heartland has remained under the control of one 
polity (Gamer 2012). China claims to follow the ‘one country, two systems’ 
formula in dealing with Hong Kong; such an approach would be impractical 
for a typical nation-state. As a modern state, China has been ruled by several 
different political ideologies: rigid Marxism during Mao’s period, soft Socialism 
under Deng Xiaoping and then aggressive but state controlled Capitalism in 
the post Deng period. China’s imminent collapse has been predicted on 
several occasions, post-Cold War, post-Tiananmen Square massacre, and 
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post-Global Financial Crisis. It appears that China defies all the conventional 
frameworks of an archetypical nation-state in the post-Westphalian system. 
Although India has not been classified as a ‘civilization-state’ in IR discourses, 
the case for India to be considered a ‘civilization-state’ is equally strong 
based on the attributes such as an uninterrupted history, the size of the 
geographical area and population, diversity of the demographics and above 
all the continuity of traditional cultural systems. India was shown as a 
landmass of hundreds of small to medium princely states rather than one 
political unit at the advent of the British Empire. On the other hand, it can be 
claimed that despite the lack of political unity, the cultural similarities among 
these states made them a part of one broad civilizational collective (Desai 
2009). 
However, India differs from China in three aspects. Unlike the dominance of 
Confucianism in China’s polity and society, India does not have one dominant 
school of thought; rather, it has inherited several diverse and often 
contradictory philosophical traditions. India’s demographic diversity is much 
broader than China’s and while 79% of the Indian population is classified as 
Hindus, there is no singular cultural-religious-ideational criteria that can 
amalgamate Hindus as one unit. The multiplicity of racial, ethnic, linguistic 
and religious identities makes India more of a subcontinent than a unified 
nation-state. Unlike China, post-independent India has largely followed one 
type of governance structure, that of parliamentary democracy through 
regular electoral mandates. India has adopted an approach similar to ‘one 
country, two systems’ employed in China, with the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
Although India’s ancient civilizational legacy originates from its Hindu-
Buddhist religious beliefs, the constitutional secularism in the Indian polity 
makes it difficult for the state to flaunt a religious identity. While Indian 
political leaders have refrained from a public display of its civilizational 
heritage there has always been a palpable sense of this heritage in the Indian 
public and policy circles. References to India’s ancient civilizational heritage 
are often made by the ruling elite both for national and international 
audiences (Michael 2013, 36). Prime Minister Modi’s recent policy 
announcements and speeches are appropriate examples of how he often 
draws from ancient thinkers and traditions that define ‘Indianness’. While 
India may be reticent to display its civilizational heritage in the international 
arena, India has never been taciturn about invoking its historically 
civilizational associations with China. 
The self-perception of China and India as civilization-states has also led to 
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greater competition to enhance their international prestige and power 
projections relative to each other. In their bilateral interactions, China and 
India emphasize Buddhism to achieve greater cooperation, while both also 
deploy Buddhism to gain greater influence in Central and Southeast Asia. The 
genesis of the 1962 border war and the ongoing territorial disputes between 
China and India lie with this divergent self-perception of being a civilization-
state. Subsequent to the Chinese takeover of Tibet, India provided sanctuary 
to the Dalai Lama – a move that made India highly suspect in China’s eyes. 
India’s move to provide sanctuary to the Dalai Lama was not entirely a 
political decision nor was India in any viable position to contest China in Tibet. 
China misconstrued the depth of reverence for the Dalai Lama in India; the 
spiritual and religious foundations of Indian civilization considers Tibetan 
Buddhism as a part of their own heritage. The Indian state and particularly 
Prime Minister Nehru on their part misconstrued China’s determination to 
reinstate their earlier preeminence in the emerging regional order. These 
contestations between India and China are a dominant feature of their 
different and competing claims to civilizational legacies. 
Conclusion
There seems to be a consensus among various scholars that India and 
China, as key actors in emerging Asia, are simultaneously moving upward on 
relative power trajectories while sustaining a rivalry which will further magnify. 
The references to the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis in the context of China 
and India have been framed in the familiar geopolitical perspective, rather 
than through their histories of civilizational exchanges. China and India are 
considered civilizational twins as well as eternal rivals. It is clear that the 
civilizational narrative is never too distanced in their exchanges, be it towards 
a grand harmony, international alliances, cold peace or outright war. To 
conclude, the discipline of International Relations has much to gain from inter-
civilizational perspectives which are integral to understanding the behavior of 
‘civilization-states’ in non-Western contexts. Any purposeful analysis of the 
China-India bilateral relationship and their worldviews, in particular, is not 
possible without studying their inter-civilizational links.
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Sometimes international law and international relations are two worlds apart. 
When Samuel Huntington published his article and book ‘The Clash of 
Civilizations’ in 1993 and 1997, it made quite a splash in the field of 
International Relations. The piece was discussed and critiqued intensively at 
the time, and as this special issue attests, after more than 20 years his work 
is still considered worth discussing, exploring and critiquing. On the other side 
of the disciplinary divide, things looked quite different. While Huntington’s 
thesis was certainly noticed in international law (Rehman 2005), his impact on 
international scholarship more broadly was modest, to say the least. 
References to Huntington’s work are often made more in passing and 
generally not with the aim of a serious engagement with his work.1 
Conversely, international law is almost completely neglected in Huntington’s 
work. It is hardly mentioned at all, apart from incidental remarks such as 
‘Western law coming out of the tradition of Grotius’ (Huntington 1997, 52) 
(without explaining what this entails exactly) or it is equated with Western 
ideas about governance and human rights.  
In this (brief) article, I will focus on the possible contribution of international 
law to the debates and critiques on the ‘clash of civilizations’. More 
particularly, I will argue that a more in-depth engagement with international 
law would enrich the debate on the ‘clash of civilizations’ for at least two 
reasons. 
1  See for example Miller and Bratspies (2008, 9 and 10), where the editors move 
from a brief mention of Huntington’s thesis straight to a discussion of the functional 
fragmentation of international law.
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First, international law could help to explore the performative effects of claims 
about ‘clashing civilizations’. For Huntington, the thesis of the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ is meant as a diagnosis of the post-Cold War world; as an 
explanatory frame that competes with other approaches in International 
Relations such as realism.2 In other words: Huntington presents his claim as if 
it deals with an object that is external to it. However, it is difficult to maintain 
this strict separation, especially if the speaker is part of the society that (s)he 
describes. In that case, statements about the ‘nature’ of a society come with 
normative consequences. For example, for someone who conceives of one’s 
society as composed of egoistic individuals, the normative ties to others are 
different than for someone who holds that society is rooted in common fate 
and pride.3 Somewhat paradoxically, this insight is at the heart of Huntington’s 
diagnoses of different civilizations, but it is not applied to his own position. 
For (international) lawyers, going back and forth between descriptive and 
performative aspects of ‘society’ is quite common. Take for example the 
structure of the (in)famous 1927 Lotus judgment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ). The PCIJ was called to decide whether Turkey 
enjoyed jurisdiction to try a French officer who failed his duty to prevent a 
collision between a French and a Turkish ship on the high seas.  In order to 
answer this question, the PCIJ postulated what it regarded as the nature of 
international legal society at the time: ‘International law governs relations 
between independent states’. From this characterization it followed, according 
to the Court, that ‘the rules of law binding upon states therefore emanate from 
their own free will (….); restrictions upon the independence of states cannot 
therefore be presumed’ (Lotus case [1927], p18). In other words, the concept 
of ‘society’ functioned as an institutional fact, linking the apparent ‘is’ of the 
existence of sovereign states to the ‘ought’ of their legal freedoms. The case 
of Lotus is just one example of courts and tribunals postulating the nature of 
(international) society as the foundation of normative ties existing between 
the members of that society.4
Secondly, international law seems an obvious starting point to reflect on 
clashing civilizations. After all, modern international law was to a large extent 
born out of such clashes, and developed into a system that defined and 
stratified ‘civilizations’ for centuries. One of the core questions that occupied 
the minds of early modern thinkers in international law concerned the 
treatment of radically different civilizations by European, colonizing powers. 
2  See for example Huntington’s description of what counts as a sound model at 
(Huntington 1997, 30). 
3  For an elaborate analysis of the impact of different conceptions of society and the 
rule of law see Dworkin (1985).
4  For an analysis see Werner (2016). The part on the Lotus case is taken from this 
article.
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As I will set out in section one, international law developed into one of the 
tools employed by colonial powers to label, categorize and manage 
differences and clashes between (postulated) civilizations. In section two I will 
set out how international law tried to overcome its colonial heritages in the 
twentieth century through the adoption of a protective conception of 
sovereignty as well as a core of cosmopolitan norms that were supposed to 
transcend nations and civilizations. The net result, as I will argue in section 
three, is that international law now offers possibilities to conceptualize world 
politics in radically different ways, including clashes of civilizations, relations 
between sovereigns and the regulation of issues of universal nature. Through 
a brief discussion of the controversies between the African Union and the 
International Criminal Court I will illustrate how these three are mobilized in 
concrete cases. Huntington’s work functions as a reminder, and warning 
signal, that such mobilizations remain possible within international law. While 
it may be true that any invocation of ‘civilization’ rests on shaky empirical 
foundations, the consequences of such invocations are too real to be ignored.
From Vitoria to the Standard of Civilization  
For modern international law, the idea that civilizations may clash goes back 
at least to the early 16th century. Just a cursory look at the title of one of the 
canonical texts of early modern international law shows how much the rise of 
international law had to do with civilizations in conflict. The reflections on the 
law of war by Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) bore the title, ‘on the Indians; 
or the law of war made by the Spaniards on the barbarians’.5 The core 
question informing Vitoria’s teachings on the subject was whether the 
Spanish crown enjoyed the right to wage war upon a radically different, 
‘barbaric’ civilization. While Vitoria is rightly praised for his critical and 
cosmopolitan ethos throughout, his work was also characterized by some 
core differentiations between European and Native American civilizations, and 
an obvious bias in favor of the right to travel, trade and preach on the part of 
the Spaniards.6
In the following centuries, international law only deepened the divisions 
between ‘Western’ and ‘other’ civilizations. Or, to be more precise: it more 
and more presented Europe/the West as ‘civilized’ and other parts of the 
world as either uncivilized or barbaric. The heyday of these differentiations 
was in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, when disciplines such as 
anthropology and ethnology provided an allegedly scientific basis for legal 
5  The text can be found, inter alia, at ‘Constitution Society’. Available at: http://www.
constitution.org/victoria/victoria_5.htm Accessed 21 September 2017.
6  For an analysis see Anghie (2004). For an emphasis on Vitoria’s cosmopolitan 
thinking, see Scott (1934).
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differentiations between cultures. The British international lawyer Lorimer, for 
example, identified three concentric zones of humanity: civilized humanity, 
barbarous humanity and savage humanity; each with a descending level of 
legal recognition (2005, 101). Even when international lawyers voiced their 
concerns about the way in which the colonial enterprise was conducted and 
spoke out on behalf of colonized communities, it remained exceptional to find 
fundamental critiques of the idea that different stages of civilization came with 
different legal entitlements.7 Legal relations between civilized powers were 
regulated by rules that were different from the rules that regulated the 
interaction with Islamic nations. As Wheaton (1836, 51) put it: ‘The 
international law of the civilized, Christian nations of Europe and America, is 
one thing; and that which governs the intercourse with the Mohammedan 
nations of the East with each other and with the Christian, is another and very 
different thing’.8 Relations between colonial powers and native communities 
remained largely outside the sphere of positive international law, and were 
governed by a core set of rules of natural law (to be interpreted and applied 
mainly by those in power). The club of ‘civilized nations’ was exclusive, but 
not completely closed. There was a possibility for newcomers to enter, if they 
managed to pass the so called ‘standard of civilization’ test, a rather 
indeterminate standard used by Western powers to negotiate their position 
vis-à-vis states such as Turkey or Japan.9 Remnants of the idea that 
international law is a matter of ‘civilized nations’ can still be found in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is, according to article 38, 
empowered to apply the ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’.
This (too) brief historical sketch shows that the use of terms such as 
‘civilization’ tends to come with stratifications and hierarchies. In the history of 
international law, ‘civilization’ has generally been invoked to create an inferior 
‘other’ and to plea for unequal rights between the core and the periphery. 
While the use of terms such as ‘civilization’ came with a flavor of scientific 
objectivity, in fact it functioned as an ideological framework to justify 
structures of domination.  
7  For an excellent analysis of the position of nineteenth century international lawyers 
in relation to colonialism see Koskenniemi (2002), in particular chapter two.
8  The quote is taken from Koskenniemi (2002, 115).
9  As Koskenniemi (2002, 135) has put it: ‘The existence of a “standard” was a myth in 
the sense that there was never anything to gain. Every concession was a matter of 
negotiation, every status depended on agreement, quid pro quo. But the existence of a 
language of a standard still gave the appearance of a fair treatment (…)’. The classical 
study on the standard of civilization remains Gong (1984).
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Clashes of Civilization in an Era of Formal Equality
Today, the invocation of ‘civilizational differences’ has not disappeared. 
Several authors, including Samuel Huntington10, have argued that new 
standards of civilization have emerged in the name of human rights, security, 
democracy, rule of law or international trade and investment law.11 Inter-
estingly however, most of the time, such references to reborn ‘standards of 
civilization’ are made to critique the direction of international law. The 
underlying assumption is mostly that equality between nations and cultures 
should be the norm, but alas, international law is still far removed from this 
ideal. In other words: if someone argues that something like a  ‘standard of 
civilization’ drives a legal regime, this is almost invariably done in an attempt 
to show the illegitimacy of the regime in question; not to justify it.12
This turn-around reflects an important development in international law more 
generally. In the course of the twentieth century, the formal division of the 
world into spheres of civilization was replaced by a new interpretation of what 
sovereign equality of nations entailed. International law rapidly changed its 
stand towards colonialism, arguing for a right to self-determination of 
colonized peoples instead.13 Newly independent states born out of 
decolonization were protected by a conception of sovereignty that differed 
significantly from its nineteenth century counterpart. Sovereignty no longer 
meant the prerogative to decide when it was necessary to wage war, but 
instead meant that states were formally protected against intervention and the 
use of force by their peers.14 In other words: sovereignty moved from a 
freedom to wage war towards a freedom against armed interventions 
(Aalberts & Werner, 2008). At the same time, post-1945 international law 
adopted norms with universal pretensions to an unprecedented degree, e.g. 
in the form of human rights law, regimes to protect areas such as Antarctica 
or outer space, or norms regulating behavior in times of armed conflict. These 
norms claim to go beyond the specific interests of states or the values held by 
10  Although Huntington does not explicitly link his invocation of the imperialist heritage 
to international law, his line of argumentation is similar to that of several critical legal 
scholars: ‘The West is attempting and will continue to attempt to sustain its preeminent 
position and defend its interests by defining those interests as the interests of the 
“world community”’ (1997, 184).
11  The classical work in this respect remains Anghie (2004). See also Douzinas 
(2007).
12  Infra note 15.
13  The landmark Resolutions driving this process were General Assembly Resolutions 
1514 (1960) and 2625 (1970). For an analysis of decolonization and specific aspects of 
international law see Craven (2009).
14  For an analysis of the significance of this changing conception of sovereignty see 
Schmitt (2003).
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different cultures. Instead, they are meant to protect interests of humankind 
as such, or to embody values that make it possible for nations and cultures to 
co-exist in the first place.
This is not to say that formal equality between sovereigns or the protection of 
individual rights and communal interests has completely set aside the logic of 
civilizational differences. International law is also still characterized by 
formalized inequalities between states and regions in the world, e.g. in the 
composition of the Security Council or the distribution of voting rights in some 
international forums (Simpson 2004). In addition, the application of universal 
norms is still affected by unequal power relations, so that some states are 
more likely to be called to account for violations of international norms than 
others. As a result, international law today offers different normative vocab-
ularies that can be mobilized to conceptualize political struggles and societal 
problems. Alongside the vocabularies of formal sovereignty and universal 
values, there is a vocabulary of empire and domination of one ‘civilization’ 
over another. As I argued in the first section, the use of such vocabularies 
should not be treated (only) as if they are truth claims. They are also 
presentations of the nature of international relations, including the presen-
tation of its main subjects and the normative ties that exist between those 
subjects. In the last section I will illustrate the mobilization of competing 
presentations of international society through a discussion of the struggles 
between the African Union and the International Criminal Court.
The International Criminal Court and ‘Africa’
According to Huntington in 1996, Africa possessed a weak civilizational 
identity at best. He added, however, ‘Africans are also developing a sense of 
African identity, and conceivably sub-Saharan Africa could cohere into a 
distinct civilization, with South Africa possibly being its core state’ (Huntington 
1997 47).
Whatever one may think of the descriptive and predictive value of both 
statements, attempts at developing an African identity have been made by 
diplomatic elites since the end of the Cold War. In this context, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has proven a useful point of reference to 
develop such an identity. Initially, the ICC fitted well in the change of identity 
that came with the death of the Organization of African States (OAS) and the 
birth of its replacement, the African Union (AU). Where the OAS revolved 
around issues of decolonization and adopted non-intervention as the core 
principle among African states, the African Union openly embraced, at least 
formally, constitutional government, democracy and human rights and allowed 
for intervention in cases of unconstitutional changes in government or gross 
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human rights violations.15 The African Union thus was more than a practical 
arrangement between states; it also constituted an attempt to redefine the 
nature of the relations between African states and peoples. In line with this 
ethos, more than 30 African states decided to join the newly established 
International Criminal Court (ICC).  
At first sight, the ICC has a clear cosmopolitan outlook, epitomized by its 
commitment to fight crimes that ‘deeply shock the consciousness of 
humanity’, ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’ and 
deserve to be prosecuted by ‘every State’ (Preamble to the Rome Statute of 
the ICC). The ICC, in other words, operates on the assumption that the world 
is bound together by certain core values, or as the preamble to the ICC 
Statute describes it, the assumption that ‘all peoples are united by common 
bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage’. From this imagery 
of international relations follows an obligation for all states to prosecute 
crimes that threaten the ‘delicate mosaic’ that holds the world together, and to 
accept the power of the ICC to step in if states are unwilling or unable to do 
so. The language of a global community united against ‘enemies of mankind’ 
was mobilized, inter alia, by the government of Uganda after it referred the 
situation in Northern Uganda to the ICC. Its long-standing fight against the 
Lord’s Resistance Army could now be articulated as a fight against enemies 
of the word as a whole, backed up by a cosmopolitan institution (Nouwen and 
Werner 2010).
However, despite its cosmopolitan outlook the ICC is also an organization 
that rests on the will and cooperation of sovereign states. Earlier international 
criminal tribunals were often created top-down, by victorious powers (e.g. 
Nuremberg, Tokyo) or by the Security Council (e.g. Yugoslavia, Rwanda). The 
ICC is created bottom-up, through a treaty that rests on the freely expressed 
consent of sovereign states. This of course seriously hampers the 
cosmopolitan ambitions of the ICC, as is evidenced by the absence – and 
lack of cooperation – of powerful states such as the United States, China or 
Russia. The ICC not only rests on a treaty created by and through the 
consent of states, it also heavily depends on states when it comes to the 
effectuation of its arrest warrants. Since the ICC lacks its own police force, it 
can only serve its cosmopolitan agenda if states are willing and able to 
cooperate with the ICC.  
15  See in particular article four of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. After 
reaffirming the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, the Act empowers 
the Union to interfere when war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are 
committed, and emphasizes respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of 
law and good governance. 
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The ICC is thus a cosmopolitan and a state-centric organization at the same 
time. Both aspects are symbolized by article 13 of the ICC Statute, which 
regulates the conditions under which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. 
According to article 13, the Court may exercise jurisdiction if a state party 
refers a case to the ICC, thus laying the initiative in the hands of governments 
of sovereign states. Another option offered by article 13 is that the Prosecutor 
initiates proceedings, thus empowering one of the organs of the Court itself. 
However, there is a third way in which proceedings can kick off, and that is if 
the Security Council refers a situation to the Court. In effect, this means that 
the (permanent) members of the Security Council enjoy special powers to 
determine which situations the Court can take up. The position of the 
members of the Council is further strengthened by article 16 of the Statute. 
According to this article, the Security Council can block investigations or 
prosecutions by the ICC for a period of 12 months, and offers the Council the 
opportunity to renew the request under the same conditions. This brings a 
third image of the Court: the Court as an institution rooted in legalized 
inequality between the permanent members of the Security Council and the 
rest of the world. 
The ICC thus offers an interesting illustration of three different vocabularies 
on the nature of the legal community it regulates: a cosmopolitan narrative, a 
narrative of sovereign equality and a narrative of formal inequality. All three 
have been mobilized lately by several African states and the African Union in 
their critiques of the ICC. Put simply, the critique is that the ICC has focused 
almost exclusively on African situations, as if the most heinous criminals all 
reside on this continent. The cosmopolitan symbolism of the ICC is thus 
recognized, but turned against the ICC itself: precisely because the ICC 
claims to deal with crimes that shock the conscience of humanity, it should be 
careful not to locate these crimes exclusively on one particular continent. Of 
course, such critiques are more poignant in the case of Africa, as it bears a 
long history of international law treating it as barbaric and radically different 
from the ‘civilized West’. The cosmopolitan pretensions of the ICC are thus 
held against the practice of the ICC, and the argument is made that in this 
case the Court fits in a longer trend of Western powers using universal values 
to subdue Africa.  
At the same time, the state-based nature of the ICC is recognized, and turned 
against the Court itself. This type of critique was voiced in relation to the 
arrest warrant issued against the incumbent president of Sudan, al-Bashir. 
The arrest warrant followed upon a referral by the Security Council, who 
referred the situation in Darfur since July 2002 to the ICC via Resolution 1593 
(2005). The Office of the Prosecution thereupon decided to go after the 
president of Sudan and issued two arrest warrants against him. Since the 
African Union held that the arrest warrant would hamper the fragile peace 
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process in Sudan, it repeatedly asked the Security Council to use its formal 
powers under article 16 to suspend the arrest warrant. However, the Security 
Council refused to act upon the requests of the African Union, leaving the 
latter frustrated and increasingly critical about the functioning of the Council 
and the ICC. A similar pattern emerged after the ICC issued arrest warrants 
(this time without prior Security Council referral) against Kenya’s president 
Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, who were accused of crimes 
against humanity. The position of the Security Council spurred critiques of 
neo-imperialism: an exclusive club assumes the power to start investigations 
into an African president, and subsequently ignores African pleas to take into 
consideration possible effects on peace and security. Another complicating 
factor was that Sudan was not a party to the ICC, as were several other 
African states. What would the situation be if al-Bashir would travel to another 
non-party state? Would that state be bound by the age-old international rules 
on state immunity, and thus under an obligation to protect al-Bashir from 
investigation and arrest? In other words: was the relation between Sudan and 
other countries one of formal equality, crystalized in the regime of state 
immunity? Or would that state be bound by the arrest warrant, as this 
ultimately rooted in the powers of the Security Council, which can create 
formal inequality between states? Whereas the ICC took the latter position, 
the African Union held on to the immunity of heads of state. This position was 
later reconfirmed in relation to the arrest warrants against the Kenyan 
president and his deputy, and even applied to the newly established African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights, that is supposed to respect the immunity 
of African Heads of State and senior officials (Kersten 2014). The struggle 
between the ICC and the African Union was deepened further when the 
African Union started to call for (collective) withdrawal from the Statute of the 
ICC. This call was followed by a number of actual resignations, including the 
highly symbolic retreat from South Africa.
However, one should be careful to speak of ‘the’ African critique, as if the 
whole continent speaks with a single voice. Not all African states share the 
critique and some states openly criticized (calls for) withdrawal from the 
Statute. Botswana, for example, argued ‘that such a move betrays the rights 
of the victims of atrocious crimes to justice and also undermines the progress 
made to date in the global efforts to fight impunity’ (Botswana Government 
Statement, 2016). Within South Africa, high profile figures such as Bishop 
Tutu characterized calls for withdrawal as ‘African leaders (…) effectively 
seeking a license to kill, maim and oppress their people without 
consequences’ (Tutu 2013). Last but not least, South Africa’s constitutional 
Court decided that withdrawal was invalid and unconstitutional, thus opening 
up a renewed debate on South Africa’s position vis-à-vis the ICC (Democratic 
Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 
2017). The ‘clash of civilizations’ as presented by the African Union is thus not 
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acknowledged by everyone on the African continent. Alongside the narrative 
of a struggle between a (Western) ICC and a marginalized continent are 
narratives about Africa’s continued commitment to cosmopolitan ideals – even 
though the actual functioning of the ICC may still be subject to substantive 
critique. 
Conclusion
So far, international law remains an under-researched topic in the literature 
on Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’. This is remarkable since international 
law itself was born out of such a clash. For centuries, the relation between 
Western, self-declared ‘civilized’ states and other, so-called less civilized 
parts of the world was one of the core questions in international law. 
International law was used as a vocabulary to define different levels of 
civilization and to regulate the relations between these stipulated civilizations. 
While the language of ‘civilization’ has now become formally outmoded in 
international law, many have claimed that regimes such as human rights, 
trade or security are still based on standards of civilization. Such claims, 
however, should not be treated as truth claims. More often than not, they are 
made as part of a normative debate on the nature of international society, and 
generally they are used to critique existing legal regimes. In this way, such 
claims actually aim to underscore competing conceptions of international 
society, based, for example, on notions of formal equality of nations or 
cosmopolitan equality between cultures and individuals. In this article I have 
illustrated the mobilization of such competing notions of international society 
in the African Union’s critique of the ICC as a neo-colonial institution. This 
discussion was also meant to underscore another point: descriptions of the 
nature of (international) society, such as Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’, 
are also speech acts, yielding presentations of institutional (legal) facts 
(Ruiter, 1993). In other words: they create imageries of society, which are 
intrinsically linked to the normative ties that are supposed to exist between its 
members. International legal argumentation is filled with debates where 
competing conceptions of society form the basis for normative claims about 
the relevant agents and their legal relations. The imagery of clashing 
civilizations is one of them, and one that still holds appeal, as the saga of the 
African Union’s critique of the ICC attests. 
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New Century, New Clashes?
When the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington first published ‘The Clash of 
Civilizations’ (1993), his hypothesis was based on the assumption that future 
international conflicts would arise from cultural and religious identities. 
However, the argument that the eight civilizations – Western, Confucian, 
Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly 
African – were morally and politically incompatible, would soon be questioned 
by scholars all over the world. One of the most famous critics was Edward 
Said, who replied years later with an essay entitled Clash of Ignorance 
(2001). This author warned that amplifying an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narrative or a 
‘west’ versus ‘Islam’ posture is both dangerous and misleading, especially 
after September 11.
In fact, Huntington believes that ‘as people define their identity in ethnic and 
religious terms, they are likely to see an “us” versus “them” relation existing 
between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion’ (1993, 29). 
For the author this would ultimately lead to a confrontation (or even war) 
between civilizations based on ‘who you are’ in terms of culture and religion. 
Moreover, Huntington does not hesitate to claim that Islam has ‘bloody 
borders’ (1993, 25), for example with the Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, the 
Jews in Israel, the Hindus in India, the Buddhists in Burma or the Catholics in 
the Philippines. 
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Despite the numerous ‘clashes of scholarships’, Huntington’s most enduring 
legacy started to be tested at Europe’s borders in the 1990s. Historically 
envisioned as a reconstruction plan after the Second World War, the origins 
of the European project were inspired by the ideals of peace, human rights, 
democracy and good governance, both within and beyond its borders. 
However, with the end of the Cold War and the humanitarian crisis in the 
Balkans, the European Economic Community (EEC) was compelled to stand 
up to new challenges and threats. 
To tackle this new strategic environment, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty shaped 
a new identity – the European Union (EU) – based on a three-pillar structure, 
including the area of freedom, security and justice. Within these pillars, 
throughout the years, member states tried to implement the best strategies 
and policies planned to control and manage its population flows at the 
national level. 
However, the disproportionate burden faced by Greece and Italy in the last 
couple of years caused a huge tension among EU members. In 2015 alone, 
more than a million migrants and refugees crossed into Europe. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 10,550 migrants 
and refugees entered Europe by land and 164,779 by sea through 03 
December 2017, around 85% arriving first in Italy and Spain and the 
remainder in Greece and Bulgaria. In addition, 3,086 people were missing or 
found dead at the Mediterranean by the beginning of December. Moreover, 
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
there were 65.6 million internally displaced persons and 22.5 million refugees 
worldwide (excluding 5.3 million Palestinians) in 2016. In turn, in the first 
quarter of 2017, the top three citizenships of asylum seekers in Europe were 
Syrians (22,500), Afghans (12,500) and Nigerians (11,500 applications). In 
the same period, according to EUROSTAT, Germany has registered 30% of 
all applicants in the EU member states, followed by Italy, France, Greece and 
the United Kingdom.
Bearing all those numbers and facts in mind and considering the absence of a 
common migration and asylum policy, the EU stance was threefold: political, 
security and military. The EU tackled this issue through a holistic and 
comprehensive approach both in the origin, transit and destination countries, 
blurring the internal and external security nexus (Eriksson and Rhinard 2009; 
Pastore 2001; Lutterbeck 2001).  
Starting with the first dimension (political) we must mention the adoption of 
the European Agenda on Security (European Commission 2015a), aimed to 
set out how the Union can bring added value in ensuring security within and 
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beyond its borders. This agenda also acknowledges that member states can 
no longer succeed fully on their own faced with cross-border terrorism, 
organized crimes or cybercrime which require indeed an effective and 
coordinated response at the European level. Following this document, also in 
2015, the European Commission presented the European Agenda on 
Migration (2015b) that set both short (prevent further losses of migrants’ lives 
at sea) and medium/long term priorities (reducing the incentives for irregular 
migration; saving lives and securing the external borders; strengthening the 
common asylum policy; and developing a new policy on legal migration) to 
better manage the EU’s external borders along with its member states. 
In terms of security (the second dimension), three facts are worth mentioning. 
First, the EU-Turkey agreement (March 2016) aiming to restrain the influx of 
people crossing to Greek islands and to assure that for every Syrian migrant 
sent back to Turkey, one Syrian already in Turkey will be resettled in the EU. 
This deal has been strongly criticized because, in return, Turkey might be 
encouraged to push more political concessions in the future (Hakura 2016) 
and the EU has apparently resigned on its responsibilities to provide 
protection and security to those in need (Collett 2016). 
Second is the strengthening of the EU’s cooperation with Western Balkan 
countries – the frontline of the Eastern route – by providing them with 
technical, humanitarian and financial assistance. In fact, on 26 October 2015, 
a meeting between the leaders of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia agreed on an 
action plan with the aim of avoiding a possible humanitarian crisis along the 
transit route. This regional approach also relies on strong coordination and 
consultation with Turkey as, by land or sea, thousands of migrants have 
entered Bulgaria or Greece with the aim of reaching the Schengen area. 
The third fact also relates to the political dimension and is the implementation 
of a European Border and Coast Guard to protect and enhance the security 
and management of the EU’s External Borders. This initiative was announced 
by President Juncker in his State of the Union Speech on 9 September 2015 
as part of a comprehensive approach set out by the European Agenda on 
Migration. The implementation of a European Border and Coast Guard 
expands the mandate of Frontex (the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU) in the fields of 
external border management. In addition, the EU’s rebranding of the latter as 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was meant to give more 
visibility to its new tasks. In this regard, on 25 January 2017, a new package 
of four documents on migration and security was approved by the European 
Commission (European Commission 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2017d). 
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The last dimension is the military. Indeed, another key pillar of the EU 
institutional approach to cope with the migration and refugee crisis is 
exemplified by the ability to deploy missions and operations to identify, 
capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers framed by the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Thus, following a tragic Libyan migrant 
shipwreck in April 2015, the EU launched a military operation – European 
Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) – with the aim of 
countering established refugee smuggling routes in the Mediterranean. This 
was agreed on 18 May 2015 as a three-phase military operation in 
accordance with the procedures of international law (Tardy 2015): the first 
phase would focus on the surveillance and assessment of human smuggling 
and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean; the second 
and third phases aimed to search, seize and disrupt the assets of smugglers, 
though it depends on the partnership with Libyan authorities upon a United 
Nations Security Council resolution. This mission counterparts Operation 
Triton as a border security operation conducted by Frontex, under Italian 
command, that began on 1 November 2014 and involved voluntary 
contributions from Croatia, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Romania, 
Poland, Lithuania and Malta. 
In October 2015, the Council renamed this mission to EUNAVFOR MED 
Operation Sophia, honoring the rescue of a baby girl born on a vessel on 22 
August off the coast of Libya. On 20 June 2016, the Council of the European 
Union decided to extend Sophia’s mandate until the end of July 2017 by 
adding the training of the Libyan Coastguard and Navy and contributing to the 
implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of 
Libya as supporting tasks. On 25 July 2017, the Council extended once again 
the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia up until 31 December 2018 and 
amended the mandate in order to set up a monitoring mechanism of trainees 
to ensure the long-term efficiency of the training of the Libyan Coastguard, 
conduct new surveillance activities and gather information on illegal trafficking 
of oil exports from Libya in accordance with UNSCR 2146 (2014) and 2362 
(2017), and enhance the possibilities for sharing information on human 
trafficking with member states’ law enforcement agencies, FRONTEX and 
EUROPOL.
Europe’s Dilemmas: A Social Constructivist Approach
With the disintegration of the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War and the 
start of globalization, International Relations research and teaching patterns 
in the last two decades of the twentieth century shifted to a new ‘reflectivist 
critique of the scientific approach to the study of social sciences’ (Behravesh 
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2011). As a result, the assumption that the fundamental structures of 
international politics are not only shaped by a neorealist anarchist power 
politics, but also by ongoing processes of social practice, paved the way for 
constructivists (Adler 2001; Onuf 1998; Wendt 1992; Zehfuss 2002) to 
challenge the nature of interactions and, thus, identity. In fact, social 
constructivist authors tend to acknowledge that ‘the structures of human 
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material 
forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt 1999, 
1). Moreover, one of the key features of International Relations constructivist 
approaches is the role that social norms play in states’ identities. 
This assumption is theoretically useful to help us to explore four practical 
dilemmas, questions or clashes: (1) the perceptions by EU citizens on the 
balance between freedom and security; (2) the rise of Far-Right movements 
and the growth of Islamism and terrorist attacks in Europe; (3) the migration 
flows in an ageing Europe in need of a more qualified manpower; and (4) the 
challenges of integration, counter radicalization and deradicalization. 
In what concerns the first ‘clash’ – the perceptions by EU citizens on the 
balance between freedom and security – the results of the Eurobarometer 
Standard surveys (Autumn 2015 and Spring 2016) illustrate that Europeans 
see immigration (48% in 2016, down ten percent from 2015) and terrorism 
(39%, up 14% from 2015) as the major challenges the EU is facing. 
Furthermore, 67% of Europeans are in favor of a common European 
migration policy and 58% have a positive opinion on the migration of people 
from other EU member states. Moreover, 79% of Europeans are in favor of 
the free movement of EU citizens who can live, work, study and do business 
anywhere in the EU. However, almost 60% also have a negative opinion on 
the immigration of people from outside the EU. In addition, the data also 
reveals terrorism as a source of growing concern following the terrorist 
attacks in France (7 January and 13 November 2015 in Paris, 14 July 2016 in 
Nice), Belgium (22 March 2016) and Germany (July and December 2016). 
As a result, two misconceptions emerged: first, that there are no differences 
between economic migrants and refugees, which is contentious, as asylum 
seekers are entitled to humanitarian protection and specific rights covered by 
the United Nations 1951 Geneva Convention, while economic migrants are 
subject to national laws; second, that these new migratory movements are 
spreading Islamism in Europe. 
This leads to the second ‘clash’, which is the rise of Far-Right movements 
and the growth of Islamism and terrorist attacks in Europe. This ‘clash’ is 
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being politically exposed by some extremist right-wing populist parties and 
movements (Greven 2016) that helped to foster hostile feelings towards 
immigrants and refugees. We are referring to political parties such as National 
Front (France), UKIP (UK), Lega Nord (Italy), Golden Dawn (Greece), 
Freedom Party (Holland), Jobbik Swedish Democrats (Sweden), Progress 
Party (Norway), Finns (Finland), Danish People’s Party (Denmark), Freedom 
Party (Austria), Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland) and Alternative für 
Deutschland (Germany), that claim that a series of terrorist incidents were 
caused by refugees or asylum seekers. For example, between 18 and 24 July 
2016, a series of attacks took place in Germany (the EU member state with 
the highest number of asylum applications) involving an Afghan refugee that 
injured five people in a train (18th), an Iranian refugee that killed nine people 
in Munich (22nd), a Syrian refugee that killed a woman in Reutlingen (24th) and 
in Ansbach, a suicide attack of a Syrian refugee (24th). Also, the attack on the 
Breitscheid Square in Berlin on 19 December 2016 was allegedly headed by 
Anis Amri, a Tunisian who had seen his asylum application denied and was 
using 14 different identities to access social benefits and trick the intelligence 
services. Recent studies (TESAT 2017, 22–25) confirm that DAESH has 
indeed been, and possibly continues to be, exploiting refugees and migrants’ 
routes to send individuals to Europe to commit acts of terrorism.
Therefore, it is not surprising that some countries have been building walls to 
control borders and prevent radical Jihadists or other members of terrorist 
cells from succeeding in reaching Western Europe from the Balkans or 
Mediterranean route. In this regard, it was widely covered by the European 
media the impact of the 32km wall between Bulgaria and Turkey, the Evros 
wall between Greece and Turkey of 12.5km, or the 175km border between 
Hungary and Serbia.
However, while a Pew Research study estimates that by 2030 Muslims will 
represent eight per cent of Europe’s total population and will reach ten per 
cent by 2050, exceeding Christians worldwide by 2070 (Yuhas 2015), some 
authors (Bullard 2016) argue that the youngest generation seems to be 
disengaged of any religious belief. 
Moreover, an ageing Europe needs to attract young people, or it will face 
major problems in terms of social welfare systems, losing geopolitical 
competitiveness (ESPAS 2012). This represents the third ‘clash’ (the 
migration flows in an ageing Europe in need of a more qualified and 
sustainable labor force). In fact, according to the Eurostat statistics, the share 
of the population aged 65 years and over increased 2.4 percentage points 
between 2006 and 2016 for the EU28, while the share of the population aged 
less than 15 years in the EU28 population decreased by 0.4 percentage 
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points.
To conclude, the fourth ‘clash’ concerns the challenges of integration, counter 
radicalization and deradicalization. Among the 28 member states, the 
question of cultural and religious identity (the core focus of Huntington’s 
piece) is being tackled in two different ways (Aleksynska and Algan 2010): 
either through an assimilation (when a minority communities’ identity is 
absorbed by the dominant features of the majority culture), or through an 
integration perspective (the minority culture is harmoniously accommodated 
into an intercultural society where all get access to the same opportunities, 
rights and duties). Although the European Institutions have been striving for 
an overall integration policy (Berlinghoff 2014; Entzinger and Biezeveld 
2003), rising criminality and terrorism along with unprecedented migratory 
pressure from the Mediterranean and Balkans routes have encouraged more 
protectionist, isolationist and sovereign approaches all over European states 
(Lacroix 2015; Malik 2015; Zappi 2003). 
What is rather interesting is that, in his book, Huntington lists five factors that 
have exacerbated the conflictual nature of Islam and Christianity (1996, 211), 
and one of the factors relates to the fact that Muslim population growth has 
generated large numbers of unemployed and dissatisfied youth that become 
recruits to Islamic causes. Should we then accept that a given economic, 
social and cultural profile might lead to radicalization and terrorism? 
Huntington argued that ‘for the relevant future, there will be no universal 
civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will 
have to learn to coexist with the others’ (1993, 49). For sure, the main way to 
address this problem does not lie only in the generic, targeted and indicated 
prevention measures (European Commission 2017, 20–35) aimed at the 
integration of the communities of immigrants and refugees, but also in 
deradicalization (any measures or programs aimed to reintegrate those 
already radicalized into society or at least dissuade them from extreme and 
violent religious or political ideologies) and counter radicalization (any 
preventative effort aimed at preventing radicalization from taking place). In 
this regard, it is worth mentioning Schmid’s (2013) effort in listing several 
national and local lessons learned, as well as the Council of the European 
Union initiative to draft revised Guidelines for the EU Strategy for Combating 
Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism (2017). In addition, EU 
institutions and national governments must be able to deliver and strike a 
balance between freedom, justice and security, as well as a sustainable 
welfare state, to fully accommodate all the cultural identities in European 
member states no matter its nationality or religion. 
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Conclusion
Twenty-five years after Huntington’s article was published, Europe is 
struggling with migration and terrorism, which are a top priority for EU citizens 
and governments. We cannot figure out what would be Huntington’s 
perspective on today’s challenges and threats, but as far as this essay is 
concerned, I believe that the author never meant to encourage a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ (‘west against the rest’). Instead, Huntington meant to warn that 
cultural identities, antagonisms and affiliations will play a major role in 
relations between states and that the shape of interactions between cultural 
identities might be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern 
world. 
Throughout this chapter, I have identified the three dimensions of the EU’s 
institutional approach to this issue (political, security and military) concluding 
that a new ‘border’s diplomacy’ (Parkes 2016) that addresses the root causes 
of underdevelopment and conflict, protecting people in need and providing 
integration through solidarity and mutual awareness is needed. In fact, we 
assumed that prevention, cooperation and multilateralism are the three key 
features that can be enhanced to depoliticize, desecuritize and demilitarize 
the ties between civilization, migration, terrorism and thus, avoid cultural and 
identity clashes with unpredictable consequences for humankind. For that 
purpose, the political, security and military measures taken by the European 
Union since 2015, and that we have mentioned throughout this essay, are 
interesting to follow in the future as most of their practical implications are still 
far from being accomplished. 
In fact, there is still room for improvement as recognized by the European 
Commission when launching the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, 
namely in what concerns the cooperation with third countries of origin (Syria, 
Libya, Iraq, the Sahel region, Afghanistan and Yemen) and transit (Egypt, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Niger and Mali) within a regional comprehensive approach. 
Also, the existing bilateral and regional cooperation platforms (Rabat 
Process, Khartoum Process, the Budapest Process, the EU-Africa Migration 
and Mobility Dialogue) must be accurately promoted as they represent an 
important forum for migration and security dialogue. The EU Delegations and 
UN special representatives in key countries (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon and Jordan) must work 
closely with Immigration Liaison Officers Network, local authorities and 
community leaders. Border control in North Africa and the Horn of Africa must 
be enhanced through the implementation of local support centers in 
coordination with the IOM, the UNHCR and the local authorities. In the 
destination countries, integration policies must be fostered and 
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deradicalization (as well as counter radicalization) must be developed in 
cooperation with intelligence services and community religious leaders. Legal 
and highly qualified migration should be encouraged (a blue card and a fast 
track procedure is on the way), and a global commons solidarity regime must 
be negotiated within the framework of the United Nations. This roadmap set in 
2015 by the European Commission, following the presentation of the 
European Agenda on Migration, is still in need of a fruitful implementation. 
To conclude, at least one question remains: 25 years after Huntington’s 
article, are we facing or moving to a new ‘clash of civilizations’? What seems 
certain is that dangerous ties are being nourished every day in the European 
society while we witness the growth of populist movements against refugees 
and migrants claiming a connection between Islam and terrorism. 
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An Alternative for Germany? 
Tracing Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ Thesis in a Right-
Wing Populist Party
JAN LÜDERT
Founded in 2013 as a protest party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) gained 
representation in fourteen federal state parliaments and, since September 
2017, holds 92 seats in the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament. Similar 
to other European right-wing parties, like the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom 
or France’s National Front, the AfD has rapidly morphed into a populist party 
with a strong anti-Islam agenda and rhetoric. This chapter traces Samuel 
Huntington’s civilization thesis of future conflict in the AfD’s party program 
‘Islam is not a part of Germany’. The author argues that the party’s fixed 
conception of Islam parallels Huntington’s conceptualization of civilizations 
and fault line conflicts. By making this argument, the author explores whether 
and how AfD party members draw on Huntington’s civilizational hypothesis in 
a broader attempt to entrench a German nationalist and anti-Islam agenda. 
Second, this chapter focuses on AfD proposals to ban minarets and burqas. 
These policy prescriptions are read against criticisms of the party’s intrinsic 
‘clash of civilizations’ logic by mainstream party members, leading German 
Islamic leaders, and other public actors. Third, the chapter ties these 
developments into a discussion of how the federal government’s response to 
the Syrian refugee crisis offered AfD party members opportunities to gain 
political advantage by establishing an anti-Islam agenda – an agenda that is 
rooted in a ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis of perceived fault line conflicts and a 
deep-seated desire for cultural homogeneity. Finally, building on the above, 
this chapter briefly assesses the Alternative for Germany’s prospects since 
entering the Bundestag in the fall of 2017. 
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The late Samuel Huntington put forth his ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (CoC) thesis 
in which he envisioned that the future of global politics would be based on 
inter-civilizational and cultural conflict; conflict that, in particular, would take 
place between the Islamic world and the West. The twenty-first century, 
accordingly, would no longer be a battleground between economic, 
ideological or political struggles. While many of Huntington’s arguments are 
incontrovertible, his most contentious claim was that the fault lines of future 
discord would originate from the Islamic world, a civilization he asserts to be 
intrinsically violent and incorrigibly illiberal (Huntington, 1993, 21–49). On the 
surface, events such as 9/11, recent terrorist attacks around Europe and 
elsewhere, and the rise of ISIS all seem to validate his thesis. 
Notwithstanding, scholars have criticized his overbroad conceptualizations of 
civilization and culture. These scholars contest his thesis because it lacks 
convincing empirical evidence (Russett, O’neal, and Cox 2000; Henderson 
and Tucker 2001; Chiozza 2002). A main line of contention against the CoC 
thesis is that it offers an impoverished and oversimplified view of pluralist 
cultures (Katzenstein 2009). Huntington, these scholars counter, assumes 
that civilizations are monolithic and homogenous and that there exists an 
unchanging duality between us and them. The religion of Islam, these authors 
go on to argue, is ‘fabricated to whip up feelings of hostility and antipathy’ in 
the West (Said 2001, 9). I agree that a Huntingtonian worldview risks 
conflating violent extremisms with Islam itself. It ultimately offers insufficient 
leverage for understanding a complex world. 
Despite its serious conceptual flaws and wanting empirical support, ideas 
espoused in the CoC thesis continue to resonate today. The focus of this 
chapter is to invite scholarly focus on how populist European figures and 
parties draw on an overbroad and fatalistic CoC logic. These actors, like 
Huntington, foresee the end of the West through a hostile takeover by radical 
Islam and, they would add, Muslim immigration to the West. This chapter 
traces these developments in light of the rapid ascent of the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) on the German political scene. It focuses on the parallels 
between Samuel Huntington’s civilizations thesis of conflict and the 
ideological framework of the AfD party’s platform which overtly makes the 
claim that ‘Islam is not a part of Germany’.
The Alternative for Germany: A Brief History
Following its establishment in the spring of 2013, the Alternative for Germany 
experienced an unprecedented ascent as a political party (Niedermayer 
2015). The party originated against the backdrop of Greece’s sovereign debt 
bailout and the pursuant Euro crisis. The AfD was at first perceived to be a 
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party of academics – not least because an economist, Bernd Lucke, founded 
it. Although failing to secure a seat in the Bundestag by a small margin in 
2014, the party secured seven seats in the European Parliament, and 
representation in 14 state parliaments between 2014 and 2016 
(Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2107). In Saxony-Anhalt and 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 24.2% and 20.8% of voters respectively 
cast their vote for the AfD. In other state elections, some five to fifteen percent 
of the electorate voted for the AfD. Most recently, in Germany’s federal 
elections, held in late September 2017, the party received 12.6% of votes and 
as such is now the Bundestag’s third largest fraction. Recent studies have 
revealed that the party was able to take votes from all of Germany’s 
established mainstream parties, and it currently boasts more than 23,000 
members. No other newly-formed party in German post-war politics has ever 
had as much electoral success. 
With Lucke’s departure following intense factional infighting in 2015, the AfD 
began to fixate less on the Euro crisis and reoriented its stance to offer voters 
a far-right nativist home. The one issue that brings AfD voters together is an 
intense concern over immigration and Islam. With such populist appeal, the 
AfD was predicted to join the Bundestag in September 2017. Surveys by 
INFRATEST DIMAP, a polling organization, show that the AfD’s voter 
demographic fit a certain typology. Supporters are predominantly male, 
between the ages of 25 and 44. Voters over the age of 60 are less 
represented but are nevertheless present in the ranks of AfD supporters. 
INFRATEST DIMAP also showed that the AfD syphoned votes from all 
established parties and draws support from across all social classes. About a 
third of its supporters are laborers and another third are unemployed. Voter 
demographics illustrate that its base predominantly completed Realschule – a 
typical degree outcome for most Germans that does not qualify for entering 
universities.
AfD’s appeal among voters and its political gains have not been the result of 
a sophisticated agenda and platform. Its success is a result of offering an 
outlet for disgruntled voters (‘Wutbürger’) for whom the AfD framed an anti-
establishment and outsider identity. The party articulated a political home for 
these voters under the slogan ‘a credo for truth’ (Mut zur Wahrheit) which it 
focuses against the ‘elite political caste’, the ‘lying’ media and all those who 
use ‘thought control’ in the name of political correctness, which, the party 
contends, discourages public discourse on entire themes that are on the 
minds of German people (AfD 2016). The Syrian refugee crisis provided the 
AfD with a boost. This was particularly observable after chancellor Merkel’s 
open-door policy of welcoming nearly a million refugees took effect in 2015. 
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The AfD has, following stark divisions within its leadership, taken a sharp 
right-wing populist and national-conservative turn based on a strong anti-
Islam agenda. This move began when the far-right patriotic faction called for 
a tough stance against the ‘Islamization of the occident’ (Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes) by connecting it to a call ‘against the delusion of a multicultural 
society’ (Patriotische Platform 2014). The AfD, as such, co-evolved as a 
political ally of the protest movement ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamization of the West’ (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes, PEGIDA) (Grabow 2016). Under an umbrella of fighting a 
culture war (‘Kulturkampf’), both forces have since mid-2015 mobilized a 
broad spectrum of Germans through their shared intent to fend off foreign 
infiltration, foremost by Muslim immigrants and refugees. 
A basic fear the AfD and PEGIDA see on the horizon is what they have coined 
‘ethnic redeployment’ (‘Umvolkung’). By allowing for unchecked immigration, 
the Islamization of German society will lead to a consequential loss of 
German culture and identity and ultimately to a breakdown of state and 
society itself. The AfD centers this doomsday argument on what it views as 
the entrenchment of parallel Islamic societies within Germany – including the 
notion that Sharia will, one day, supplant the rule of law (Patzelt 2016). 
Frauke Petry, a former party leader, went as far as to call upon Germans to 
reclaim the word ‘Volk’ from its national-socialist connotations and to reassert 
a bottled-up patriotism instead (BBC 2016). Such pronouncements are not 
isolated. Bernd Höcke, a member of the far-right faction, repeatedly invokes 
the ‘Fatherland’ and ‘Volk’. He stresses that Germany must overcome its 
collective national guilt and make a ‘180 degree’ turn to regain its national 
pride (Taub and Fisher 2017). The AfD’s portrayal of Germany’s national 
identity as being undermined by migration and multiculturalism dovetails with 
one of Huntington’s predictions: ‘civilization rallying’ by ‘populist politicians, 
religious leaders and the media’ will arouse ‘mass support’ and will be used to 
pressure governments (Huntington 1993, 38). The remainder of the chapter 
traces these and other overlapping CoC declarations through an analysis of 
the AfD’s party program ‘Islam is not a part of Germany’.  
The AfD Fills the Gap between Reality and Perception
According to statistics, some 4.5 million Muslims reside in Germany. Given 
Germany’s population of 82.2 million, this means that approximately 5.5% of 
its people have a religious background in Islam. A vast majority of the Muslim 
community in Germany are of Turkish origin and descent, first arriving as so-
called guest workers (Gastarbeiter) in the 1960s, with a second group fleeing 
from war-torn regions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Almost one in four, or 
some 1.2 million Muslims, moved to Germany fairly recently and 
154An Alternative for Germany?
predominantly due to the Syrian refugee crisis (Stichs 2016). These statistics 
stand in stark contrast to perception, however. According to a recent IPSOS 
poll, Germans grossly overestimate the current number and projected growth 
of Muslims in Germany. The poll revealed that Germans think that some 21% 
of its population is Muslim (IPSOS 2016). This four-fold gap between reality 
and perception is bridged by the AfD with an anti-Islam agenda for a 
disgruntled and susceptible electorate.
In late April 2016, the AfD adopted a new party program for the 2017 federal 
elections which insists that ‘Islam is not part of Germany’. Stating further that 
the ‘spread of Islam’ poses a ‘great danger for our nation, our society and our 
values’. The party manifesto argued that Islamic states seek to broaden their 
own power bases by building and staffing mosques on German territory. 
These states, the AfD explains, are engaged in a cultural war and perpetuate 
a form of religious imperialism. A trend which has to be halted (AfD 2017, 34–
35). The central political goal for the party is ‘self-preservation, not self-
destruction of our state and people’ (AfD 2017, 28). To this end, the party 
proposes a tightening of border controls to avert the ‘massive influx’ of people 
and especially those from African and predominantly Muslim states: regions, 
the party alleges, that do not belong to the ‘West and its values’ (AfD 2017, 
18).
Culture as a Great Divider 
The cadence of these arguments bears a striking resemblance to realist 
assumptions of state survival, anarchy, and the inevitability of conflict. The 
AfD justify them as political prudence and draw upon Samuel Huntington’s 
argument concerning the great divisions among humankind and the 
hypothesis that cultural blocs will become the primary source of future 
conflict. It is evident that a ‘growth of civilization-consciousness’ – or the 
‘trends toward a turning inward’ – as espoused by Huntington shows up in the 
AfD’s nationalist and nativist agenda (Huntington 1993, 26). Certainly, the AfD 
mobilizes its support via a Huntingtonian prescription of rallying around 
common religious and civilizational signifiers. For the AfD, a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ is imminent.
At the domestic, or micro-level, ‘adjacent groups along the fault lines between 
civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each 
other’ (Huntington 1993, 29). Orthodox Islam, as the AfD echoes, makes a 
claim to power (‘Herrschaftsanspruch’) and is in militant opposition to all 
‘infidels’; read: the people of Europe and of the West. Huntington’s micro-level 
conflict, the party agrees, is already common-place in German cities where 
‘Islamic parallel societies with Sharia judges’ rule entire communities outside 
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the rule of German law. Immigrants, in order to have a right to stay in 
Germany, the party demands, owe allegiance to German values 
(‘Bringschuld’) and must assimilate to its leading culture (‘Leitkultur’) (AfD 
2017, 32). Integration, for the AfD, ‘does not mean that Germany adjusts to 
Muslims. Integration, means that Muslims assimilate to Germany’ (Afd 2017, 
45). Huntington uses religion as the basic element of culture – apart from kin, 
language, values – to build a spurious and circular causal relationship in 
which religion is the cultural glue of civilizations. Just as the AfD, he describes 
the decline of the West and invokes a sense of urgency because immigration 
threatens Western civilization.
By seeking to bolster a cultural core in which Germany is seen to be the 
center of the West, the AfD equally claims to draw upon the values of 
‘Christianity, antiquity, and principles of humanism and the enlightenment’, 
‘the liberal rule of law, our appreciation for educations, the arts and sciences 
as well as social market capitalism as an expression of human creativity’. 
With this basis, the AfD’s central goal is to ‘protect’ German culture from 
Muslim infiltration as well as the ideology of multiculturalism. Both of these, 
the party manifesto alleges, inevitably lead to ‘domestic conflict and the 
dismemberment of the state’ (AfD 2017, 47). AfD pronouncements are close 
to verbatim to Huntington’s take on ‘Western ideas of individualism, 
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, 
democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state’, and as the 
AfD’s view highlights, ‘often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, 
Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures’ (Huntington 1993, 40). 
Undoubtedly, Huntington’s ‘descriptive hypotheses’ and his ‘implications for 
Western policy’ to mitigate against the CoC show up in AfD’s policy 
statements:
The culture war between the West and Islam, which is already 
taking place in Europe, as a doctrine of salvation and the 
bearers of non-assimilative cultural traditions and rights, can 
only be averted by a series of defensive and restrictive 
measures which prevent a further destruction of European 
values [and] of the coexistence of enlightened citizens. The 
AfD will not allow Germany to lose its cultural face from 
misunderstood tolerance (AfD 2017, 47). 
Micro-level and fault line conflicts perpetuated by illiberal Islam, as the AfD 
declares, are reality. They are a serious German domestic and European 
problem. They not only exist in Islam abroad but are more immediately 
dangerous because of their existence within states, the EU, the liberal West, 
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and Christian civilization more broadly. As AfD party vice chairman Alexander 
Gauland put it, ‘Islam’ is problematic insofar as ‘Muslim believers are not a 
problem, but Islam as a religion is’ (Tagesschau 2017). Beatrix von Storch, an 
AfD representative to the European parliament, explains it this way: ‘The 
biggest threat to democracy and freedom today stems from political Islam’ 
(Handelsblatt 2017).
These understandings by leading AfD figures are worth noting because 
criticisms of the CoC equally apply to the AfD. Both use a reductive argument 
that essentializes Islam and especially as a religion with a propensity for 
conflict while equally ignoring Muslims’ multifaceted identities, religious 
affiliations, and pluralistic cultures. Just as they view the West as a coherent 
and homogenous cultural bloc, so they disregard complexity in favor of broad-
brush demarcations between the West and the rest. What permeates through 
the AfD’s party program is a Huntingtonian worldview: a reified Islam, 
understood as a retrograde, barbarian and savage ‘other’, threatening the 
survival of a progressive and peaceful West that is retrenching and under 
attack. In the same vein as Huntington constructs his argument, the AfD also 
perceives a double threat: the West is in decline while Islam is a force 
introducing conflict. The AfD therefore also needs to be understood as a party 
that holds onto a nativist ideology within this civilization-based logic. The AfD 
harbors a deep-seated desire for a homogenous German core and ‘leading 
culture’, a culture that non-natives – by their presence, ideas and way of life – 
fundamentally undermine and threaten. As Huntington would have it, a world 
of clashing civilizations ‘is inevitably a world of double standards: people 
apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others’ 
(Huntington 1993, 36).
The AfD opposes criticism which claims that the party is Islamophobic, 
xenophobic or racist, asserting instead that it is engaged in a rational 
discourse of critiquing religion (AfD 2017, 34). The AfD’s platform presents 
the following critiques of Islamic culture: the minaret is a symbol of 
dominance which institutes religious imperialism; Burqas and Niqabs should 
be banned from public because they do not conform with the principles of 
equality; and that the financing of mosques by foreign governments 
constitutes territorial encroachment on German territory – a practice that 
should be outlawed (AfD 2017a). These calls – apart from being difficult to 
reconcile with the German constitution, which guarantees religious freedom 
and expression – are at odds with the party’s own commitment to the rule of 
law. Formulations chosen in the party program tread a fine line of 
constitutional conformity; party leaders and supporters are less nuanced. Jörg 
Meuthen, a party spokesman, is steadfast: conflict is inherent to Islam but not 
to other religions. He mused that although only a few Muslims are terrorists, 
almost all of recent terrorism has roots in Islam. More to the point, Albrecht 
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Glaser, a member of the AfD’s leadership circle, stated that Islam is a 
construction that does not know religious freedom and does not respect it, 
and where it reigns, stifles every kind of freedom of religion. One who treats 
the constitution in such a way forfeits their rights under the constitution (Leif, 
2017).
Unsurprisingly, such views invite criticism from all of the established German 
parties, religious leaders, and the media alike. For example, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) called the AfD’s criticism of Islam an attempt to put 
an entire religion under general suspicion, to be not in conformity with the 
constitution, and to draw on unsubstantiated facts to make its case (SPD 
2017). Die Linke countered, stating that to define an entire religion as 
conflictual is ‘just as absurd’ as to argue that Christianity and the Ku Klux 
Klan are one and the same (Die Linke 2017). Green party leadership member 
Katrin Göring-Eckhard noted that the AfD’s reactionary political line would 
soon be uncovered as baseless in its assessment and ineffectual in its 
proposals. Religious leaders are equally united against the AfD. Aiman 
Mazyek, the head of Germany’s Muslim Council, warned that the AfD is a 
divisive force without solutions to real problems. Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, 
head of the Protestant church, declared that the AfD’s views cannot be 
reconciled with a Christian moral compass and that hounding against Islam is 
unacceptable. He declared that he was taking a strong stance against the 
AfD’s own ‘fundamentalism’. Likewise, for Josef Schuster, President of the 
Central Council of Jews, the AfD’s positions on Islam are ‘unconstitutional’ 
(evangelisch 2017).
Self-Fulling Prophecy or Political Prudence?
To conclude, the preceding discussion indicates that the Alternative for 
Germany embraced central tenets of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis 
to mobilize a substantial part of German society. In this way, 25 years on, the 
‘clash of civilizations’ remains a relevant topic for scholarly debate and 
political analysis. By drawing on Huntington’s reductionist conceptualization 
of conflict originating from Islam, the AfD continues to activate political capital. 
In particular, the humanitarian gesture made by the German government to 
welcome Syrian refugees helped the party bolster the perception that the 
country was under threat. As such, the AfD was able to enter the Bundestag 
as the third largest party and main oppositional faction in September 2017. To 
this extent, Huntington provided some bearing on the forces of ‘civilization 
rallying’ by populist forces. Critically, the CoC has also, even if unwittingly, 
provided the AfD with fodder to drive a self-fulfilling prophecy: Germany, at 
the core of the West, is under threat from radical Islam. It is here that 
Huntington’s theory and the party’s manifesto and political discourse pander 
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more to the electorate’s perception than conform with reality. 
Theory and party, this chapter has argued, are equally problematic in their 
use of oversimplified categories, essentialist understandings of complex 
political phenomena, as well as their spurious and selective use of evidence 
to make their claims. Perhaps most troubling, they thereby perpetuate a 
divisive worldview of us versus them. An understanding that the West is under 
siege by radical Islam has provided the AfD with a tool to drive a nationalist 
agenda, just as much as it offered Huntington a stand-in enemy for the 
evaporating communist threat of the post-Cold War era. The AfD understands 
and justifies its approach as politically prudent. Still, the inherent danger with 
this approach is similar to that which has been made against Huntington. The 
CoC and AfD are thus usefully understood as two sides of the same coin: 
they construct a conflict scenario for which only policies of containment and 
restriction are offered as solutions. What both misjudge is that unbridled 
intolerance and opposing differences are at the root of every extremism. In 
this moment of populist resurgence with the AfD in Germany, under the Trump 
administration in the US, the National Front in France, the Party for Freedom 
in the Netherlands, Jobbik in Hungary and elsewhere, the question becomes 
not whether Islam is an inherent threat to stability but whether radicalization 
within diverse cultures is at the heart of whipping up the very conflict they 
seek to end. In the final analysis then, and to respond to this chapter’s title, 
the AfD is not an appropriate alternative for Germany.
References
AfD. 2017. “Programm für Deutschland.” Alternative für Deutschland. https://
www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-
Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf Accessed 03 November 2017. 
AfD. 2017. “Mut zur Wahrheit.”Alternative für Deutschland. www.
alternativefuer.de/program-hintergrund/mut-zur-wahrheit Accessed 03 
November 2017. 
BBC. 2016. “‘Nazi word’ revived by German AfD chief.” British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 12 September. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-37337927 Accessed 03 November 2017.
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2017. “Alternative für Deutschland.” 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 06 May. http://www.bpb.de/politik/
grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/211108/afd Accessed 03 November 
2017.
159 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
Chiozza, G. 2002. “Is there a clash of civilizations? Evidence from patterns of 
international conflict involvement, 1946–97.” Journal of peace research 39(6): 
711–734.
Die Linke. 2017. “Stoppt die AfD! Linke Antworten auf die Gefahr von rechts.” 
Accessed 03 November 2017. http://www.dielinke-nrw.de/fileadmin/
kundendaten/www.dielinke-nrw.de/pdf/Dowloadbereich/AfD-Broschuere_
A6_170410b.pdf
evangelisch. 2016. “Empörung über die AfD.”evangelisch, 02 May. https://
www.evangelisch.de/inhalte/134173/02-05-2016/empoerung-ueber-die-afd 
Accessed 03 November 2017.
Handelsblatt. 2016. “Der Islam gehört nicht zu Deutschland.” Handelsblatt, 23 
May. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/afd-und-islam-der-islam-
gehoert-nicht-zu-deutschland-/13628828.html Accessed 03 November 2017. 
Henderson, E. A. and R. Tucker. 2001.“Clear and present strangers: The 
clash of civilizations and international conflict.” International Studies 
Quarterly 45(2): 317–338.
Huntington, S. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?.” Foreign Affairs 72(3): 
22–49. 
Ipsos. 2016. “The Perils of Perception.” Ipsos. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/
default/files/2016-12/Perils-of-perception-2016.pdf Accessed 03 November 
2017. 
Katzenstein, P. 2009. Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist 
Perspectives. Routledge. 
Leif, T. 2017. “AfD-Vize wil Islam Grundrecht entziehen.” Tagesschau, April 
20. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/glaser-afd-islam-religionsfreiheit-101.
html
Niedermayer, O. 2013. “Eine neue Konkurrentin im Parteiensystem? Die 
Alternative für Deutschland.” In Die Parteien nach der Bundestagswahl, 
edited by O. Niedermayer, 175–207. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden.
160An Alternative for Germany?
Patriotische Plattform. 2014. “Stellungnahme der Patriotischen Plattform: AfD 
muß sich gegen Islamisierung des Abendlandes aussprechen!” Patriotische 
Plattform, 09 December. http://patriotische-plattform.de/blog/2014/12/09/
stellungnahme-der-patriotischen-plattform-afd-muss-sich-gegen-
islamisierung-des-abendlandes-aussprechen/ Accessed 03 November 2017. 
Russett, B. M., J. R. O’neal and M. Cox. 2000. “Clash of civilizations, or 
realism and liberalism déjà vu? Some evidence.” Journal of Peace 
Research 37(5): 583-608.
Said, E. 2001. “The clash of ignorance.” The Nation 22.
Stichs, A. 2016. Wie viele Muslime leben in Deutschland? Eine Hochrechnung 
über die Anzahl der Muslime in Deutschland zum Stand 31. Dezember 2015 
Im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz (Nuremberg: Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees).
SPD. 2017. “Faktencheck: Was ist dran an der Islamkritik der AfD?.” SPD. 
https://www.spd.de/standpunkte/fuer-unser-land-menschlich-und-weltoffen/
faktencheck-was-ist-dran-an-der-islamkritik-der-afd/ Accessed 03 November 
2017. 
Tagesschau. 2017. “Afd-Vize fordert Einreisestopp für Muslime.” Tagesschau, 
04 March. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gauland-einreiseverbot-101.html 
Accessed 03 November 2017.
Taub, A. and M. Fisher. 2017. “Germany’s Extreme Right Challenges Guilt 
over Nazi Past.” The New York Times, 17 January. https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/01/18/world/europe/germany-afd-alternative-bjorn-hocke.html 
Accessed 03 November 2017. 
161 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 25 Years On
Note on Indexing
E-IR’s publications do not feature indexes. If you are reading this book in 
paperback and want to find a particular word or phrase you can do so by 
downloading a free PDF version of this book from the E-IR website. 
View the e-book in any standard PDF reader such as Adobe Acrobat Reader 
(pc) or Preview (mac) and enter your search terms in the search box. You can 
then navigate through the search results and find what you are looking for. In 
practice, this method can prove much more targeted and effective than 
consulting an index. 
If you are using apps (or devices) to read our e-books, you should also find 
word search functionality in those.
You can find all of our e-books at: http://www.e-ir.info/publications
E-IR Edited Collections 
Series Editors: Stephen McGlinchey, Marianna Karakoulaki and  
Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska
___________________________________________________________
The purpose of this collection is to present Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ thesis, and to appraise its validity and shortcomings 25 years after the 
publication of his landmark article. 
The notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ is examined from a multidisciplinary 
perspective. First, the volume examines Huntington’s contribution from a theoretical 
perspective, focusing on his ideas about politics and the concept of civilization. 
Second, the individual articles also consider Huntington’s thesis in the light of recent 
events, including the conflict in Ukraine, the rise of ISIS, China–India relations, 
the electoral success of far-right movements in Europe, the refugee crisis in the 
Mediterranean and the activity of the International Criminal Court in Africa.
In sum, this book offers a vibrant and multifaceted conversation among 
established and emerging scholars on one of the most important paradigms for the 




Ravi Dutt Bajpai, Gregorio Bettiza, Glen M.E. Duerr, Ian Hall, Jeffrey Haynes, Anna 
Khakee, Jan Lüdert, Kim Richard Nossal, Fabio Petito, Erik Ringmar, Anna Tiido, 
Wouter Werner and Ana Isabel Xavier.
www.E-IR.info
